United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

A black background with a black square Description automatically generated with medium confidence

 

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI- 2023-004450
	First-tier Tribunal No: RP/00057/2020

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24 March 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

 

Between

 

AK

(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)

Appellant

and

 

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Respondent

 

Representation

For the Appellant: Ms G Patel instructed by Broudie Jackson Canter Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

 

Heard at Field House on 5 November 2024

Decision and Reasons

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Introduction

1.              The appellant is a national of Zimbabwe. On 22 June 2020, the respondent made a decision to revoke the appellant's refugee status after the appellant had amassed a series of convictions for a range of offences between March 2011 and June 2019. The appellant was subsequently convicted on 25 September 2020 of causing death by dangerous driving, driving without a license, using a vehicle without a license, using a vehicle whilst uninsured and aggravated vehicle taking. The appellant pleaded guilty to those offences, and he received a custodial sentence of 8 years. In a supplementary letter dated 31 August 2022 the respondent certified that the presumption under section 72(2) Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ("NIAA 2002") applies to the appellant.

2.              The appellant's appeal against the respondent's decisions was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Thapar ("the judge") for reasons set out in her decision promulgated on 7 August 2023. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The decision of the FtT was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Grimes for reasons set out in a decision issued on 13 December 2023 ("the error of law decision"). In the error of law decision, the Upper Tribunal said:

"46. ... For the avoidance of any doubt, we preserve the findings made by Judge Thappar that:

i) The appellant has not rebutted the section 72 NIAA 2002 presumption that he is a danger to the community in the UK; and

ii) The appellant has not established that his removal to Zimbabwe will be in breach of Article 3.

47. The remaining issue as to whether the appellant's removal to Zimbabwe will be in breach of Article 8 will be determined by the Upper Tribunal following a hearing..."

The hearing of the appeal Before me

3.              At the outset of the hearing, Ms Patel confirmed that the issue in the appeal is the appellant's Article 8 claim, and in particular, whether the appellant can establish that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions 1 and 2, as set out in s117C(6) of the NIAA 2002. I was told that the matter would be dealt with by submissions only.

4.              Ms Patel referred to the psychiatric report of Dr Dilum Jayawickrama ("Dr Jayawickrama"), a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist dated 13 June 2024 obtained in support of the appeal [35]. The report confirms, at paragraph [2] that the appellant is currently detained under Section 47/49 of the Mental Health Act 1983 on Howell Ward (Medium secure high dependency ward) since his transfer from HMP Huntercombe on 7 March 2024. He was transferred due to a relapse of his bipolar affective disorder and presenting risks within the prison environment. The appellant is still detained. The decision of the Mental Health Tribunal dated 10 September 2024 confirms that the appellant ceased to be a section 47/49 patient on 24 July 2024 because his fixed period of imprisonment ended but was then detained as a s37 patient.

5.              Ms Patel submits Dr Jayawickrama has set out the appellant's psychiatric history at some length and it seems that periods of non-compliance with medication in the past has resulted in a deterioration in his mental health. The index offence occurred at a time when the appellant was prescribed 'Aripiprazole,' an anti-psychotic medication that he did not find helpful. Dr Jayawickrama refers to various reports prepared over the years which demonstrate the appellant has been under mental health services since February 2013 and has previously been found to have a moderate to severe learning disorder, and there is evidence of attention deficit hyperactive disorder. Dr Jayawickrama records, at paragraph [55] of the report, the appellant's claim that at the time of the index offence the appellant was manic and was not on any medication although he was prescribed with a monthly injection of Aripiprazole. Whilst at HMP Stocken, he presented as acutely unwell showing bizarre unpredictable behavior and on 21 December 2020 he was admitted to the Tamarind Centre, initially to the seclusion suite, where he presented as being 'thought disordered and elated in mood.". The reports indicate that during his time in prison, the appellant had shown very limited insight into his illness and attributed his symptoms solely to ADHD, and overall, his progress deteriorated with a worsening of his manic and psychotic symptoms.

6.              Dr Jayawickrama confirms the appellant was transferred to Llanarth Court Hospital on 7 March 2024 and following the commencement of the depot medication and also due to the structure and support around him, his mental state started to gradually improve. However, within a few weeks his compliance with oral medication declined and he started to miss medication resulting in a further relapse of his mental illness. He assaulted a member of staff. He was returned to seclusion and injectable olanzapine was recommenced. Dr Jayawickrama confirms the appellant is currently prescribed Olanzapine depot injection intramuscular (300mgs fortnightly ), Valproic Acid 1000mgs in the evening, 500mgs in the morning and Nicotine replacements.

7.              Ms Patel submits Dr Jayawickrama expresses the opinion that the appellant's history suggest a complex clinical picture. There is clear information that the appellant has presented to services with symptoms suggestive of a bipolar affective disorder, and has been diagnosed with intellectual difficulties and suffers with learning difficulties of a moderate to severe degree. He has had frequent relapses, possibly due to non-compliance with medication and being under the influence of illicit substances. More recently, at HMP Huntercombe, the appellant relapsed with another manic episode, but following a period of successful treatment within Llanarth Court, the appellant "has achieved some stability of his mental disorder and is currently concordant with his medication without any significant manic symptoms."

8.              Dr Jayawickrama's opinion is that the appellant has bipolar affective disorder, with mild learning disability and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). His symptoms of his ADHD have improved with age and currently, he is not significantly affected by this disorder. Dr Jayawickrama states that the bipolar affective disorder is a relapsing, remitting and a lifelong condition, and the appellant is likely to have further relapses, more frequent relapses with age, and a reduction in his period of remission. The appellant needs significant support at present to manage his disorder and at present, would need to remain in hospital to manage his mental disorder, achieve a period of stability, and to be provided with further treatment including pharmacological and psychological treatment. Dr Jayawickrama states, at present, the appellant is not suitable to manage his own medication and within the medium secure high dependency environment his medication compliance is closely monitored. Dr Jayawickrama is not fully aware of the services available in Zimbabwe, but is clear that if the appellant is unable to access medication or if he is non-compliant with medication, there is a significant risk that he will destabilise in his mental health and present as a risk to his health, to others and to his own safety.

9.              Ms Patel also refers to the letter from Dr Jayawickrama dated 1 August 2024 in which it is said that during his stay in hospital the appellant's mental health has improved and the appellant is "currently relatively stable with his bipolar affective disorder". He is said to be compliant with his medication and was recently granted "ground leaves". Dr Jayawickrama confirms that the Mental Health Review Tribunal has requested further information to identify a potential appropriate placement for the appellant and as the responsible clinician, Dr Jayawickrama will be urging the importance of discharging the appellant to the community with an appropriate support package/accommodation. Dr Jayawickrama note the appellant's immigration status is an ongoing "stress factor" that could cause a relapse of his mental disorder. A negative decision could cause an emotional reaction.

10.          Ms Patel refers to the decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal which refers to the evidence of Dr Jayawickrama, and the Probation Officer, Ms Dickson. The Tribunal accepted the unchallenged evidence of the diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder made by Dr Jayawickrama. The Tribunal noted the appellant responds to medication and that the appellant is in a highly supportive setting. Ms Patel submits the letter from the Probation Officer, Hannah Dickson, dated 16 October 2024 records that following a recent multidisciplinary team meeting it was concluded that a low secure mental health facility would be the preferred discharge plan, and that inquiries are ongoing regarding a placement. The appellant will be subject to weekly probation appointments.

11.          Ms Patel submits that the respondent's 'CPIN - Zimbabwe: Medical treatment and healthcare (April 2021) addresses the availability of facilities and treatment for mental healthcare and psychiatric care in section 5. Although facilities exist, patients do not have medications to treat their illness due to drug shortages and psychiatrists prescribe all patients the same outdated, unspecified drug, often rife with side effects. Ms Patel submits the background material demonstrates the appellant would face very significant obstacles to his integration in Zimbabwe.

12.          Ms Patel refers to the decision in TC (PS compliance - "issues based" reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 164. As here, the Tribunal was concerned with a national of Zimbabwe who had come to the UK with his mother at a young age. The appellant had been diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder with psychotic features. The FtT allowed the appeal. Although the Upper Tribunal accepted there were other errors in the decision of the FtT, the Upper Tribunal found there to be no error in the FtT's decision that the appeal succeeded on Article 3 grounds. As here, the appellant had relied upon evidence that he requires antipsychotic medication which the CPIN confirms to be unavailable in Zimbabwe. There it was conceded on behalf of the respondent that if the FtT was right to allow the appeal on Article 3 grounds, it could not be said that the appellant has not established 'very significant obstacles to his integration to Zimbabwe.

13.          In reply, Mr Lawson submits that here, there is a preserved finding that t he appellant has not established that his removal to Zimbabwe will be in breach of Article 3. The appellant is currently detained under s37 of the Mental Health Act and in his report dated 14 January 2021, Dr Maganty, a Consultant Forensic Psychologist recorded that when asked on 17 December 2020 about his plans for mental health support after returning to Zimbabwe, the appellant had said: "..he would not need his Aripiprazole as he was not "really ill...", and that he looked forward to spending time with his father. The appellant had referred to a sister on his mother's side living in Birmingham and three step-brothers on his paternal side, all living in Botswana. Mr Lawson refers to the statement made by the appellant's mother, in which she claims that she has a brother in Zimbabwe who has 'a family of 6' and could not support the appellant. Mr Lawson submits there is therefore some evidence of at least some support available to the appellant in Zimbabwe and a network that he can turn to. In the decision, the respondent referred to the appellant's mental health and the diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder. The respondent referred to the CPIN: Zimbabwe: Medical treatment and healthcare, April 2021 which sets out the treatment and medication available in Zimbabwe. Mr Lawson submits that standard of treatment available in Zimbabwe may not be the same as that in the UK, but treatment will be available to the appellant.

Decision

14.         The appellant has appealed the respondent's decisions to refuse his human rights claim under s.82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on the ground that the decision is unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

15.         It is uncontroversial that the appellant has established a family and private life in the UK. T he decision to refuse the appellant's human rights claim has consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. I accept that the interference is in accordance with the law, and that the interference is necessary to protect the legitimate aim of immigration control and the prevention of crime and disorder. The central issue in this appeal is whether the decision to deport the appellant is proportionate to the legitimate aim. The burden shifts to the respondent to establish that the decision is proportionate.

16.         Section 117A in Part 5A of the NIAA 2002 provides that, when a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and, as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the HRA 1998, the court, in considering the public interest question, must (in particular) have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B and, additionally, in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C. Section 117C specifically deals with the weight to be attached to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals and provides a structure for conducting the necessary balancing exercise, dependent in part, on the length of sentence imposed.

17.         On 25 September 2020 the appellant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving, driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence, using a vehicle while uninsured and aggravated vehicle taking. He was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. The appellant is a foreign criminal, as defined in s117D(2) of the NIAA 2002. Applying s117C(6) of the 2002 Act, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

18.         I have been provided with a letter dated 16 October 2024 from Hannah Dickson, the allocated Probation Officer for the appellant. She refers to the appellant's convictions, and states that enquiries are on-going regarding the appellant's discharge to, preferably, a low secure mental health facility. The appellant has expressed a desire to return to Birmingham where his mother resides, on discharge. She states the appellant will be subject to weekly probation appointments given he is assessed as high risk of serious harm. His appointments will comprise of telephone appointments, home visits and office visits. The frequency of his reporting will be reviewed and reduced dependant on risk, behaviour, and engagement/compliance. He will be subject to additional licence conditions that will include notifying his supervising officer of any developing personal relationships, and requirements for the purposes of ensuring that he addresses his alcohol and drug problems. He will need to wear an electronic tag and must take part in activities as directed by his probation officer. Hannah Dickson confirms the appellant is currently assessed as MAPPA CAT 2 Level 1.

19.         As Ms Patel identified at the outset of the hearing, the live issue in the appeal is whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 of s117C of the 2002 Act so at to outweigh the public interest such that the deportation of the appellant is disproportionate.

20.         In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, Lord Hamblen referred to the 'very compelling circumstances' test. He cited the judgement of Sales LJ in Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 WLR 4203, at [50], that the 'very compelling circumstances' test "provides a safety valve, with an appropriately high threshold of application, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them".

21.         In Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 1626, Lord Justice Underhill explained:

"53. The starting-point is to identify the basic structure of the law in this area. At para. 47 of his judgment in  HA (Iraq) Lord Hamblen approved the summary which I gave at para. 29 of my judgment in this Court:

"(A)  In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does  not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.

(B)  In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply - that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements - a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'."

...

57.   NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over-and-above requirement is that, in a case where the "very compelling circumstances" on which a claimant relies under section 117C(6) include an Exception-specified circumstance ("an Exception-overlap case") ⁹  it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5): as Jackson LJ puts it at para. 29, the article 8 case must be "especially strong". That higher threshold may be reached  either because the circumstance in question is present to a degree which is "well beyond" what would be sufficient to establish a "bare case",  or - as shown by the phrases which I have italicised in paras. 29 and 30 - because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances,  or because of a combination of both. I will refer to those considerations, of whichever kind, as "something more". To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of the claimant's deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree ("unduly unduly harsh"?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors - perhaps very long residence in this country (even if Exception 1 is not satisfied) - to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold; or, as I have said, a combination of the two.

...

62. ...  I agree that it would in principle conduce to transparent decision-making if the tribunal identified with precision in every case what the something more consisted of; but that will not always be straightforward. The proportionality assessment is generally multi-factorial and requires a holistic approach. A tribunal must of course in its reasons identify the factors to which it has given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two. There may be cases where for some reason peculiar to the case this degree of specificity is necessary; but I do not believe that there is any universal rule. We should not make decision-making in this area more complicated than it regrettably already is."

22.         It is useful to first address the reliance that Ms Patel places upon the decision of the Upper Tribunal in TC (PS compliance - "issues based" reasoning) Zimbabwe. There, as here, the appellant had relied upon evidence that he requires antipsychotic medication. The Upper Tribunal noted, at [49], that there was no dispute that the medication prescribed to the appellant, olanzapine, is unavailable in Zimbabwe. The presenting officer had been unable to take the Upper Tribunal to any evidence inconsistent with the FtT's conclusion that there would be no community mental health treatment available to the appellant, which on the evidence before the Tribunal was vital to maintain his fragile mental health. The Upper Tribunal concluded the FtT's conclusions on Article 3 were adequately based on the evidence before the Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal noted, at [53], that in many cases, the respondent seeks to adduce additional evidence on available medication but that did not happen in that case. I accept, as Mr Lawson submits, there is a preserved finding here that the appellant has not established that his removal to Zimbabwe will be in breach of Article 3. In any event, here, in the respondent's decision of 22 June 2020, the respondent considered the evidence then available that the appellant had been diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder and was being treated with a depot (injection) antipsychotic medication to manage his condition. The respondent said:

"...The MedCOI database stated that there are psychiatrists in Zimbabwe who can treat people with long-term chronic psychiatric conditions. There are also psychiatric hospitals in Zimbabwe.... Citalopram, fluoxetine, paroxetine, risperidone, and olanzapine are available in Zimbabwe. ( my emphasis) The MedCOI database further stated: 'Treatment is sufficient, but not optimally. Not all current medication is available. Mirtazapine can be replaced by citalopram, fluoxetine orparoxetine. Paliperidone can be replaced by olanzapine or risperidone. (my emphasis) There is no medication available for side effects of antipsychotics, but by lowering the dose of the antipsychotic, these can be prevented or made less severe. It is also possible that by changing the antipsychotic, the side effects will disappear or be less severe..."

23.         The appellant's presentation following his remand and sentence of imprisonment is set out in paragraphs [68] to [93] of the report. The evidence of Dr Jayawickrama is that the appellant's mental state has significantly improved with the psychotropic medication currently prescribed (olanzapine depot 300mg fortnightly and Valporic acid 1500mgs in divided doses). I accept it is important that the appellant continues with his medication. I also accept, as Dr Jayawickrama states, that if the appellant is unable to access medication or if he is non-compliant with medication, there is a significant risk that he will destabilise in his mental health and present as a risk to his health, to others and to his own safety. There are, according to Dr Jayawickrama, alternative medications to address bipolar affective disorder that can be considered if there is a lack of further response to the current treatment that he is receiving.

24.         A review of the CPIN relied upon by the parties demonstrates that essential antipsychotic, antidepressant, anxiolytic, mood-stabilizing, and antiepileptic medications are sometimes present at specialist mental health facilities and even at primary care facilities in Zimbabwe. There are difficulties with chronic shortages of some of the medications and unreliable supply chains, although paying users may access these drugs through the private sector.

25.         There is therefore, here, evidence that the antipsychotic medication prescribed to the appellant, olanzapine, is available in Zimbabwe and that it can be used as a replacement for medication such as paliperidone if that is not available. Bipolar affective disorder is a relapsing and remitting disorder and Dr Jayawickrama is unable to comment on the mental health services that may be available to the appellant in Zimbabwe or the support that he would receive. In her statement, the appellant's mother confirms she has a brother in Zimbabwe. She did not attend the hearing before me so that her evidence could be tested in cross-examination. Even if her brother has his own family, I do not accept that he would not provide the appellant with any support at all. The appellant has not established that psychotropic medication that he is currently prescribed would not be available to him or that he would not receive financial help from his family in the United Kingdom and some help from his maternal uncle in Zimbabwe in order to access medication and care. I accept that there will be some deterioration in his mental health following removal with a detrimental effect in the short term. However, it can be reasonably inferred that he will receive some support from his maternal uncle to access treatment. The appellant has not adduced evidence capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he would face a real risk on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in Zimbabwe or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy "intense suffering". The appellant's appeal cannot succeed on Article 3 grounds.

26.         Ms Patel does not invite me to revisit the preserved finding. The appellant is a 'serious offender' (having been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years) and therefore the public interest requires his deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, set out in s117C of the 2002 Act. The test in s117C(6) is a proportionality test, balancing the rights of the appellant against the public interest in his deportation. The scales are nevertheless weighted heavily in favour of deportation. Given the nature of the offences for which the appellant has been convicted and the length of his sentence, there is a cogent and strong public interest in his deportation.

27.         Against the cogent public interest in deportation, I have had regard to the evidence before me and all that is submitted by Ms Patel on behalf of the appellant, which, Ms Patel claims, taken cumulatively, outweigh the public interest. In reaching my decision although neither the appellant nor his mother gave evidence before me, I have had regard to the statement made by the appellant's mother dated 21 November 2022, that was previously before the FtT. I have had regard to the previous psychiatric reports relied upon by the appellant before the FtT and have considered the evidence that was before the FtT. I have not considered it necessary to set out that evidence in any detail in this decision. I have had particular regard to the updated psychiatric report prepared by Dr Jayawickrama and the letter dated 1 August 2024. I have also considered the appellant's medical records, the letter from the appellant's probation officer, Hannah Dickson dated 16 October 2024 and the decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal dated 20 September 2024. Ms Patel claims the additional evidence now available is strong evidence that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration to Zimbabwe.

28.         As far as Exception 1 is concerned, the appellant arrived in the UK in April 2005 aged 10. On a purely arithmetical calculation, I accept the appellant has been resident in the UK for most of his life.

29.         It is now well established that the question whether a foreign criminal is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom is to be determined in accordance with common sense. In her statement, the appellant's mother describes the difficulties experienced by the appellant because of his learning difficulties and years of ridicule for not being able to read and write. She claims he is vulnerable and open to exploitation and manipulation. Dr Jayawickrama refers to the appellant having attended school in London following his arrival in the UK and to his having left school at the age of 17 without any meaningful qualifications. Dr Jayawickrama refers to the appellant having completed voluntary work but never having been involved in any paid employment during his adult life. His longest personal relationship lasted for three years when he was living in Liverpool but that relationship broke down after it became chaotic with drug use. I have been provided with a PNC print that sets out the appellant's offending history, which sets out seventeen convictions for 30 offences between 2011 and 2020. On any view, the appellant has a long history of convictions during his adolescence. T he appellant had regularly been committing offences and there is very limited evidence before me regarding the appellant's social and cultural integration. The focus of the appellant's adolescent years in the UK appears to have been substance abuse, and engagement in criminal activity, leading to a lengthy custodial sentence. There is no evidence before me that the appellant has taken any opportunity provided, constructively, for example, to learn new skills that will assist him in the future. Looking at the evidence before me holistically, and having regard to the appellant's upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, together with the relationships he has with family and friends, I do not accept that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.

30.         I am just persuaded, as Ms Patel submits, that the appellant would encounter very significant obstacles to re-integration in Zimbabwe. I remind myself that the assessment of 'integration' calls for a broad evaluative judgement as set out by Sales LJ in SSHD -v- Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, at [14]. The appellant arrived in the UK with his mother who made a successful claim for asylum. The appellant was granted refugee status as a dependent of his mother. In her witness statement, the appellant's mother claims the appellant has grown up in the UK and only understands the UK culture. She claims he does not understand Zimbabwe culture and claims that he would stand out as someone from the UK. I accept the appellant was a child when he left Zimbabwe, but he was not so young that he would not have any knowledge about life there. The appellant speaks English, which is the language used in government and business and as the main medium of instruction in schools.

31.         The evidence of Dr Jayawickrama is that the appellant's mental state has significantly improved with the psychotropic medication currently prescribed (olanzapine depot 300mg fortnightly and Valporic acid 1500mgs in divided doses). In the letter dated 1 August 2024, Dr Jayawickrama confirms the appellant's mental health has improved during his stay in hospital and that he is currently relatively stable with his bipolar affective disorder. He is currently compliant with his medication and was "recently granted ground leaves". Dr Jayawickrama stresses the importance of the appellant being discharged to the community with an appropriate support package rather to an unknown place. As I have said, I accept that there will be some deterioration in the appellant's mental health following removal with a detrimental effect in the short term. The appellant has no qualifications and no work experience beyond the voluntary work he has completed. On the evidence before me I am just persuaded that the hardship the appellant will encounter reaches the level of severity required by s117C(4)(c) of the 2002 Act.

32.         Notwithstanding the fact that the appellant would encounter very significant obstacles to re-integration in Zimbabwe, I have found the appellant is not socially and culturally integrated in the UK. He therefore fails to meet the first exception to deportation set out in s117C(4) of the 2002 Act. The appellant is not in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner and neither does he have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child. Exception 2 is therefore irrelevant. The appellant therefore fails to meet the statutory exceptions to deportation.

33.         Ms Patel submits the strength of the evidence that is now available, taken together with other factors such as the appellant's length of residence in the UK and the lack of support in Zimbabwe, is such that that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exception 1.

34.         The test in s117C(6) is a proportionality test, balancing the rights of the appellant against the public interest in his deportation. The scales are nevertheless weighted heavily in favour of deportation. The public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. I attach due weight to the length of time the appellant has spent in the UK. However the appellant is not socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and much of his life in the UK has been mired by criminal activity. The lack of any further convictions is explained by the fact that the appellant has been serving a sentence of imprisonment and has then been detained rather than any positive steps taken by the appellant towards rehabilitation. It is clear that the appellant still poses a risk and that on release, he will be subject to a series of stringent conditions.

35.         The very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration in Zimbabwe are the combination of the appellant's mental health, his lack of qualifications and limited work experience. Although there will be treatment available to the appellant in Zimbabwe to manage his mental health, I accept that the combination of those factors is such that I am just persuaded they amount to very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration in Zimbabwe.

36.         On return there will inevitably be some disruption for the appellant to begin with, but there are facilities available in Zimbabwe, albeit limited, to assist in the management of the appellant's mental health. The appellant has a maternal uncle in Zimbabwe and even if the support that he and his family are able to provide is limited because of their own difficulties, I am satisfied that they would provide at least some support in the short term. There will inevitably be a period of adjustment. The appellant has benefitted from some financial support from his mother and there is no reason why that cannot continue.

37.         Even giving due weight to the length of time that the appellant has been in the UK, the circumstances of his arrival and the fact that I am just persuaded that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration into Zimbabwe, something more is required. Having considered the evidence as a whole, whilst I accept that he will naturally encounter some hardship in returning to Zimbabwe, I find that the appellant has failed to establish an Article 8 claim that goes beyond the exceptions to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold required to establish very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

38.         In my final analysis, I find the appellant's protected rights, whether considered collectively with rights of others that he has formed associations with, or individually, are not in my judgement such as to outweigh the public interest in the appellant's removal having regard to the policy of the respondent as expressed in the immigration rules and the 2002 Act. I am not satisfied that the public interest is weakened to the point where it is capable of being outweighed by the appellant's Article 8 claim. I am satisfied that on the facts here, the decision to refuse his Article 8 claim is not disproportionate to the legitimate aim and I therefore dismiss the appeal on Article 8 grounds.

Notice of Decision

 

39.         The appeal is dismissed on Article 8 grounds.

 

V. Mandalia

Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

14 March 2025