Case No: HQ16X02119
Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWHC 1491 (Comm)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 15/06/2018

Before: 
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER

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Between:

	 ALI SAATSAZ JEDDI 	Claimant/
Interpleader Claimant	
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	(1)	SOTHEBY’S 

(2)	ALI PISHVAIE 

(3)	BELFORD INVEST LIMITED

	First Defendant

Second Defendant/
First Interpleader Defendant

Third Defendant/
Second Interpleader Defendant	

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HENRY LEGGE QC and LUKE HARRIS 
 (instructed by Hunters) for the Claimant

JAMES RAMSDEN QC and CLEON CATSAMBIS (instructed by B&M Law LLP) for the First Interpleader Defendant

Hearing dates: 15 to 24 May 2018

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Judgment
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER
1.	The Claimant (“Mr Jeddi”) lives and works in Iran. He describes himself as coming from a family of artists and as being a collector of fine art and cultural objects who from time to time sells items, both inside and outside Iran.  The evidence and documents in this case suggest that he frequently deals in such items.
2.	The Second Defendant (“Mr Pishvaie”) was born in Iran in 1950.  His father was a prominent politician before the Iranian revolution, being, at various times, Prosecutor General of Tehran and the Vice Minister of Justice and a Supreme Court judge.  Mr Pishvaie himself left Iran in 1968 to study in the USA. He qualified as an electrical engineer from the University of Portland, Oregon. He presently works as a property developer based in France, where he resides.  He is a collector of antiques, including ancient coins and other antique objects from the Persian empire.
3.	Both Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie claim to be interested in a rock crystal jar (“the Jar”) which is currently in the possession of Sotheby’s.  What falls for determination is the nature of their respective rights and interests in, and who has an immediate right to possession of, the Jar.
4.	In brief, Mr Jeddi claims to be the sole owner of the Jar and entitled to its immediate possession.  On the other hand, Mr Pishvaie claims to be a co-owner with Mr Jeddi of the Jar, his case being that he and Mr Jeddi own the Jar as to 25% and 75% respectively.
5.	As I will set out, there is a very sharp dispute between Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie as to the facts concerning the provenance and dealings with the Jar prior to its deposit with Sotheby’s.  It is, however, convenient first to record the undisputed facts as to what happened upon and since that deposit.

The Deposit with Sotheby’s

6.	It is common ground between the parties that the Jar was deposited for sale with Sotheby’s on 31 January 2012 by Mr Pishvaie, in the name of the Third Defendant (“Belford”).  
7.	The Deposit Receipt was signed by Mr Pishvaie, and by Mr Edward Gibbs, head of the Middle East and Indian Art Department of Sotheby’s.  The Receipt recorded that two items were deposited, namely the Jar, with a “Provisional Estimated Value” of “£1.5 million to report”, and a “painted and illuminated hiliyeh”.  In answer to certain of the Property Related Questions on the form, it was stated that the country in which the property was located before it was deposited with Sotheby’s was the UK; and that all the items had the same country of origin.
8.	Sotheby’s took photographs of the Jar confirming its condition on deposit. These reveal that upon arrival it had a concretion layer on its surface.  Thereafter, Sotheby’s carried out some research.  As part of this process, Mr Gibbs contacted Professor Jeremy Johns of Oxford University to enquire whether he might be able to research the Jar.  Professor Johns and Dr Elise Morero, also of Oxford University, attended Sotheby’s on 2 May 2012 to examine the Jar.  In June 2012, with the approval of Mr Pishvaie, the Jar was handed over to Plowden & Smith for a non-invasive cleaning in order to remove the concretion layer.  Over the next few months, Professor Johns and Dr Morero continued their studies of the Jar, leading to Dr Morero producing a research paper in December 2012.
9.	On the basis of the research carried out, Sotheby’s revised the preliminary estimate of £1.5 million to between £5 million and £7 million.  Mr Pishvaie instructed Sotheby’s to make preparations for the Jar to be sold by way of private sale.  To further this, Sotheby’s produced a marketing brochure.  
10.	The Jar is described in the brochure as follows:
“Height: 15.5 cm.
Diameter: 13 cm.
Carved from a large block of translucent quartz, the ewer stands on a short foot, and has a globular body with a tall, slightly everted neck; the original handle is now missing; there are drill holes close to the break line suggesting an old repair.  It is relief-carved on the exterior with mirrored decoration meeting at the front of the ewer.  The neck features a row of four birds resembling partridges, two on each side facing away from the handle and two which meet head on.  The globular body is designed with four birds that echo the row above.  These stand amongst stylised vegetal designs and scrolling palmettes, forming a harmonious yet natural design.”
11.	In the same brochure, and under the heading “Technical Analysis” appeared the following:
“The technical analysis of this vase was conducted by Elise Morero of the Research Laboratory for Archaeology & the History of Art at Oxford University.  It was compared to rock crystal models (ewers and fragments) from the Fatimid period as well as nineteenth-century European and modern copies. …
The overall conclusion of the technical analysis carried out by Elise Morero suggests that this piece may pre-figure Fatimid models, and may belong to the rare group of surviving rock crystals from the Abbasid dynasty.”
12.	The “Conclusion” in the brochure was this:
“This extraordinary rock crystal ewer reinforces our knowledge of the connections that exist between early Persian metalwork, early rock crystal production in the central Abbasid lands, notably Basra, and the continuation and efflorescence of this craft in Fatimid Egypt, as paralleled by relief-cut glass models.  This piece is indeed the missing link between the two traditions of cut glass and carved rock crystal.  The multiple stylistic sources and parallels used to explain its significance are crucial to our understanding of the origin of shapes and ideas and their dissemination across media. This piece carries multiple associations, and helps to fill in the gaps in the story of a craft and a tradition that represents the pinnacle of luxury artistic production at the heart of the medieval Islamic world.”
13.	After the production of the brochure, Sotheby’s marketed the Jar without success for a period of some fifteen months, although it was not placed in auction.

The Dispute Emerges

14.	On or about 12 July 2014, Sotheby’s received correspondence from Mr Jeddi stating that he was the owner of the Jar, that Mr Pishvaie had been acting solely as his agent when he had deposited it with Sotheby’s, that he had lost confidence in Mr Pishvaie, and that he did not want the Jar to be sold on his behalf.  In this letter, Mr Jeddi said that his claim that Mr Pishvaie had been acting as his agent was demonstrated by an agreement between himself and Mr Pishvaie, of which he attached a copy.  This was a copy of the handwritten note recording what has been called during the trial “the Dubai Agreement”.  A few days later Mr Jeddi followed this up with a further letter to Mr Gibbs asking for the Jar to be released to his designated carrier.  
15.	There ensued communications and correspondence in which Sotheby’s sought to verify Mr Jeddi’s position with Mr Pishvaie.  According to an attendance note which she kept, in a telephone call on 26 August 2014 with Ms Karen Young, Associate General Counsel in Sotheby’s Legal Department, Mr Pishvaie stated that Mr Jeddi was “saying false things”, and that the “crystal object was mine; late 2011/12 exchanged a brass piece because difference in value, took % interest in it. Came back to him as didn’t sell. To sell it at S’bys”.
16.	Sotheby’s stated its position to be that Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie should seek to resolve the matter between themselves and, failing that, it would abide by a court order obtained by either party for release of the Jar.  On 6 June 2015 Mr Jeddi renewed his demand for the release of the Jar.  On 6 July 2015, Mr Pishvaie, on his own behalf and on behalf of Belford, stated that “I confirm the co-ownership of the rock crystal Jar and refuse the release of this object to Mr Ali Jeddi”.  On 8 July 2015, Sotheby’s notified Mr Jeddi of this position, stating that he might “wish to consider the possibility of seeking an order for delivery up of the Property in which case we would interplead so that the issue of ownership can be considered by the Court between you and Mr Pishvaie and/or any other party claiming an ownership interest in the Property”.

Proceedings Commenced

17.	Mr Jeddi commenced proceedings against Sotheby’s for delivery up of the Jar on 14 June 2016.  Sotheby’s interpleaded, and joined Mr Pishvaie as Second Defendant/First Interpleader Defendant and Belford as the Third Defendant/Second Interpleader Defendant.  
18.	By an Order of Master Yoxall, made by consent, and dated 1 December 2016, it was directed that Mr Jeddi, Mr Pishvaie and Belford “do proceed to the trial of an issue to determine the nature of their respective rights and interests in the Jar, including which of them has the immediate right to possession of the Jar.”  It is that issue (“the interpleader issue”) which has been tried before me.
19.	By the same Order, Mr Jeddi’s action against Sotheby’s was stayed pending the determination of the interpleader issue.  Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie have agreed that any claims between them should be litigated after the interpleader issue has been decided.  
20.	It is convenient to record here that Belford has disclaimed any claim to or interest in the Jar.  The interpleader issue falls to be determined between Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie.

The Parties’ Two Positions

21.	Pleadings were exchanged and they set out two irreconcilable cases as to the provenance and ownership of the Jar.  Those pleaded cases have been supported by witness statements and have been maintained and supported by evidence and submissions at the trial.  Before I analyse the two cases, and the evidence supporting each, it is helpful to present an outline of the two competing narratives.

Mr Jeddi’s case

22.	Mr Jeddi’s case and evidence is that he bought the Jar from Mr Naser Nik Mohammadi in 2010.  His case is further that the background to that purchase was as follows:

(1)	Mr Mohammadi lives in Iran and currently owns and manages a large estate there.  He was formerly in the business of buying and selling art and antiques.
(2)	Mr Mohammadi bought the Jar in a shop on a trip to Peshawar, Pakistan in or about 2001, for about US$7000.  Mr Mohammadi’s evidence was to the effect that as soon as he saw it he “thought it was Islamic and probably 700 to 800 years old”.
(3)	Mr Mohammadi did not take the Jar back to Iran, but made arrangements for it to be sent to Dubai, where he hoped to arrange a sale.
(4)	The Jar was held by a friend of Mr Mohammadi’s in Dubai from 2001 to 2010.  During that period it remained unsold.
(5)	Mr Mohammadi did not initially offer the Jar to Mr Jeddi because he did not think that Mr Jeddi dealt in such objects.  When Mr Mohammadi realised that Mr Jeddi’s interests extended beyond calligraphy, he told him about the Jar.  They spoke about it on a number of occasions but, without a photograph, Mr Jeddi displayed no real interest.   Then Mr Mohammadi came across a photograph of the Jar which had been taken in Dubai in about 2003, and showed this to Mr Jeddi, who immediately changed his mind and wanted to see the Jar in person. 
(6)	Mr Jeddi travelled to Dubai to see the Jar.  He went there and back in one day, on 1 March 2010.  He viewed the Jar at the house of the friend of Mr Mohammadi’s where it was kept in an empty kettle box with foam inserts for its protection.  Mr Jeddi stayed for 15 or 20 minutes, but his evidence was that as soon as he saw it he knew that it was an authentic antique and that he wanted to purchase it.  Upon his return to Iran he confirmed this to Mr Mohammadi.
23.	The sale was agreed at some point between 1 and 8 March 2010, at a price of US$150,000, which Mr Jeddi paid in cash.  Mr Jeddi then returned to Dubai on 8 March 2010 and collected the Jar.  He put it in a hard luggage case, and left the case with a friend of his – not Mr Mohammadi’s friend – in Dubai for safekeeping.  He did not lock the case out of respect for his friend.
24.	When the sale was concluded it had simply been an oral agreement. Some months afterwards, however, Mr Jeddi contacted Mr Mohammadi to ask him to sign a Bill of Sale to document Mr Jeddi’s purchase of the Jar.  Mr Jeddi drafted an initial version of the Bill of Sale in Farsi, and gave it to a friend of his, Mr Hosseini, who speaks English, who in turn gave it to a friend who had experience of English legal writing.  Mr Jeddi wanted it in English because he intended to sell the Jar in London.
25.	On Mr Jeddi’s case, this resulted in a Bill of Sale (“the Bill of Sale”) which was signed by Mr Jeddi and Mr Mohammadi on 15 August 2010.  The original of this document has been lost, but copies have been produced to the court.  The Bill of Sale is in these terms: 
“FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF the sum of 1 500 000 000 RL, paid by cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Mr Naser Mohammadi (the seller) DOES HEREBY SELL, ASSIGN, AND TRANSFER to Mr Ali Saatsaz Jeddi the property described as follows
Description: A Rock crystal Jar, ornamented with motifs of birds and flowers, lacking handles, slightly broken on above edge.  This object is believed to belong to an Islamic period.
The property is being sold on an ‘AS IS’ basis and the seller explicitly disclaims all warranties, whether expressed or implied, including but not limited to, any warranties concerning date and origin of the said object.
The buyer has been given the opportunity to inspect the Property, or alternatively, have the Property inspected.  Additionally, the Buyer has accepted the Property in its existing condition.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Bill of Sale on August 15, 2010.”
This is followed by the signatures of Mr Mohammadi and Mr Jeddi, and of Mr Hosseini as witness.
26.	Mr Jeddi’s case is that the Jar remained with his friend in Dubai from 8 March 2010 until he gave it to Mr Pishvaie on 25 January 2012.  During that period, he showed it to a few people in Dubai.  Furthermore, during that period, and specifically in May 2011, he met with a Mr Mohammad Reza Atighehchi, an antiques dealer, in Dubai.  During the meeting, Mr Jeddi handed three or four photographs of the Jar to Mr Atighehchi, stating that the Jar was being stored at a friend’s house in Dubai, but that the friend was not there that day.  Mr Atighehchi’s witness statement is to the effect that Mr Jeddi offered to take him there another day but Mr Atighehchi said that there was no need “as I could see from the photographs what we were dealing with”.  Mr Jeddi told Mr Atighehchi that he wished to sell the Jar at Sotheby’s.  Mr Atighehchi subsequently showed Mr Gibbs of Sotheby’s the photographs at a dinner at the Trocadero restaurant in Paris, but the matter was not taken further through Mr Atighehchi.
27.	Mr Jeddi’s case is that on the morning of 25 January 2012, in Dubai, a potential purchaser, whom he identified in court as being Mr Ahmad Shah, offered him US$ 5 million for the Jar.  Mr Jeddi did not accept that offer because he wanted to consign the Jar to auction.  Accordingly later that day he met with Mr Pishvaie at the Carlton Tower Hotel in Dubai, and showed Mr Pishvaie the Jar.  Mr Pishvaie examined it with a magnifying glass.  
28.	Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie then agreed that the Jar should be consigned to auction in London, with a base, or reserve, price of £5 million.  After discussing the terms of their agreement, Mr Pishvaie then wrote out a document recording it in English.  That document is what has been described as “the Dubai Agreement”.  It was in these terms:
“[Notepaper of Carlton Tower Hotel Dubai] 25/1/2012
I the undersigned Ali M. Pishvaie, hereby state that the Islamic crystal Jar has been consigned by Mr Ali Jeddi to me for sale at one of London auction houses (Sotheby’s or Christie’s).
The proceeds from the sale would be shared on 75% and 25% basis (25% to Mr Pishvaie). All the cost regarding this sale should be paid by Mr Pishvaie.
The shares are based on hammer price.”
The document was signed by Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie.

29.	Mr Jeddi’s case is that it was understood and in the Dubai Agreement recorded that Mr Pishvaie was simply to act as Mr Jeddi’s agent in consigning the Jar to an auction house.  Mr Jeddi was and would remain the sole owner of the Jar and his case is that he understood that Mr Pishvaie would obey any further instructions he gave in relation to the sale of the Jar, and expected to be kept informed about any developments and consulted before any steps were taken in relation to the Jar.
30.	At the meeting, Mr Jeddi handed over the Jar to Mr Pishvaie, who then travelled with it “by air either directly to London or maybe via France”, and so was able to deposit it with Sotheby’s on 31 January 2012, as it is known that he did.

Mr Pishvaie’s case

31.	Mr Pishvaie’s case is strikingly different.  His case is that the Jar was originally part of his father’s collection and was given him by his father.  The Jar was brought to western Europe in late 1968 / early 1969.  It was left in the possession of an uncle of Mr Pishvaie’s, Hossein Nazari, in Paris from 1969 until about 1981, when it was transferred to the UK and stored in vaults at Barclays Bank Park Lane.  In 2009 Mr Pishvaie moved his collection, including the Jar, to Christie’s Fine Art Storage Services in London (“CFASS”). Mr Pishvaie’s case is that the Jar did not fit his collection very well.  Accordingly, he was willing to consider parting with it.  
32.	By an email sent on 27 March 2010 Mr Jeddi offered to sell Mr Pishvaie what has been referred to as “the Bronze Object”.   The photographs of the Bronze Object sent with the email on 27 March 2010 show it to be a bronze stand with stags and snakes, about 30 x 14 cm.  Though Mr Jeddi had not provided any evidence of its provenance or value, its appearance has been described as consistent with its having come from Baluchistan and dating from c. 2800-2600 BC.
33.	Mr Pishvaie says that he wanted the Bronze Object.  He had shown Mr Jeddi a photograph of the Jar on his mobile phone, and Mr Jeddi and he proceeded to agree to an exchange.  As both he and Mr Jeddi considered that the Jar was worth more than the Bronze Object, the agreement was that there would be an exchange but Mr Pishvaie would retain a 25% ownership in the Jar.
34.	Mr Jeddi has never been to London, and he has been unable to obtain a visa to enter the UK, even for the purposes of this case.  The exchange accordingly had to be carried out by an intermediary.  Mr Pishvaie’s case is that he was telephoned in early 2011 by a man named Mr Mahmoud, whom he understood to represent Mr Jeddi, and they arranged to meet at the Millennium Hotel, Gloucester Road.  Mr Pishvaie took the Jar out of CFASS and with him to the meeting, at which he gave it to Mr Mahmoud in exchange for the Bronze Object.  The Bronze Object is still in Mr Pishvaie’s collection.
35.	Mr Pishvaie accepts that Mr Jeddi had the Jar over the next few months, necessarily outside the UK, and was attempting to sell it. He does not dispute that this involved Mr Jeddi’s giving Mr Atighehchi photographs of the Jar, and that Mr Atighehchi showed photographs to Mr Gibbs in Paris, although Mr Pishvaie states that he was surprised that this was done without his being told.  On Mr Pishvaie’s case, however, Mr Jeddi failed to sell the Jar and accordingly when the two men met on 25 January 2012 at the Carlton Tower Hotel in Dubai they agreed that the Jar would be consigned to Mr Pishvaie to take to Sotheby’s for sale.   
36.	This, on Mr Pishvaie’s case, is what was reflected in the Dubai Agreement.  His case is not that the Dubai Agreement created a co-ownership. His case is rather that it reflects and maintains the pre-existing co-ownership, by which Mr Pishvaie had a 25% ownership share, and Mr Jeddi a 75% ownership share.  Mr Pishvaie says in his witness statement that, consistently with his being a co-owner, he was left by the Dubai Agreement with a “full and unlimited discretion to sell [the Jar] at a price to be determined by me”.  He states that he agreed to bear the costs of sale because he expected the auction house to waive the costs of the sale and incorporate them into the buyer’s fees.  
37.	Mr Pishvaie’s case is that he did not take the Jar in Dubai and did not bring it back with him to London.  Instead his case is that he received the Jar in London from Mahmoud, and having done so placed the Jar with Sotheby’s on 31 January 2012. 
38.	There is no dispute that Mr Pishvaie was asked by Sotheby’s as to the provenance of the Jar.  Mr Pishvaie swore an affidavit on this point on 11 June 2013 in Mougins, France, which was then provided to Sotheby’s.  That affidavit said this:
“I the undersigned Ali M. Pishvaie declare that the early Islamic crystal Jar purchased in Isfahan has been in the family collection since 1956.
It was shipped with a group of objects to Europe in November 1968 and has been in the U.K. from 1981 to the present day.”

39.	It is equally not in dispute that that account of Mr Pishvaie’s, confirmed in that affidavit, was used by Sotheby’s in the marketing brochure to which I have already referred.  It stated, under the heading “Provenance”:
“Private Collection in Isfahan until 1969
In Europe since 1968
In UK since 1981.”
40.	In these proceedings Mr Pishvaie relies as evidence that the Jar has been in western Europe since the late 1960s upon what has been called “the 1969 Inventory”.  Mr Pishvaie has produced what he says is the original and three official translations of it.  What is said to be the original is a letter written in graphite on a half sheet of foolscap paper which has a narrow feint quadrille (ie it is squared, like graph paper). 
41.	The letter is in Farsi.  Translated it says: 
“[3 February 1969]
Mr Ali Pishvaeei
Further to Friday’s phone call and per request of your father to send your family collection items to Hamburg through Mr Javad Meshkin, please note that transportation and insurance costs will be paid by a carpet trader friend in Germany.
Please don’t pay him anything in this regard.  Mr Pishvaeei said that you will be travelling to Europe next month to collect the items.  When collecting, please check the items against the following list and hand a signed copy (of this note) to Mr Meshkin.
Best Regards
Mohammadreza Rowhani.”

There then followed a list of 16 items or groups of items, of which item no. 8 was “a crystal decanter with no handles (broken), bird design”. 

The Transcripts

42.	Unbeknownst to Mr Pishvaie, Mr Jeddi apparently made video recordings of meetings between him and Mr Pishvaie in Dubai. These have not, however, been produced, and Mr Jeddi gave evidence that he was not sure what had become of them.
43.	In addition, and again without Mr Pishvaie’s knowledge, Mr Jeddi recorded phone conversations between himself and Mr Pishvaie.   Mr Jeddi says that he only started to record their conversations after a certain period, and that he commenced the recordings after he became concerned that Mr Pishvaie had provided “fabricated documents” to Sotheby’s.  What has been produced are recordings of 31 calls.  The length of these calls was, in total, some 4 ½ hours, and the transcriptions run to 91 pages of the English translation.  Not all the calls are dated.  Of those that are dated, the earliest dates from March 2013 and the latest from 14 June 2014.  
44.	Only one of the conversations, namely the last, is still on Mr Jeddi’s mobile telephone.  The others have been deleted and overwritten.  Mr Jeddi’s evidence was that he had periodically transferred data from his mobile phone to a computer.  Those conversations of which there is a record and which are dated – save for the very last – were transferred via a cable, which meant that the metadata was transferred as well.  Those conversations of which there is a record but for which there is no date were, according to Mr Jeddi, transferred to his computer via a friend’s mobile phone by Bluetooth, and this had lost the metadata.
45.	All the transcripts of the recordings which Mr Jeddi has disclosed (“the transcripts”) were before the court, and were read by me, and questions were asked about them during the witnesses’ evidence. 

The Factual Witnesses

46.	Mr Jeddi gave evidence via video link from Paris.  While he has a Schengen visa he had not been granted a UK visa.  Mr Mohammadi gave evidence by Skype and telephone from Tehran.  A witness statement from Mr Atighehchi was put before the court under a hearsay notice.  On his side, Mr Pishvaie gave evidence in court.  
47.	Mr Pishvaie also called evidence from Mr Paul Heard.  Mr Heard had worked as a security porter at CFASS in the period between August 2007 and December 2014.  His evidence was that he had been permitted access to clients’ units provided this was authorised by the client, usually by phone or email, and in Mr Pishvaie’s case it was done by phone.  Mr Heard also gave evidence in his witness statement that in or about 2009 he saw “a decorated and partially broken crystal Jar in Mr Pishvaie’s unit on several occasions.”
48.	In response to Mr Heard’s evidence, Mr Jeddi called Mr Jonathan Weathers.  He had been Operations Manager at CFASS from 1996 to 2009.  Mr Weathers’ evidence was to the effect that clients had not been able to give authority to staff at CFASS to enter their units on the telephone.  He also gave evidence that Mr Heard had had no background in art or antiques and that he regarded it as highly implausible that Mr Heard would have been able to identify and describe a crystal Jar in Mr Pishvaie’s unit, or to distinguish it from any other Jar he might have seen at CFASS.
49.	In turn in response to Mr Weathers, Mr Pishvaie called Mr David Collis who had worked as Security Controller at CFASS between November 2012 and December 2014 when it had closed. He gave evidence that during his period at CFASS, clients had authorised staff to enter their units by email or by phone, and that Mr Pishvaie’s authorisations had usually come by phone.  He also gave evidence that, with Mr Pishvaie’s authority he had arranged for lights to be replaced in his storage unit when he was not present.

Expert Evidence

50.	Expert evidence has been adduced going to the authenticity of the 1969 Inventory, to the date of what have been called the “1990 Translations” of that Inventory, and to the authenticity of the signatures on the Bill of Sale.
51.	In brief, a report was served from M. Philippe Coville, a French telecommunications expert, which was to the effect that the two 1990 Translations of the 1969 Inventory did not date from 1990, because in 1990 the telephone number and the internet domain name which appear in the header of each did not exist.  The response of Mr Pishvaie to this was that this was not in dispute.  His case is that a translation was made of the 1969 Inventory in 1990, but that that translation has been lost; and that the two “1990 Translations” are “reissues” of the lost 1990 translation which were produced in 2009 or 2010.
52.	On behalf of Mr Pishvaie a report was served from Peter Bower, a Forensic Paper Historian and Paper Analyst, in relation to what Mr Pishvaie contends is the original 1969 Inventory.  The conclusion of that report is that:
“There is nothing out of period in the paper for the date of 3 February 1969 on the letter. The fibre blend, type of ruled lines, surface finish, the lack of OBAs [optical brightening agents] and the condition and degree of foxing present, are all consistent with a date of manufacture during the late 1960s.”
53.	In response to that, Mr Jeddi served a report from Robert Radley.  He did not disagree with Mr Bower’s conclusion, but stated (1) that the paper might be “consistent with” a later date; and (2) it could not be established when the writing was put on the paper.
54.	There was also a report served from Fiona Marsh, a specialist in the scientific examination of documents and handwriting.  Her evidence was to the effect that there was “moderate evidence” that Mr Jeddi’s Farsi signature on the Bill of Sale was a copy of his signature written by someone familiar with it.  In response Mr Radley stated that there was insufficient evidence to form a view in relation to the Farsi signature, but that in relation to the “English style” signature, there was “moderate, approaching strong” evidence that Mr Jeddi had written it.

National and International Restrictions on Dealing in Antiquities

55.	A further matter to which it is relevant to refer before analysing the two parties’ cases relates to the international regime for the protection of cultural objects.  It was common ground that the year 1970 has come to occupy a special place for those engaged in or affected by the trade in cultural heritage.  That was the year when the 16th General Conference of UNESCO adopted the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (“the UNESCO Convention”).  A large number of States have ratified the UNESCO Convention, including Iran in 1975 and the UK in 2002.
56.	What is significant for present purposes is that the date of 1970 has been taken by very many museums, as well as by auction houses, reputable dealers and institutions as a “cut-off” date for the investigation of provenance.  What this means is that such museums, dealers and institutions will not deal in or acquire antiquities unless they have a known provenance dating to 1970 or before.  In practical terms of relevance to the present case, and as Mr Pishvaie said in his evidence, if an item which might have derived from the Middle East does not have provenance indicating that it has been in Europe since before 1971 it would be very difficult to sell on the London market.
57.	It was also clear at the trial that, distinct from the UNESCO Convention, Iran has its own municipal laws prohibiting or restricting the export of antiquities. There was no detailed evidence in relation to what these laws are but the penalties for contravention of Iran’s laws relating to dealing with antiquities can clearly be severe.  Evidence was given that Mr Atighehchi had himself, some years ago, been imprisoned for offences relating to dealing in antiquities. 

Analysis and Findings as to each party’s factual case

58.	Each side attacked the other’s factual case, both as to its broad thrust and as to its details.  Each side accused the other of fabricating documents, deliberate deception, and lying to the Court.  Each side submitted that there were multiple reasons why I could place no reliance on the evidence of the other.  In those circumstances it has been particularly important to consider the documents which are known to be genuine and the inferences which can be drawn from them and from established facts.  While the oral evidence of the protagonists is not without significance, I have treated it with caution, and have generally placed reliance on it only when it is in accordance with documents which are known to be genuine, inferences from established facts, and the inherent probabilities.

Assessment of Mr Pishvaie’s Factual Case

59.	 It is convenient to start by considering Mr Pishvaie’s factual case.  Having heard the evidence, including Mr Pishvaie’s own testimony, I came to the firm conclusion that his case as to the pre-2012 provenance of the Jar, and as to the nature of the arrangements between him and Mr Jeddi, was false.  The reasons for this conclusion overlap and are cumulative, but can be stated under five heads.

The case as to provenance and the removal of the Jar from Iran in 1968/1969
60.	As Mr Legge QC for Mr Jeddi commented, in light of the UNESCO Convention and the effect which it has had on the trade in antiquities, it was highly convenient, if one wanted to sell an item in London or through an auction house, that it should have left Iran before 1971.  That does not, however, of itself mean that a pre-1971 European provenance is suspect.  Nevertheless, I regarded Mr Pishvaie’s case as to the pre-2011 history of the Jar as being inherently implausible.  This was for at least four reasons which I will now set out.  
61.	In the first place, Mr Pishvaie’s account was that the Jar had been acquired by his father, with perhaps 10-15 other items, from a Prince in Isfahan in 1956.  His evidence was, however, that this was not a matter which he ever discussed with his father.  Moreover, on Mr Pishvaie’s case, the Jar had not been displayed by his father in their house, but had simply been kept in a “very big box” along with other items.  This is notwithstanding that the Jar was, on Mr Pishvaie’s case, significant enough to have a line entry to itself on the 1969 Inventory, was made of rock crystal (which is a precious stone), and had been purchased by his father from a person of standing.  While these matters do not, of course, mean that the Jar would necessarily have been displayed, I find it somewhat surprising that it was not.  In light of the further matters discussed below, I consider that it is most likely that the case of non-display was put forward by Mr Pishvaie to account for the absence of any photographs of the Jar in his father’s house.
62.	Secondly, Mr Pishvaie’s account of the gift of the Jar to him in 1968/1969 was a surprising one.  On this account his father, who was then 48, a collector and a member of the Iranian establishment, chose to give what Mr Pishvaie said was a valuable collection, including the Jar, to his 19-year old son, and to ship these items to Europe.  This is notwithstanding that Mr Pishvaie had actually gone to study in the USA.  The result, on Mr Pishvaie’s case, was that this collection, apart from some small items such as coins and seals which he took to the USA, was simply left with his uncle in Paris for over a decade.  Mr Pishvaie did not suggest in his evidence that his father had wanted to remove articles from Iran in 1968/69 because of any political concerns, but only that his father had wanted him to have them.  It is a surprising arrangement that a father should give and send valuable and fragile items to a 19-year old student who could not accommodate them himself, and particularly surprising that this collection should have included the Jar which, on Mr Pishvaie’s evidence, he had never discussed with his father, and which did not fit with what Mr Pishvaie stated he had started to collect at the age of 16, namely coins.  
63.	Thirdly, there is a striking absence of any documentary or photographic evidence to support Mr Pishvaie’s account of where the Jar was before 2011.  The only exception is the disputed 1969 Inventory and its translations, to which I will return.   Thus, Mr Pishvaie has produced no photograph of or showing the Jar in the whole period from 1956 to 2012, whether in Mr Pishvaie’s father’s house, or when it was in Paris with his uncle, or after he says he moved it to London in 1981.  There is no record of his father’s purchase of the Jar and there is no inventory of his father’s collection; there is no tax document which refers to the Jar at any point; there is no insurance document which refers to the Jar; there is no valuation of the Jar at any point; and there is no document recording that the Jar was part of the collection which went to Mr Pishvaie rather than to his siblings. Equally there is no inventory of Mr Pishvaie’s collection which shows the Jar.  Mr Pishvaie said that this was because he has no inventory of his collection at all, notwithstanding that it now amounts to 800 objects and 1400 numismatic items.  Whether or not that is the case, the simple position is that there is a significant, and to my mind surprising, lack of documentary support for Mr Pishvaie’s case.
64.	Fourthly, there is no mention of the provenance for which Mr Pishvaie now contends in any of the transcripts.  I will return below to my assessment of the significance of the transcripts.  At this point it is sufficient to record that I consider that this is another pointer against Mr Pishvaie’s account being accurate.

The Exchange with the Bronze Object
65.	Mr Pishvaie’s account of the exchange of the Jar with the Bronze Object was implausible and unevidenced, and I could not accept it.
66.	In this regard, I considered that Mr Pishvaie’s account of how the exchange was agreed was not credible.  On his account, Mr Jeddi agreed to the exchange without having seen the Jar himself.  Mr Pishvaie’s account is that he had two photographs of the Jar on his mobile phone (an iphone 3, which Mr Pishvaie no longer possesses and which was not backed up), both taken from the side; that he showed these to Mr Jeddi, who agreed to the exchange, and did not ask for the photographs to be sent to him by email or text, or to have an enlarged copy.  This was notwithstanding that, as Mr Pishvaie accepted, rock crystal objects can be easily faked.  I do not accept that Mr Jeddi would have agreed to exchange the Bronze Object with a Jar which he had not seen and of which he had been shown so limited a photographic record.
67.	When the point about the implausibility of Mr Jeddi’s agreeing to the exchange in such circumstances was put to Mr Pishvaie in cross-examination, his response was to say that when the physical exchange was effected with Mr Mahmoud at the Millennium Hotel, Mr Mahmoud had carried out a half-hour examination of the Jar.  This was a point which had not been prefigured in Mr Pishvaie’s witness statements or statements of case.  I regarded it with scepticism for this reason, and because it would have meant Mr Mahmoud having to make a decision, without reference to Mr Jeddi, as to whether or not to go ahead with an exchange with Mr Pishvaie which Mr Mahmoud had had no part in agreeing.
68.	Conversely, looking at the alleged exchange from what would have been Mr Pishvaie’s point of view, it appeared equally implausible.  On his case, he had a rock crystal Jar, with an impeccable provenance, which might be mediaeval, and which he thought was valuable.  An experienced collector would not, in my judgment, have agreed to exchange such an item with a Bronze Object, which had no provenance, and without even seeing the Bronze Object itself (as opposed to a photograph), as Mr Pishvaie stated he had not.  
69.	Further and significantly, there is no documentary evidence at all which records or refers to the alleged exchange agreement.  
70.	Nor is there any mention of the exchange agreement in the transcripts.  As I regard this as a particularly significant point in the present context, I should record my assessment of the evidence of the transcripts.  I fully accept that they have to be approached with caution, for some of the reasons given by Mr Ramsden QC, who appeared for Mr Pishvaie.  Thus, some of the recordings are not dated.  Furthermore, not all the conversations between the two were recorded.  Recording of conversations by one party without informing the other gives rise to the dangers that the party doing the recording has and pursues an agenda, and leads the other party to make concessions or commit themselves without doing so themselves.
71.	In the present case, even giving due weight to all these points, I considered that the transcripts are revealing.  The sheer number and length of the conversations means that there is a considerable amount of material on which to assess the relationship between the parties.  Though Mr Pishvaie made a general suggestion in his witness statement that transcript excerpts begin or end abruptly, neither he nor his counsel identified any specific points, within the conversations which have been recorded and transcribed, where there are or might be excisions or interpolations.  Furthermore, it emerges from reading the transcripts that both parties spoke freely.  In these circumstances I do regard it as significant that in some 4 ½ hours of conversations there is no mention at all of the exchange.  Had it occurred, this would have been a very important part of the two men’s dealings with the Jar. There are various points in the transcripts at which, had the exchange taken place, one would expect to see it referred to, but it is not, and at which Mr Pishvaie, had he thought he retained an ownership interest in the Jar as a result of the exchange would have asserted it, but did not. 
72.	The conduct of the parties at a time which would have been subsequent to the alleged exchange agreement also indicates that it had not occurred.  Thus, if there had been an exchange, one would not have expected Mr Jeddi to have approached Mr Atighehchi to attempt to interest Mr Gibbs in the Jar.   If there had been the exchange and Mr Jeddi had wanted to sell in London, why should that not have been, from the outset, through Mr Pishavaie, who had good contacts with Mr Gibbs, and who, on this basis, was a co-owner?  Furthermore if, for some reason, Mr Jeddi had nevertheless wanted to approach Mr Atighehchi, he would surely have told him of the exchange, because it would have established a pre-1971 European provenance.  Mr Atighehchi’s witness statement is inconsistent with his having been told about any such exchange (or provenance).

The Dubai Agreement
73.	The terms of the Dubai Agreement itself tell against acceptance of Mr Pishvaie’s factual case.  In my judgment there are four features of the Dubai Agreement which are significant in this regard.  In considering them it is to be borne in mind that the Dubai Agreement was drafted and written out in English by Mr Pishvaie himself, as Mr Jeddi does not speak or write English confidently.
74.	The first feature is that the Dubai Agreement contains no mention that Mr Pishvaie and Mr Jeddi are co-owners or of the exchange agreement.  I did not consider that Mr Pishvaie had any satisfactory explanation as to why the Dubai Agreement did not refer to the pre-existing co-ownership if it had existed.
75.	The second feature is that the language of the Dubai Agreement is that the Jar “has been consigned by [Mr. Jeddi] to Mr Pishvaie”.  What this language naturally indicates, in my judgment, is that Mr Pishvaie has been entrusted by Mr Jeddi with property which is regarded as belonging – as between the two of them – solely to Mr Jeddi.  Furthermore, the words “has been consigned” have a clear connotation that physical delivery has taken place, which would be consistent with Mr Jeddi’s case that he handed over the Jar to Mr Pishvaie at the Carlton Tower Hotel on 25 January 2012, and would not be consistent with Mr Pishvaie’s case that the Jar was not handed to him on 25 January 2012 (and, as I understood his evidence, was not even seen by him at that point), and that he only received it from Mr Mahmoud in London after he had returned from Dubai.
76.	The third feature is that the terms of the Dubai Agreement make little economic sense, especially from Mr Pishvaie’s point of view, if he was already a co-owner of 25% of the Jar as a result of the exchange agreement.  Most simply, by the Dubai Agreement he agreed to bear all the costs of the sale.  That agreement at least exposed Mr Pishvaie to the risk that, if the auction house did not waive its fees, he would have to pay them all himself from his share.  It is difficult to see why he should have agreed to that, if he was already the 25% owner of the Jar.  
77.	It was argued on behalf of Mr Pishvaie that it was significant that the Dubai Agreement did not set a reserve; and it was suggested that it left him with sole discretion as to what price to sell at, and that this was consistent with his being a co-owner.  I considered that there was no force in this point, in light of the evidence given at the trial.  Specifically, Mr Pishvaie accepted that Mr Jeddi had set a minimum price of £5 million (T6/58 and 84-85).  I considered this to be consistent with the evidence of the transcripts. 
78.	One further point may be mentioned under the present head.  As I have said, on Mr Pishvaie’s case, he was not given the Jar at the Dubai meeting, and it was transported to London by Mr Jeddi’s agent or agents, and delivered to Mr Pishvaie by Mr Mahmoud in London.  I considered, however, that paragraph 851 of the transcripts (as well as paragraph 390) appeared to indicate that Mr Pishvaie had been instrumental in taking the Jar to London, even if he had not carried it himself.  If that is the correct reading of these passages, it reinforces my conclusions as to the nature of the dealings between the two men in Dubai. 

Mr Pishvaie’s dealings with Sotheby’s 
79.	There were a number of features of Mr Pishvaie’s dealings with Sotheby’s which indicate that, even on his own case, he was prepared to mislead the auction house in order to obtain an advantage, or at least was reckless as to whether Sotheby’s was misled.  
80.	In this regard, there were two aspects of his affidavit of 11 June 2013 which were concerning.  In the first place, Mr Pishvaie initially stated that he had obtained the information that the Jar had been obtained by his father from a Prince in Isfahan in 1956 from his mother after the present litigation had been commenced.  He subsequently said that when he spoke to his mother, it was to be sure that his affidavit was accurate.  Even assuming the latter account to be correct, it was unsatisfactory that Mr Pishvaie should have sworn the affidavit in circumstances where he was not sure of the contents and did not check this until some years later.
81.	Secondly, and more significantly, Mr Pishvaie’s affidavit stated that the Jar had been in the UK “from 1981 to the present day”.  It became apparent, however, that even on Mr Pishvaie’s case he believed or at least strongly suspected that the Jar had been out of the UK, and indeed in Dubai, during 2011, during which period he accepted that Mr Jeddi was trying to sell it.  Even if the remainder of his factual case were accepted, to swear the affidavit which he did, without mentioning this issue, would have been deliberately misleading or at least reckless as to whether the statement was true.
82.	Furthermore, it emerges from the transcripts that, when Mr Pishvaie needed to speak to Mr Jeddi as to the course to be adopted in relation to the Jar and had to give a reason to Mr Gibbs of Sotheby’s as to why he needed time to make a decision, he would tell Mr Gibbs that he needed to speak to his sister (rather than reveal that he would be speaking to Mr Jeddi).  This excuse was plainly false, but was intended to be accepted by Mr Gibbs as true.  It was, furthermore, more than just a venial “excuse”.  Even assuming the rest of Mr Pishvaie’s case to be true, it was intended to conceal from Mr Gibbs the fact that Mr Pishvaie had an overseas co-owner, a fact which, if revealed would at least have raised questions as to where the Jar had been in the recent past.  If Mr Pishvaie’s factual case is not true, then the misstatement was more misleading, as it helped conceal from Mr Gibbs the fact that Mr Pishvaie had no ownership interest in the Jar at all. 
83.	These matters are to be taken together with a separate incident concerning a Sasanian jar.  On Mr Pishvaie’s case, Mr Jeddi sold him a pair of such jars, he retained one, and sold the other at Sotheby’s.  The catalogue entry for the Sasanian jar which Mr Pishvaie sold at Sotheby’s gave as the provenance: “Reportedly found in the Caucasus region in the early 1920s … European private collection since the 1970s.”  Mr Pishvaie stated that this provenance had been given him by Mr Jeddi, which Mr Jeddi denied.  But even if Mr Jeddi had given this provenance, it was Mr Pishvaie who was responsible for supplying the provenance to Sotheby’s, and, on his own evidence, he did not believe this provenance or at the least was reckless as to whether or not it was true.  Thus, his evidence was that he suspected that Mr Jeddi had shipped the item out of Iran but was lying about that because he could not have done so legally.  Mr Pishvaie did not, however, tell Sotheby’s that he suspected that the provenance was not true.  
84.	These various matters, which arise on Mr Pishvaie’s own evidence, caused me to doubt his integrity and the scrupulousness with which he approached dealings with the auction house and in particular with which he approached representations as to provenance and ownership. 

Mr Pishvaie’s evidence 
85.	Mr Pishvaie gave evidence over two days.  I came to the conclusion that he was an unreliable witness, and one who was prepared to assert matters which he knew not to be true or which he had no basis for believing to be true.
86.	What appeared to me to be a clear example of this concerned certain tiles.  On Mr Pishvaie’s evidence, these had been sold to him by Mr Jeddi as Timurid, which he dated as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the western calendar. He said that he had later become suspicious of them, had had thermal luminescence tests performed, and had rejected them as replicas.  It was put to him by Mr Legge QC that Mr Jeddi had not misrepresented the date of the tiles and on the contrary, when sending Mr Pishvaie details of the tiles, had sent pages from an earlier Sotheby’s catalogue in which they had featured, and which had stated that they were eighteenth/nineteenth century.  Faced with this, Mr Pishvaie denied that Mr Jeddi had sent the Sotheby’s catalogue.  This was notwithstanding that the pages from the earlier catalogue appeared in his own disclosure as an attachment to Mr Jeddi’s email.  This evidence was, as it seemed to me, simply a deliberately or recklessly untrue response to a point which he saw as being adverse to him.

The material relied on by Mr Pishvaie

87.	The matters summarised above persuaded me that I could not rely on Mr Pishvaie’s account, and that his factual case was untrue.  Before reaching that conclusion, however, I have considered carefully the points relied upon by Mr Pishvaie in support of his case, and in particular three matters: first, the 1969 Inventory and its translations; secondly, the evidence of Mr Heard; and thirdly Mr Pishvaie’s case that Mr Jeddi had misstated the nature of the previous dealings between the two men.

The 1969 Inventory
88.	I have already given reasons why I considered the account of the gift of the Jar by his father to Mr Pishvaie in 1968/1969 and its shipment to Europe to be implausible.  In addition, the 1969 Farsi document which is said to be the original of the 1969 Inventory is itself surprising.  
89.	Specifically, on Mr Pishvaie’s case it is a letter to him written by Mr Rowhani, who was a lawyer in Tehran, who intended it to be evidence of the shipment of the items which could be used by Mr Pishvaie when he collected the goods to ensure that they had all arrived, and a copy of which could be handed over as a receipt.  Given this it is, to my mind, strange that the document would have been written on a sheet of squared paper torn from a book or pad rather than on headed or otherwise personalised paper.  More significantly, moreover, it is surprising that a document intended for such a purpose should have been written in pencil, an inherently temporary medium which is capable of alteration.
90.	It is common ground that the “1990 Translations” of the 1969 Inventory do not physically date from 1990.  What have been called the “1990 Translations” were, on Mr Pishvaie’s case, physically produced in 2009 or 2010, but were certified copies of the translation produced in 1990.  The person who is stated to have produced these translations, Mr Mavaddat, was not called and did not give any evidence in these proceedings.  There appeared furthermore to be a number of difficulties with Mr Pishvaie’s case as to why a translation had been produced in 1990.  His explanation was that it had been required because he was contemplating obtaining insurance, but it was not clear why a document showing shipment in 1969 would have been required for that purpose, and in any event his evidence was that he had found out that insurance was too expensive before the translation was made.  It was also unclear on Mr Pishvaie’s account as to how the 2009/2010 copies had been made if the original of the 1990 translation had been lost.  In my judgment, given that no independent evidence has been produced of the existence of the 1990 translation or the 2009/2010 copies before 2016, I do not consider that they add materially to the case for the reliability and authenticity of the Farsi version of the 1969 Inventory.
91.	I have taken into account the seriousness of the allegation and the fact that a finding of the fraudulent production of a document is not to be lightly arrived at.  Having considered all the evidence, I am nonetheless of the view that, on the balance of probabilities, the 1969 Inventory is a forgery.  I consider it more likely than not that it was produced on the paper it was because that was old paper which had no other identifying characteristics, and was written in pencil because pencil is impossible to date.
The Evidence of Mr Heard
92.	The other evidence on which Mr Ramsden QC heavily relied was the evidence of Paul Heard.  Mr Legge QC made it clear that he was not contending that Mr Heard had lied to the court, and I considered him to be an honest witness.  For a number of reasons, however, I considered that his evidence that he had seen the Jar in Mr Pishvaie’s unit in CFASS in about 2009 and subsequently, was mistaken.  Identifications, both of objects and people, several years after the sighting(s) need always to be treated with caution.  This is especially so in the present case, given that Mr Heard is not a saleroom porter, but a warehouseman.  He had no special reason to take note of the contents of Mr Pishvaie’s unit, or to focus on its contents as opposed to those of the roughly 230 other units at CFASS, some of which were very full of items.  The description he gave of the Jar which he said he remembered as being in Mr Pishvaie’s unit did not reflect what the Jar would have looked like had it been there between 2009 and 2012, in that it omitted any description of the concretion, which, from the photographs which Sotheby’s took after its deposit, would have been a conspicuous feature of the Jar at that time.   Moreover, Mr Heard had been shown a picture of the Jar the week before the hearing.  I do not consider that this was likely to be conducive to testing whether Mr Heard actually remembered the Jar.  My conclusion is that Mr Heard was probably confusing the Jar with another Jar, ewer or decanter which he had seen either in Mr Pishvaie’s unit or elsewhere.
The issue as to the previous dealings between Mr Jeddi and Mr Pishvaie
93.	Mr Pishvaie contended that in his dealings with Mr Jeddi before those relating to the Jar, he had never acted as an agent for Mr Jeddi.  He contended that Mr Jeddi’s case that Mr Pishvaie had indeed acted as his agent before, perhaps on 4 or 5 occasions, and always on the basis of a commission of 25% of the hammer price, was false, and that this was significant because this allegation of a prior history of agency was relied upon by Mr Jeddi to support his case as to there having been an agency in relation to the Jar.
94.	I concluded that I could not form a reliable view as to what had been the nature of all the dealings which there had been between the two men. There had been quite a number of what appeared to be simple sales from Mr Jeddi to Mr Pishvaie.  I was not satisfied that there had been 4 or 5 cases in which Mr Pishvaie had acted as Mr Jeddi’s agent, and there appeared to me to be no clear evidence of a previous occasion on which Mr Pishvaie had acted for an agreed 25% of the hammer price.  I took into account these points in considering the two competing accounts of the two men’s dealings with the Jar.  I came, nevertheless to the conclusion that the disagreement in relation to their prior dealings, and the fact that I was not able to accept all of Mr Jeddi’s case in relation to them did not alter the clear conclusions as to the nature of their dealings with the Jar itself, which emerge from the evidence and not least from the Dubai Agreement itself.

Assessment of Mr Jeddi’s factual case

95.	I accept the main features of Mr Jeddi’s case as to what occurred in 2011 and 2012, and in particular as to what occurred at the meeting in Dubai on 25 January 2012.  Specifically, I accept and find: (i) that by some point in 2011 Mr Jeddi had acquired the Jar, not from Mr Pishvaie; (ii) that he wished to see whether it could be sold on the London market; (iii) that he approached Mr Atighehchi to this end, and Mr Atighehchi showed photographs of the Jar, which he had been given by Mr Jeddi, to Mr Gibbs; (iv) that Mr Jeddi decided not to use Mr Atighehchi to consign the Jar to a London auction house, but to ask Mr Pishvaie, who had good relations with Mr Gibbs, to do so; (v) that at the meeting in Dubai on 25 January 2012 Mr Jeddi told Mr Pishvaie that he had had an offer of some US $5 million for the Jar; (vi) that Mr Jeddi handed over the Jar, which had been in his possession, on the basis that Mr Pishvaie would consign it to Sotheby’s, and would, as recompense for whatever was required to be done by him to facilitate a sale, take 25% of the hammer price, less costs of the sale; and (vii) that Mr Pishvaie then took the Jar back to London.
96.	I accept these matters because Mr Jeddi’s evidence on them appeared to me to be credible and supported by the documents, other evidence, and the inherent probabilities.  Thus: 
(1)	The type of arrangement which Mr Jeddi says was made in Dubai is an entirely plausible one.  Mr Jeddi had a potentially very valuable object which he wished to offer for sale in London to seek to attract the best price.  He did not himself have contacts with the London auction houses, and indeed could not travel to London.  Mr Pishvaie did have such contacts, and could travel to London.  
(2)	That Mr Jeddi had been looking for someone with the appropriate contacts to consign the Jar to an auction house is supported by his involvement of Mr Atighehchi, and generally by Mr Atighehchi’s evidence, which was essentially accepted by Mr Pishvaie. 
(3)	The factual account which I accept, as summarised above, and in particular the nature of the arrangements made on 25 January 2012, appears to me to be entirely consistent with, and supported by, the terms of the Dubai Agreement itself.
(4)	That factual account also appears to me to be consistent with the way in which the dealings between the two men are described in the transcripts.  While the transcripts need to be viewed as a whole, particularly significant are the terms of transcripts MP3:13-B and MP3:45-B.
(5)	My rejection of Mr Pishvaie’s factual case means that there is no plausible explanation as to what occurred in 2011/2012 other than Mr Jeddi’s, as set out above. 
97.	It was argued on behalf of Mr Pishvaie that a share of 25% of the sale proceeds would have been excessive if the arrangement had been simply of the sort which Mr Jeddi described, as he would only have had to take the Jar to London and leave it at Sotheby’s.  He argued that it indicated, instead, that there was a co-ownership.  I was not persuaded by this.  I consider that both parties considered that there would be a considerable advantage to be had by the Jar’s being consigned by someone Mr Gibbs knew well.  Furthermore, I consider that both parties must have contemplated that Mr Pishvaie would take care of the import of the Jar into England, either dealing with any duty payable or providing reasons as to why duty was not exigible, and would provide any required information about the Jar (including as to provenance) to ensure its acceptance for sale by an auction house.  These were services for which Mr Pishvaie might be expected to have sought a significant commission.
98.	Thus, as I have set out, I accept the essential features of Mr Jeddi’s case and evidence as to what occurred in 2011/2012 and the nature of his dealings with Mr Pishvaie at the time of the Dubai Agreement.  I have, however, had much more difficulty in accepting his factual case about the provenance of the Jar pre-2011, including its purchase by Mr Mohammadi in 2001, its having been in Dubai from 2001, and its purchase from Mr Mohammadi in 2010.  This version of events finds no support in the transcripts.  Further, as Mr Ramsden QC submitted, there are various features of this account of the Jar’s provenance which appear implausible.  These include:
(1)	That Mr Mohammadi retained no receipt for the purchase of the Jar;
(2)	That Mr Mohammadi did so little to establish the authenticity of the Jar, or to sell it, while it remained, on his account, in Dubai from 2001 to 2010;
(3)	That Mr Mohammadi did not, throughout that period, take a photograph of the Jar, and that the only photograph which was taken – by a friend whose name was not revealed – was of poor quality and has been lost;
(4)	That Mr Jeddi was the first potential purchaser with whom Mr Mohammadi dealt directly in an effort to sell the Jar and this, on his account, was some two to three years after his purchase of the Jar and the Jar was not actually shown to Mr Jeddi for a further four to five years.  
99.	My reservations about accepting Mr Jeddi’s account of the pre-2011 provenance of the Jar have been added to by a concern that it might have had a different provenance which it was in neither side’s interest to reveal to the court.  Specifically, there appeared to me to be a possibility that the Jar had been acquired by Mr Jeddi in Iran, and transported from there to Dubai, but that he did not wish to admit this because he feared that it might cause him trouble with the Iranian authorities.  Such an explanation of what occurred would be consistent with:
(1)	The fact that, as emerges from the transcripts, Mr Jeddi clearly had concerns that his conversations with Mr Pishvaie might be listened in on, and as a result he agreed with Mr Pishvaie that they should refer to the Jar as a “painting”.  I accepted Mr Pishvaie’s evidence that it was the Iranian authorities who Mr Jeddi was concerned might be listening in;
(2)	The reference in the transcripts (paragraph 910) to Mr Jeddi’s having brought the “painting” over – apparently to Dubai – through an airport; and 
(3)	Mr Pishvaie’s belief that Mr Jeddi had brought other items (and in particular the Sasanian jars) out of Iran, but had not wished to reveal this because their export was not permitted.
100.	I concluded that I was not able to say that Mr Jeddi’s account of the provenance of the Jar before 2011 was more likely than not to be true.  I was left unsure as to what that provenance was, and I make no finding on the point. 
101.	For completeness, I should say that I have considered whether my doubts as to Mr Jeddi’s account of the pre-2011 provenance of the Jar affect my acceptance of his account of the facts in 2011 / 2012.  I do not consider that they do.  As I have said, my acceptance of his account of the facts in 2011/ 2012 is based not merely on accepting his own evidence but on the consistency of his account with the documents and the inherent probabilities.  It is not difficult to imagine reasons as to why he might not have presented the full picture as to the Jar’s pre-2011 provenance but have been accurate as to the events of 2011/2012.
Conclusions

102.	I have found that Mr Pishvaie did not and does not have the 25% ownership of the Jar which he claims.
103.	The parties informed me that it was agreed between them that, if I found that Mr Pishvaie did not have the ownership interest he claimed, Mr Jeddi had the immediate right to possession of the Jar.  That is enough to dispose of this aspect of the interpleader issue.
104.	Quite apart from the agreement of the parties, however, I consider that it is correct that Mr Jeddi has shown an immediate right to possession of the Jar.  That question is to be approached by reference to a comparison of the comparative rights of the claimants to the property rather than by determination of the question of absolute entitlement: Parker v British Airways Board [1982] 1 QB 1004; Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher [1995] QB 334, especially at 345C/D per Auld LJ; Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427; Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2001] 1 WLR 1437 at [14] per Lightman J.
105.	I find the position to be as follows:
(1)	At the time of the meeting in Dubai on 25 January 2012, Mr Jeddi was in possession of the Jar. He therefore had at least a possessory title which was good as against all save anyone who could assert that they were, or were claiming through, the true owner or had a prior and subsisting right to keep the chattel.  Mr Pishvaie fell into neither of those categories of exception.
(2)	The legal effect of the Dubai Agreement and Mr Jeddi’s handing over of the Jar was that (i) Mr Jeddi authorised Mr Pishvaie to sell the Jar for him as his agent, (ii) agreed to pay Mr Pishvaie a commission if the Jar were sold, and (iii) bailed the Jar to Mr Pishvaie for the purposes of the sale.  
(3)	As confirmed in Angove’s Pty Ltd v Bailey [2016] UKSC 47, [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [6] per Lord Sumption JSC, the general rule is that the authority of an agent may be revoked by the principal, even if it is agreed by their contract to be irrevocable.   While this position is subject to exceptions none of them applies here. Specifically, while there is an exception where the agreement between principal and agent is that the authority is irrevocable and where the agent has a relevant interest of his own in the exercise of the authority, it is also clear that an authority will not be irrevocable where the agent’s only interest is a commercial interest in being able to earn his commission: Angove’s Pty Ltd v Bailey at [9].  Here, in my judgment the agency created by the Dubai Agreement was not agreed to be irrevocable, and certainly was not agreed to be irrevocable even if significant efforts to sell the Jar had been made and had failed; and in any event Mr Pishvaie’s only interest in the exercise of the authority was to earn the commission. 
(4)	Mr Jeddi has revoked Mr Pishavie’s authority.  This revocation was effected, at latest, by 30 July 2014 when Ms Young of Sotheby’s told Mr Pishvaie that Mr Jeddi no longer wanted him to act as Mr Jeddi’s agent.  That the authority has been revoked has been repeatedly confirmed thereafter, including during these proceedings.
(5)	The purpose of the bailment of the Jar to Mr Pishvaie was to enable him to sell the Jar.  Once his authority had been terminated, the purpose of the bailment came to an end, and with it Mr Pishvaie’s right to possession of the Jar.
106.	In the circumstances, Mr Pishvaie has no proprietary interest in the Jar, nor actual possession of it, nor a right to possession.  Mr Jeddi has, as between the two claimants, an immediate right to possession.