Case No: 200101165/Y3‑200007338/X1‑200100107/X1‑200006738/Z3‑200004860/Z1
Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Crim 1217
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL

Date: Wednesday 2nd May 2001
B E F O R E :

THE VICE PRESIDENT
(LORD JUSTICE ROSE)

MR JUSTICE LEVESON

and

MR JUSTICE MITTING

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R E G I N A

‑ v ‑

BERNARD WEBBE
WILLIAM ANDREW MITCHELL
ANDREW DAVIS
ROBERT JOHN MOORE
PAUL WHITE
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Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Tel No: 0171 421 4040   Fax No: 0171 831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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MR G WHELAN appeared on behalf of the Appellant WEBBE
MR J LLOYD‑JONES appeared on behalf of the Appellant MITCHELL
MR C MORGAN appeared on behalf of the Appellant DAVIS
MISS S HALES appeared on behalf of the Appellant MOORE
MR E HAYGARTH appeared on behalf of the Applicant WHITE
MR AYLETT appeared as an Amicus
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JUDGMENT

1.	THE VICE PRESIDENT: These four appeals and one renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence have been listed together to enable the Court to consider the proposal of the Sentencing Advisory Panel, in their advice to this Court in March 2001, that sentencing guidelines should be framed in relation to offences of handling dishonestly obtained goods, contrary to section 22 of the Theft Act 1968.
2.	The Court is grateful to Mr Aylett, on behalf of the Attorney‑General, as amicus, for his written and oral submissions as to whether and, if so, in what terms guidelines should be framed.
3.	The difficulty of issuing guidelines in relation to handling arises from the enormous variety of possible sentences according to the circumstances, as pointed out by Lord Lane CJ, in R v Patel (1984) 6 Cr App R(S) 191 at pages 192 to 193. The offence is triable either way and can attract a penalty within the range from a conditional discharge or modest fine at one end, to many years' imprisonment, up to the maximum of 14 provided by Parliament, at the other.
4.	The particular feature of handling which marks it out from most other offences is that it is, by definition, ancillary to another offence in a way which can conveniently be described as secondary to a primary offence. Because the primary offence may be, for example, shoplifting or armed robbery, the degree of gravity of the secondary offence can vary accordingly.
5.	This lead Mr Aylett, in his written submissions, to invite us to consider whether guidelines in relation to handling are practicable or desirable, when the disparate character of handling offences is compared to the much more limited kinds of conduct involved in some cases in which, hitherto, the court has issued guidelines. For example, causing death by dangerous driving, (R v Boswell 79 Cr App R 277), rape (R v Billam 82 Cr App R 347), white collar dishonesty (R v Barrick 81 Cr App R 78 and Clark [1998] 2 Cr App R 137), the carrying and use of knives (Attorney‑General's Reference 38 of 1996 [1997] 2 Cr App R(S) 10) and incest
6.	(Attorney‑General Reference No 1 of 1989 11 Cr App R(S) 409) are all offences where the criminal conduct does not generally embrace a wide range of activity.
7.	On the other hand, guidelines have been framed in relation to firearms offences (R v Avis [1998] 1 Cr App R(S) 420), burglary (R v Brewster [1998] 1 Cr App R(S) 181), smuggling (R v Dosanjh [1999] 1 Cr App R(S) 107) and health and safety offences(R v Howe & Sons [1999] 2 All ER 249), all of which may be committed in widely differing circumstances.
8.	We have therefore concluded that, although there is, as it seems to us, no clear evidence of inconsistency in the Court's current sentencing practice, it will be helpful in promoting consistency to adopt the Sentencing Advisory Panel's proposal that guidelines should be given. We stress, however, as this Court has stressed in earlier cases, that what we suggest is not to be regarded as mandatory, but is by way of guidance only.
9.	There are a number of authorities to which reference can conveniently be made, which show the range of sentences which may be appropriate in relation to handling. In R v Wilson (1982) Cr App R(S) 196, a sentence of 12 months was reduced to 2 months, in relation to a man of 40 of good character who, operating a caravan site, pleaded guilty to handling two stolen caravans worth about £4,500, which he had bought for his own use.
10.	In R v Battams (1979) 1 Cr App R(S) 15, the Court of Appeal indicated that a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate for a receiver of stolen goods, obviously known in the locality as a person willing to assist in the disposal of such goods, however modest the sums of money involved. In that case, a sentence of 18 months was reduced to 12 months, to take account of the appellant's physical disability.
11.	In R v Khemlani (1981) 3 Cr App R(S) 208, a man of good character, who pleaded guilty to handling 350 stolen watches, was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment. But the Court of Appeal took the view that the matter could be far better met by imposing a fine and making a compensation order in favour of the owners of the goods.
12.	In R v Hutchings 15 Cr App R(S) 498, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between those convicted of committing an armed robbery of a post office van and those convicted of assisting in the disposal of the proceeds of the robbery, and, the robbers having been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, the handlers were sentenced initially to 10 years, reduced on appeal to 7 years.
13.	In R v Bloomfield (1995) 16 Cr App R(S) 221, the Court of Appeal noted that the appropriate sentencing bracket for a receiver, who dealt regularly with thieves and burglars providing a regular outlet, was between 2 and 4 years' imprisonment, although, in that particular case, which was a one‑off offence, a significantly lower sentence was imposed, namely 15 months for receiving three stolen caravans, for which he, a caravan dealer, had paid £9,000.
14.	In Attorney‑General's Reference No 70 of 1999 [2000] 2 Cr App R(S) 28, sentences totalling 12 months' imprisonment were increased to 30 months in relation to an offender convicted of conspiracy to handle and steal computers, which he sold through his business. In the course of the judgment of the Court, reference was made, at page 30, to a number of authorities, to at least one of which we have already referred.
15.	In that context, we turn to the advice of the sentencing panel with which, as will emerge, we largely although not entirely agree. Paragraph 11 of that advice, with which we agree, is in these terms:
“The relative seriousness of a particular case of handling depends upon the interplay of a different factors. One important issue is whether the handler has had advance knowledge of the original offence; or has directly or indirectly made known his willingness to receive the proceeds of the original offence, as compared with a handler who has had no connection with the original offence but who has dishonestly accepted the stolen goods at an undervalue. Where the handler has had knowledge of the original offence, the seriousness of the handling is inevitably linked to the seriousness of that original offence. The link to the original offence explains the need for the high maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment for handling, which might otherwise look anomalous. Sentences approaching the maximum should clearly be reserved for the most serious and unusual cases where the handler had previous knowledge of a very serious offence such as an armed robbery, which itself carries life imprisonment as its maximum.” 
16.	Paragraph 12, with the terms of which we also agree, and says as follows:
“The replacement value of the goods involved is often a helpful indication of the seriousness of the offence. (In this context the Mode of Trial guidelines suggest that cases of handling should normally be dealt with in the magistrates' court, and hence attract a maximum sentence of six months' imprisonment, if the value of the property is under £10,000.) We do not, however, believe that monetary value in itself should be regarded as the determining factor.” 
17.	We interpose the comment that it is important for sentencers to bear in mind that value would not be regarded as prescriptive. There is an obvious difference, for example, between the gravity of receiving in a public house £100 worth of stolen television sets, and the gravity of receiving £100 in cash from the proceeds of a robbery which has taken place in the receiver's presence. Furthermore, accurate values in relation to the property received may very often be extremely difficult to ascertain.
18.	The panel, in paragraph 12 of their advice, go on to identify other factors significantly affecting the relative seriousness of the handling offence, namely the level of sophistication of the handler, the ultimate designation of the goods, the criminal origin of the goods, the impact on the victim, the level of profit made or expected by the handler, and, especially in cases of actual or intended disposal of goods, the precise role played by the handler. In our judgment, those factors are rightly identified.
19.	We also agree, in relation to paragraph 13 of the panel's advice, that handling cases at or towards the lower end of the scale are characterised by the handler having no connection with the original offence, an absence of sophistication on the part of the handler, the less serious nature of the original offence, the relatively low value of the goods and the absence of any significant profit.
20.	The sentencing panel, in paragraph 14, go on to identify nine factors, which may be regarded as aggravating the offence. With each of those factors we agree. They are as follows:
1. The closeness of the handler to the primary offence. (We add that closeness may be geographical, arising from presence at or near the primary offence when it was committed, or temporal, where the handler instigated or encouraged the primary offence beforehand, or, soon after, provided a safe haven or route for disposal).
2. Particular seriousness in the primary offence.
3. High value of the goods to the loser, including sentimental value.
4. The fact that the goods were the proceeds of a domestic burglary.
5. Sophistication in relation to the handling.
6. A high level of profit made or expected by the handler.
7. The provision by the handler of a regular outlet for stolen goods.
8. Threats of violence or abuse of power by the handler over others, for example, an adult commissioning criminal activity by children, or a drug dealer pressurizing addicts to steal in order to pay for their habit.
9. As is statutorily provided by section 151(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the commission of an offence while on bail.
21.	We also agree with the mitigating factors identified as being among those relevant by the sentencing panel: namely, low monetary value of the goods, the fact that the offence was a one‑off offence, committed by an otherwise honest defendant, the fact that there is little or no benefit to the defendant, and the fact of voluntary restitution to the victim.
22.	We also agree with the panel that other factors to be taken into account include personal mitigation, ready co‑operation with the police, previous convictions, especially for offences of dishonesty and, as statutorily provided by section 152 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, a timely plea of guilty.
23.	The panel, in paragraph 21 of their advice, helpfully identify four possible levels of seriousness of the offence. They suggest that a distinction can be drawn between offences first, for which a fine or a discharge is appropriate; second, for which a community sentence is appropriate; third, for those which cross the custody threshold and, fourth, more serious offences.
24.	We agree that offences do fall into those four categories. We do not, however, take the view that it is always possible to draw a distinction between the first two categories of offence with quite the clarity which the panel suggest.
25.	In our judgment, the panel are right to say that, where the property handled is of low monetary value and was acquired for the receiver's own use, the starting point should generally be a moderate fine or, in some cases (particularly, of course, if a fine cannot be paid by a particular defendant) a discharge. Such an outcome would, in our judgment be appropriate in relation to someone of previous good character handling low value domestic goods for his own use. By low value we mean less than four figures.
26.	We agree that, irrespective of value, the presence of any one of the aggravating features to which we have referred is likely to result in a community sentence rather than a fine or discharge. We agree that a community sentence may be appropriate where property worth less than four figures is acquired for resale, or where more valuable goods are acquired for the handler's own use. Such a sentence may well be appropriate in relation to a young offender with little criminal experience, playing a peripheral role. But adult defendants with a record of dishonesty are likely to attract a custodial sentence.
27.	Thus far, as we have indicated, we agree with the factors which the panel identifies in relation to the sentencing process for less serious offences. But we do not believe that a clear dividing line is capable of being drawn between those offences which, appropriately attract, on the one hand, a discharge or fine and, on the other, a community sentence.
28.	So far as the custody threshold is concerned, we agree that a defendant either with a record of offences of dishonesty, or who engages in sophisticated law breaking, will attract a custodial sentence. It is in relation to the length of that sentence that the aggravating and mitigating features which we have earlier identified will come into play, as will the personal mitigation of the offender, who may appropriately, in accordance with Ollerenshaw [1991] 1 Cr App R(S) 65, be dealt with by a somewhat shorter sentence than might, at first blush, otherwise have seemed appropriate.
29.	We also agree with the panel that, in relation to more serious offences, there will be some for which a sentence within the range of 12 months to 4 years will be appropriate and there will be others for which a sentence of considerably more than 4 years, up to the maximum, may be appropriate. In this regard, the factors to be taken into consideration will include whether an offence is committed in the context of a business, whether the offender is acting as an organiser or distributor of the proceeds of crime and whether the offender has made himself available to other criminals as willing to handle the proceeds of thefts or burglaries.
30.	In all of these more serious cases, according to the other circumstances, sentences in the range of 12 months to 4 years are likely to be appropriate if the value of the goods involved is up to around £100,000. Where the value of the goods is in excess of £100,000, or where the offence is highly organised and bears the hallmarks of a professional commercial operation, a sentence of 4 years and upwards is likely to be appropriate, and it will be the higher where the source of the handled property is known by the handler to be a serious violent offence such as armed robbery. As we have earlier indicated, sentences significantly higher than 4 years also may be appropriate where a professional handler, over a substantial period of time, demonstrated by his record or otherwise, has promoted and encouraged, albeit indirectly, criminal activity by others.
31.	The sentences which we have indicated will, of course, be subject to discount in appropriate cases for a plea of guilty.
32.	We should also add that a court passing sentence in handling cases should always have in mind the power to make restitution orders under sections 148 and 149 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, to make compensation orders under section 130 of the Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000, and to make confiscation orders in relation to profits, under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995. A Magistrates' Court cannot, of course, make a confiscation order in a case of handling. But it is open to magistrates, in such a case, where appropriate, to commit to the Crown Court for sentence.
33.	It is implicit, in what we have said, that this Court is greatly indebted to the Sentencing Advisory Panel for the advice which they have tendered.
34.	In the context of those observations, we turn to the particular cases before this Court.
35.	Bernard Webbe, who is 33, pleaded guilty at Manchester Crown Court on 11th December 2000 to an offence of attempting to handle and an offence of handling stolen watches. He was sentenced on 8th January 2001 by His Honour Judge Owen to 15 months' imprisonment concurrently on each count. He appeals against sentence by leave of the Single Judge.
36.	The offences came to light on 17th August 2000 when, in the course of a search being made at an address in Stretford, by police officers in relation to drugs offences, the officers asked to search the appellant's car. In the boot there were three watches and £250 in cash. The appellant said they were Christmas presents which he had bought the day before through his company. One of the watches was an 18 carat gold watch with a retail value of £7,700. It had, on its journey from Switzerland to a Malaysian agent in Singapore in 1996, gone missing. That was the subject of count 1. Count 2 related to two other link chronographs, each with a retail value of £1,150 which had been stolen in transit to a shop in Northern Ireland. That gave rise to count 2. In interview the appellant made no comment. But later, he said that he had paid £200 for the watches, to a man he had met in the street.
37.	The appellant is of previous good character, and there was before the sentencing judge, as there is before this Court, a pre‑sentence report which indicated the appellant's regret and that he was not a man who had criminal attitudes or a general disrespect for the law. He seemed to be genuinely ashamed and the risk of reoffending was minimal.
38.	On his behalf, Mr Whelan submits that the sentence passed failed to take proper account of the plea of guilty, the good character of the appellant, the fact that he was unaware of the true value of the watches, and the absence of any professional hallmarks in this offence.
39.	It is apparent that the total retail value of these goods was only slightly in excess of £10,000. It is also apparent that the appellant was not forthcoming in interview and could have provided the police with more help than he did as to the source and circumstances of his acquisitions. That being so, it seems to us that the custody threshold was passed, though the case could, in our judgment, properly have been dealt with, in all the circumstances, in the Magistrates' Court.
40.	Taking into account the appellant's good character, the fact that the goods were apparently for the appellant's own use, the plea of guilty and the observations made in Ollerenshaw, we take the view that a sentence of 15 months, was manifestly excessive. We quash it. The appeal is allowed to the extent that, in substitution for that sentence, we impose a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment concurrently on each count.
41.	William Andrew Mitchell and Andrew Simon Davis, pleaded guilty at Peterborough Crown Court on 30th October 2000 to an offence of handling stolen goods which had been added by amendment to the indictment on the date fixed for trial. They were both sentenced by His Honour Judge Mayor QC on 4th December 2000, to 18 months' detention in a young offender institution. They appeal against sentence by leave of the Single Judge. There were two co‑accused. The appellant Mitchell's brother, Brett, was tried and convicted of robbery, and sentenced to 3 years' detention in a young offender institution. His application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused by the Single Judge and not renewed. Another young man called Aaron Speechley, pleaded guilty to one count of handling stolen goods and was sentenced to an 18 month's detention and training order. A fifth man called Graham had been apparently involved in these events, but, absent identification of him by the victim, there were no proceedings against him.
42.	The circumstances were that, on the afternoon of 21st June 1999, a Mrs Smith was walking through the precincts of Peterborough Cathedral. She was of slight build. She walked past the appellants and the co‑accused and, shortly afterwards, heard footsteps behind her. Brett Mitchell seized her handbag. There was a short struggle. She screamed. Brett Mitchell punched her once in the face. The appellants and the other co‑accused were standing only a short distance away. Brett Mitchell ran off with the handbag, which contained credit cards, bank cards a bunch of keys and £6 in cash. The appellants and the others ran off with Brett Mitchell. The woman sustained a bruise to her cheek and grazes to the right side of her chin.
43.	The following day the two Mitchell brothers contacted the police. Brett Mitchell said that they had seen the woman near the cathedral and he had said they should rob her. He said a friend with a knife and others whom he did not know had robbed the woman. He and the appellant, William Mitchell, were arrested. William Mitchell, in interview, said he and others had been drinking and there was talk about being short of money. His brother mentioned robbing someone but he, William, said nothing. A man called Graham produced a knife to rob the woman. William Mitchell admitted holding some of the items as the young men went through the victim's handbag. But he said he handed them back. He left the scene with the others but he was not one of those who went to a cash point where an attempt was made, unsuccessfully, to obtain money.
44.	The appellant, Davies, was arrested on 25th June. He, in interview, also referred to the activities of Graham. He said they had searched the bag and shared the contents and he had had £5 from the robbery. He accepted that there had been a conversation beforehand about committing a robbery, and he spoke of them going to the cash point.
45.	The learned judge, in passing sentence, rightly referred to the gravity of robbery in the street, by the use of violence. He referred to the presence of the appellants at that offence. He said that full credit would be given for the guilty pleas and the admissions made to the police. Nonetheless, this was not handling at some remove from the offence. Far from aiding the victim, they had gone off to see what profit could be made.
46.	Mitchell was born on 10th July 1981. He was not quite 18 at the time of the offences, and he was 19 when sentenced. His only previous appearance before the courts was in 1996, for a serious sexual offence, in relation to which he was sentenced to 3 years' detention in a young offender institution. He has no previous convictions for dishonesty.
47.	Davies was born on 19th October 1982. He was 16 at the time of the offence and 18 when he was sentenced. He has made a number of appearances before the courts both before and since this offence.
48.	His most recent appearance before the offence was, a month before it took place, in May 1999 when a 6 month supervision order was made. He has made appearances for dishonesty, in the nature of stealing a pedal cycle on one occasion and shoplifting on another, before and after the commission of this offence.
49.	There was a pre‑sentence report on Mitchell before the judge, saying that he had not re‑offended since this offence, which seemed to be a one‑off and there seemed to be a low risk of reoffending. There is a very favourable prison report upon Mitchell speaking of his patient, relaxed and controlled behaviour, in particular in his capacity as an orderly. A pre‑sentence report on Davies referred to the 10 hours or so which were, by the time he came to be sentenced, outstanding, in relation to a community service order which had previously been made; it also referred to the other appearances before the courts before and after this offence. However, the pre‑sentence report pointed out that no offence had been actually committed during the year 2000 by this appellant. There is a prison report which refers to him as being initially quiet and withdrawn and having, at one stage, been bullied but as trying hard although his behaviour is sometimes erratic and immature. There is a further report upon him, dated 17th April, indicating an increasing maturity on his part.
50.	On behalf of Mitchell, Mr Lloyd Jones stresses that this appellant was to be dealt with solely for the offence of handling to which he had pleaded guilty. Robbery had not been his idea. He had played no part in it. He had not held himself out as a willing handler before the robbery. He played no active part in it and his presence had not supported the robber. As to the last of those propositions we entertain very considerable doubt, bearing in mind that he is over 6 feet tall and was standing nearby.
51.	Mr Lloyd‑Jones emphasises the way in which Mitchell, in the circumstances we have described, went to the police and identified the other participant in the offence of robbery. Mr Lloyd‑Jones stresses the absence from Mitchell's record of any other sign of dishonesty, and he submits that Mitchell's participation, amounting as it did to no more than briefly handling the contents of the victim's handbag, without any benefit accruing to him, was of a minimal nature.
52.	On behalf of Davies, Mr Morgan accepts that the sentencing exercise which faced the learned judge was difficult, in the light of his other court appearances but in the absence of any misconduct throughout 2000. He had obtained a place on a mechanics course and, young as he was at the relevant time and still is, it may be that he has turned the corner away from criminal activities.
53.	This Court takes the view that it would not be proper to differentiate between the sentences appropriate for Mitchell and Davies. Factors in relation to each of them, which we hope we have sufficiently identified, point in different directions. Not without a degree of hesitation, we take the view that the sentence of 18 months was somewhat longer than all the circumstances of this case require. It is true that these appellants could not have been closer to the primary offence than they were. It is true that the primary offence was a grave one. As against that, the benefit to either of them was small in the case of Davies and nonexistent in the case of Mitchell, and the actual value of the goods taken, (albeit of course credit cards and keys are of use to the criminal fraternity) was comparatively modest. Taking into account in particular, the youth of these appellants, and the other factors to which we have referred, we quash the sentence of 18 months and substitute for it, in relation to each of them, a sentence of 12 months' detention in a young offender institution. This will lead to their release in the not too distant future. To that extent their appeals are allowed.
54.	Robert John Moore pleaded guilty at Northampton Crown Court on 19th September 2000 to two offences of handling stolen property. He asked for 47 other offences, predominantly of burglary and theft, to be taken into consideration. He was sentenced by His Honour Judge Allen, sitting with justices, to 4 years' imprisonment concurrently on each count.
55.	The total value of the goods in the indictment was somewhat less than £2,000. On the other hand, the value of the property involved in the other offences, almost none of which was recovered, was some £20,000.
56.	The appellant appeals by leave of the Single Judge.
57.	The facts can be very briefly stated. On the evening of 12th/13th February 2000, a dwelling‑house in Kiln Way, Wellingborough, was entered through an open window and jewellery stolen. On the same evening, another dwelling house, not far away, was entered by breaking a rear kitchen window while the occupants were in bed and a considerable number of compact discs and computer equipment was stolen.
58.	On 15th February, that is to say a day or two after the burglary in Kiln Way, the appellant visited a pawnbrokers and presented a stolen necklace and ring, for which he was paid cash. As evidence of identity, he produced a tenancy agreement in his own name.
59.	A few days later, on 21st February, the appellant handed to his girlfriend stolen rings which she took and converted into cash at the same pawnbrokers. On 22nd March the appellant went to another pawnbrokers to sell compact discs and he was arrested by police officers. His home was searched and a number of stolen items were seized. It emerged that the appellant and his girlfriend had tried to sell computer parts at other shops in Wellingborough. At about the same time, the victims of the Kiln Way burglary saw some of the stolen property in the window of the pawnshop.
60.	The appellant was interviewed on three occasions. On the first, he claimed that the CDs were his own and the jewellery belonged to his girlfriend. He denied involvement in the Kiln Way burglary and was unable to explain the other stolen items at his premises. On the second occasion, some six weeks later, he refused to be any more forthcoming but, on 28th April, he effectively admitted having carried out the burglary at Kiln Way, saying the window was open and he climbed in, went upstairs and found the jewellery.
61.	The 47 offences which he asked to have taken into consideration included some 27 of theft and some 17 or so of burglary.
62.	The learned judge, in passing sentence, said he gave credit for the plea and such frankness as the appellant had shown, but the handling of the stolen property, soon after the burglaries, and the other offences involving many dwelling‑house burglaries, called for the sentence which he imposed.
63.	The appellant is 26. He has 18 previous convictions involving 60 offences. He has been sentenced to immediate custody on seven previous occasions. His record includes many offences of dishonesty, including burglary, theft and handling.
64.	The submission which is made on his behalf, by Miss Moore, is that the weight of offences taken into consideration was very much greater than the two offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty on the indictment. The learned judge, in passing the sentence which he did, inadequately reflected the credit which needed to be given by the court for the frankness which the appellant had shown in admitting these other offences, and asking for them to be taken into consideration. She submits, rightly, that the convention of taking offences into consideration, is pragmatically based and is of benefit to the police and to a defendant. It is of benefit for the police in clearing up offences. It is of benefit to the defendant because he avoids the need to have to appear on an another occasion to be dealt with for offences which he now admits. Miss Hales does not submit that, if the appellant were being sentenced for the many offences of burglary which he had taken into consideration, 4 years would be otherwise than appropriate. But she submits that it did not adequately reflect the degree of co‑operation by the appellant, in all these circumstances of this case.
65.	In our judgment, it is not generally desirable that a very large number of offences should be taken into consideration when there are comparatively few offences in the indictment and when the offences taken into consideration are of a different kind from those in the indictment. It is a far preferable course for the indictment, so far as possible, to reflect the general level of criminality of a particular defendant.
66.	There are, of course, cases where it is entirely appropriate for there to be many similar offences to be taken into consideration, for example, in social security frauds; and many other examples can be thought of.
67.	That said, in the present case, all the offences taken into consideration were offences of dishonesty. They were not offences, in that sense, dissimilar from those in the indictment. Furthermore, the burglary offences were ones to which the same maximum sentence as for handling applies, that is 14 years.
68.	In our judgment, the learned judge fully recognised that the appellant was entitled to credit, not only for his pleas of guilty, but also for the co‑operation which he had shown in disclosing and admitting his part in the other offences which were taken into consideration. We have no hesitation in concluding that, had the learned judge been called upon to sentence the offender for 17 domestic burglaries, in the light of his record, the sentence would have been very considerably longer than 4 years' imprisonment. Despite Miss Hale's submissions, therefore, we are unpersuaded that the sentence of 4 years failed to reflect the degree of co‑operation displayed by the appellant.
69.	So far as the receiving offences themselves are concerned, it is apparent, in relation to at least one of them, that the appellant was, to put it no higher, extremely close to the commission of the primary offence. The total sentence was not excessive. In our judgment, there is no merit in this appeal and accordingly it is dismissed.
70.	Paul White, on 26th June 2000, changed his plea to guilty on three counts of handling stolen goods and pleaded guilty to a further count of handling which had been added by leave of the court.
71.	On 21st July, at Liverpool Crown Court, he was sentenced by His Honour Judge Trigger to 30 months' imprisonment, ordered concurrently on each count to which he had pleaded guilty but consecutively to the period of 3 years' imprisonment, which he was then currently serving. Verdicts of not guilty were entered under section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act, following his pleas of not guilty to offences of conspiracy to steal and conspiracy to handle.
72.	He now renews his application for leave to appeal against sentence, following refusal by the Single Judge.
73.	The facts disclosed that, the applicant had admitted handling some £210,000 worth of goods. He did so in these circumstances. He leased a warehouse in Liverpool, which was searched by the police, on 9th August 1999. There were found pallets of cigarettes, wine, whiskey, gin and vermouth, which had belonged to one of two trailer loads, stolen from a haulage company in Manchester two days before. The goods recovered were worth £72,000. There were also recovered two parked trailers, which, with their loads, had been stolen in the early hours of that very day from South Wales. One trailer contained 130 assorted television sets, the other 540 boxed television stands. The trailers were worth about £12,000 each. The goods still on them were worth £84,000.
74.	Nearby there were two other trailers loaded with electrical items, cookers, tumble dryers and spin dryers. The trailer had been stolen a day or so before, between 7th and 8th August, from two firms in Stoke on Trent. Of 122 items stolen, 113 were recovered from the trailers. The stolen load was valued at about £20,000. A stolen trailer was later recovered not far away. There was another trailer, containing a palette of car tyres. That came from a consignment of tyres stolen on 2nd August 1999, while they were being moved from Burton on Trent to Tilbury Docks. 780 tyres had been stolen. Forty were recovered by the police; £37,000 worth of tyres were missing. The container was worth between £5,000 and £6,000.
75.	There were other co‑accused, the brothers Grego, who were sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment, having each pleaded guilty to one count of theft, and two others who were acquitted.
76.	The learned judge, in passing sentence, referred to the total value of the items as being over £100,000 and items such as television sets being readily disposable. He gave credit for the plea of guilty, but he drew attention to the fact that, at the time, the applicant had been on bail for a remarkably similar offence. That was an aggravating feature. The judge pointed out that the applicant must have been aware of others higher up in the organisation but that was not information which he had shared with the police. The judge concluded that the applicant had run a dishonest business yard, making it available to others for the disposal of dishonest goods. Without people like him, the business of thieves would be more difficult.
77.	The applicant is 36 years of age. He has, on nine previous occasions, appeared before the courts for a variety of offences, predominantly involving motor vehicles. There is a prison report before the court, which speaks of the applicant's good behaviour, privileged position, and willingness to help inmates and staff.
78.	The submission made by Mr Haygarth is that albeit a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate and albeit a sentence of imprisonment which would convert the existing 3 years to a long‑term sentence was inevitable, the sentence of two‑and‑a‑half years imposed by the learned judge was arguably excessive, and should be interfered with by this Court. That submission we are unable to accept.
79.	This, as it seems to us, was large scale professional receiving by a man with an unpromising criminal record. Goods reached him remarkably quickly after they had been stolen. The offences were committed while he was on bail for other serious offences. In our judgment, the sentence passed upon him, albeit ordered to run consecutively to the sentence he was serving was a modest sentence. It cannot, in our judgment, be categorised as, even arguably, manifestly excessive. Accordingly this application is refused.