No: 200501686/A7 
Neutral Citation Number: [2005] EWCA Crim 2491
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2 

Thursday, 6th October 2005
 
B E F O R E:
 
THE VICE PRESIDENT 
(LORD JUSTICE ROSE)

MR JUSTICE GOLDRING 
 
MR JUSTICE WILKIE 

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R E G I N A 

-v- 

SARAH GEORGINA GISBORNE
 
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MR T GREENE appeared on behalf of the APPELLANT
MISS A RAFFERTY appeared on behalf of the CROWN
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J U D G M E N T
1.	THE VICE PRESIDENT:  On 4th February 2005 at Peterborough Crown Court, this appellant pleaded guilty and on 25th February was sentenced by His Honour Judge Coleman in respect of an offence of conspiracy to damage property.  The sentence was one of six-and-a-half years' imprisonment. An anti-social behaviour order for 2 years was made to take effect on the appellant's release from prison and she was disqualified from driving for 3 years.  The terms of the anti-social behaviour order, which had effectively been agreed by the defence, who did not seek to suggest that an ASBO should not be made, were that the defendant was prohibited from: 
"1. Going within 500 metres of any of the premises named in Schedule 1 of this document (save when travelling through the relevant county to a location outside the relevant county by motorised vehicle or public transport) or sending or attempting to send any article or transmission into any of the said premises, or 
2. Knowingly or intentionally contacting, directly or indirectly, the owners, shareholders, employees or agents or members of the family of owners, shareholders, employees or agents of Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd, Yamanouchi UK Ltd or any of the subsidiary companies of any of the said companies, or 
3. Knowingly or intentionally contacting, directly or indirectly, any other company or organisation which conducts business, in any way whatsoever, with the said Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd, the said Yamanouchi UK Ltd or any of the said subsidiary companies where the nature of the contact is intended to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person."
2.	She appeals against sentence by leave of the Single Judge.
3.	The facts were these.  The appellant was a prominent animal rights activist with connections with organisations which target employees and associates of Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd (to whom we shall refer as HLS), which engaged in experimentation on animals.  The tactics used included a wide spectrum of activities, some lawful, some unlawful.  The appellant had a number of previous convictions to which in due course we shall come, mostly related to her involvement with the animal rights movement's campaign against HLS and similar companies.
4.	On 14th July 2004 she hired, in her own name, a Ford Focus motorcar from a car hire company.  Over the next two nights, she went to the houses of five individuals, in different parts of the country, and caused considerable damage to eight motorcars.  Paint stripper was used on all of them. Some had their tyres punctured, and some had expanding foam placed in their exhaust pipes. In several cases slogans were sprayed on the cars and in one case a slogan was sprayed on a house and its front doorstep.  The slogans included "scum", "out of HLS", "puppy killers" and "dead man".
5.	The three attacks which occurred on the night of the 14th/15th July were at addresses in Hampshire and Surrey where the appellant lived.  The fourth and fifth attacks, the following night, were on premises in Cambridgeshire.  All the premises were occupied by people in some way indirectly involved in animal experimentation.  Two of the addresses attacked on the first night were occupied by people employed by a company connected to HLS called Yamanouchi UK Ltd, one of them being a retired grandmother who had been working part-time as a telephonist at Yamanouchi.  The third was the home of someone connected to a freight company which had been involved in the importation of primates into this country.
6.	In the Cambridgeshire attacks, one was at the home of a person who had given evidence at a planning enquiry concerning a proposed primate testing laboratory at the university and the other was at the home of two people employed by HLS.  Their family included children aged 5 and 7.  That family had been the victims of violence and harassment over a period of some four-and-a-half years.  That had included unwanted mail, hoax bombs and a demonstration on their son's first birthday.  In consequence, they had installed a number of CCTV cameras at their home which recorded two masked women throwing paint stripper and also recorded the registration number of the hire car which they used:  it was those recordings which led to this appellant.  The police ascertained that the car, had been hired by the appellant in her own name and they were waiting for the appellant when she returned the car to the hire company on 15th July.  She was then arrested.
7.	In her bag there were clothes containing traces of paint, a substance which may have been paint stripper and an expanding foam similar to that inserted in the exhaust pipes.  There was also an awl which could have been used for puncturing tyres and there were traces of expanding foam found in the car.  There was a similar bag of clothing at the appellant's home.  The total value of the damage caused to the vehicles and otherwise was just under £40,000.
8.	The victims of these attacks made victim impact statements.  One of the women victims described being overwhelmed by a feeling of having been invaded.  She felt violated and completely unable to live a free life.  The attacks on the cars had taken place close to where she was sleeping.
9.	The lady to whom earlier we referred, who was a part-time switch board operator, did not return to work again after she had been subjected to abuse on the telephone.  She wanted to sell her house because of the intrusion which she felt had occurred and her daughter was so concerned about future attacks that she was reluctant to allow her grandchildren to stay.  She was effectively denied the opportunity of carrying on with the part-time job which she enjoyed.  One of the victims had received a threatening letter from animal rights activists on the very evening that her car was attacked.  
10.	When she was interviewed, the appellant declined to comment.
11.	In passing sentence, the learned judge accepted that, by the plea of guilty, the appellant had saved court time.  But he commented that she had had little alternative given the evidence against her and was therefore only entitled to some credit in respect of her plea of guilty.  It is common ground before us that the learned judge's attention was not drawn to the recently issued guidelines by the Sentencing Guidelines Council.  The judge went onto describe this conduct as a well thought out exercise.  The appellant plainly had knowledge of those she had targeted and had caused substantial damage.  He also referred to the effect of the conduct on the victims and to the appellant's significant record of previous offending. His view was that a deterrent sentence had to be imposed.
12.	The appellant was born in July 1965.  Since the year 2000 she had previously before the courts, on some eight occasions, for offences including using disorderly and threatening behaviour, (twice) and assaulting the police (twice).  In June 2002 she was sentenced to 12 months for burglary of business premises in Welwyn Garden City and theft of documents and, in December 2002, she was sentenced to 12 months for violent disorder in North Yorkshire.  The victim of her attentions on that occasion was a 72 year old whose windows were broken and home damaged with paint and otherwise, for no better reason than that his brother was a Director of HLS who, at the time, was giving evidence in a Crown Court elsewhere against organisers of the Stop Huntingdon Campaign.
13.	On behalf of the appellant Mr Greene advances criticisms of all three aspects of the sentence passed by the learned judge.  First, he says, in relation to the six-and-a-half year term of imprisonment, that indicates either that the judge started at too high a point, bearing in mind that the maximum sentence for this offence is 10 years, or he failed to give full credit for the plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity, or both.  Mr Greene submitted that the planning of these activities was not sophisticated and, in support of that proposition, he stresses the hiring of the vehicle in the appellant's own name.
14.	As to the anti-social behaviour order, Mr Greene does not suggest that it was inappropriate for such an order to be made in the terms which it was, and he accepts that his criticism of the order is of lesser impact if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced.  He makes the same observation in relation to the disqualification from driving.  He points out that a 3 year term will not effectively disqualify the appellant from driving, because, during that period, certainly in the light of the sentence passed by the learned judge, the appellant will be in prison throughout.  On the other hand, it is to be observed that, if a disqualification from driving is part of the appellant's record and appears upon her driving licence, that may well have, or be capable of having, an effect upon her ability to hire cars in the future.
15.	In this country, everyone can freely hold any personal opinion or belief, however unusual, on any subject.  But no one can, with impunity, seek to impose on others his or her opinions or beliefs by intimidation or by violence or threats of violence to persons or property.  All those who by such conduct disrupt the ability of others lawfully to live their lives challenge the essentially peaceful fabric of our society and must expect to be severely punished.  
16.	In this case, the appellant's beliefs are of no consequence.  What is of consequence is the misery which, with premeditation and planning, she chose deliberately and repeatedly to inflict on several victims, all of whom were law-abiding and some of whom were particularly vulnerable.  As a result, substantial damage has been done, not just in monetary terms but also and, more importantly, to the well-being and sense of security of many individuals.  Furthermore, as her record shows, this is by no means the first occasion on which this appellant has chosen to behave in this kind of way.  If she or others continue to campaign by these means, they can expect the courts to respond within increasingly condign punishment.
17.	The only substantial question on this appeal, in relation to the six-and-a-half year term of imprisonment, is whether the sentencing judge gave sufficient discount for the appellant's plea of guilty.  We have concluded that he did not.  The case against the appellant was utterly overwhelming as the judge recognised.  But, in the light of paragraph 5.2 of the Guideline issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in December 2004, the strength of the prosecution case should not, in itself, be regarded as a reason for reducing the discount otherwise appropriate for a prompt plea of guilty.  As this appellant pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity, she was entitled to a discount of one-third from the sentence which would have been appropriate following a trial.
18.	In the light of those considerations, while endorsing the judge's view that a deterrent sentence in this case was entirely appropriate, we quash the sentence of six-and-a-half years' imprisonment and, in substitution for it, there will be a sentence of five-and-a-half years' imprisonment.  So far as the anti-social behaviour order is concerned, we see no reason why that order should not have been made and it was properly made in appropriate terms.  So far as the disqualification from driving is concerned, in our judgment such a penalty may be a useful tool in cases of this kind for the reason which we have already indicated. The term of that disqualification is not, in all the circumstances, susceptible to effective challenge. The appeal is however allowed to the extent which we have already indicated.