Neutral Citation Number: [2011] EWCA Crim 1322
Case No: 201101093 A2 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL

Date: Friday, 6th May 2011

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS 

MRS JUSTICE RAFFERTY DBE 
 
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PAGET QC
(SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
R E G I N A 

v 

JOANNE MARGARET SMITH
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company 
165 Fleet Street  London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mr P Hill appeared on behalf of the Appellant 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T 

1.	MRS JUSTICE RAFFERTY:  On 31st January 2011, in the Crown Court sitting at Canterbury, this 32 year old appellant was convicted of unlawful wounding and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment with consequential orders.  By leave of the Single Judge, she appeals against the length of her sentence.
2.	She spent the evening of 29th July 2010 and the early hours of the following morning drinking with friends.  In the small hours she arrived back in Dover, where lived with her partner, Mr Johnson.  She put on some music at an unacceptable and offensive volume.  He became anxious.  The two argued.  Matters became physical and he went to the kitchen to fetch his shoes, having decided to leave the house.
3.	As so to do he came into the hall, he found the appellant there, knife in hand.  He put up his own hand to defend himself and she stabbed him in the chest.  He pulled out the knife and fell to the floor.
4.	She called the emergency services.  She shouted for help.  Neighbours attended and, when they came, they found her tending to his wound so that, when the emergency services later took him to hospital, the chances for him were improved by her promptness.  He had endured a two and a half inch wound to his chest which had punctured a valve in his heart, and various other minor injuries.  He made a full recovery.  
5.	Arrested, she had minor bruising either side of her neck and a bump on her head.  It tended to support the account she was to give in interview that, after the argument about the volume, Johnson had grabbed her by the throat.  He then left the room.  She had decided she wanted him out of the premises and had grabbed a knife from the kitchen but only so as to scare him into leaving.  She had gone into the hall and, as he had come toward her, he grabbed her arm and her next recollection was of him lying slumped on the floor, blood coming from his chest.  She did not know how he sustained his injuries.  She was candid: there had been previous violent incidents between the two, always fuelled by alcohol ingested by both.
6.	Born on 11th June 1978, she had been of previous good character.  She provided full character references, one of which at least referred to what a good mother she was and the potential effect of her separation from her son.
7.	The judge pointed out that the wound she caused was millimetres away from proving fatal.  Only prompt action by the paramedics and swift transfer to a centre of excellence had saved Mr Johnson.  
8.	The jury had rejected her assertion of self‑defence.  The relationship between the two had been turbulent, particularly when each was in drink, and they were probably as bad as each other.  When sober they were a delight.  He reminded himself of the character references which spoke so warmly of the appellant and how good a mother she was.  Both she and Johnson had a longstanding drink problem and each an inability to control her temper.  The appellant's background was worrying because, when she was drunk, she resorted to violence.
9.	The offence fell within the second highest category of the work done by the Sentencing Guidelines Council, that is a particularly grave injury or the use of a weapon: starting point, 18 months loss of liberty; range, 12 months to three years loss of liberty.  
10.	In her favour were that this would be the first loss of liberty.  It would have a devastating effect on her and her son.  She would almost certainly lose both job and home.  She clearly regretted what she had done, proof positive being in her calling of the emergency services and her stemming of the flow of blood, which increased Johnson's chances of surviving, but she had used a weapon and caused a particularly grave injury.  She had gone into another room to get it and brought it to the scene.  She had not the mitigation of a plea.  She had a history of turning to violence when drunk.
11.	The criticism is simply that in all the circumstances the sentence was too long.  Mr Hill, who appeared below and here, makes the point that there are occasions in these courts when remorse is claimed: it is difficult to think of a clearer example of it being evidently genuine.  The appellant did not leave the scene.  She did not prevaricate.  She was seen by attending neighbours to be doing all she could to help Mr Johnson.  The judge accepted that her staunching of the blood improved his chances of survival and she could not at the scene have done more to put right the damage she had inflicted.
12.	This was a difficult sentencing exercise even for an experienced tribunal.  The appellant could rely upon her good character.  She was a mature woman.  She had behaved well in respect of her son.  She could rely on her behaviour at the scene.  She could not rely upon her enduringly poor behaviour when in drink and in temper.  On the other hand, she did not stand proud in those regards, the judge specifically finding that she and Johnson were as bad as each other.  
13.	Taking all those things into account, and particularly in reliance upon the prompt action she took to staunch the blood and that she stood a woman of previous good character in the dock, we have concluded that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and the interests of justice can be met in a reduction.  We quash the term of 30 months and for it we substitute one of 18 months.  To that limited extent, this appeal succeeds.