United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-005407
	First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59953/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

 

On 4 ^th of April 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

 

Between

 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Appellant

and

 

JS

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

For the Respondent: Mr Richardson, instructed by Lawmatic Solicitors

 

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2025

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court .

DECISION AND REASONS

 

Introduction

1.              The Secretary of State appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 15 October 2024 allowing the Respondent's appeal on protection grounds.

2.              For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that the First-tier Tribunal's decision did not involve the making of an error of law and we decline to set it aside.

Background

3.              The Respondent is a national of Bangladesh who arrived in the UK on 28 September 2021 and claimed asylum on 7 December 2021. The basis of his claim was that he had been politically active in Bangladesh as the General Secretary of his branch of the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal ('JCD'), the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party ('BNP'), as a result of which he had been attacked, arrested, imprisoned and subjected to prosecution on false charges brought by local Awami League leaders.

4.              The Secretary of State refused the Respondent's asylum claim on 24 October 2023. Although the Secretary of State rejected the Respondent's account of events in Bangladesh in its entirety, the decision recognised that if the material facts of the Respondent's claim were accepted, then there would not be sufficient protection in Bangladesh and internal relocation would not be viable. The Respondent appealed the refusal of his protection claim and the Secretary of State carried out a review on 30 May 2024 which maintained the decision on a similar basis. Again, it was accepted in the review that if the material parts of the Respondent's account were accepted, then issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would not arise.

5.              On 5 August 2024, Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power following weeks of violent protests and unrest. An interim government was established on 8 August 2024 under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus.

6.              The Respondent's appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 26 September 2024, shortly after the fall of the Awami League government. It does not appear that either party sought to adduce evidence at that hearing which addressed the change of government or its relevance to the Respondent's case.

The First-tier Tribunal's decision

7.              The First-tier Tribunal found the Respondent to be a credible witness, noting that his consistent and detailed account was supported by documentary evidence. The judge made a number of detailed factual findings which accepted the Respondent's account of his political activity for the BNP in Bangladesh, his arrest and detention for two months on a false charge brought by the president of the local Awami League in 2018, a physical attack on the Respondent and another person at his father's shop, and prosecution on a second false charge by the vice-chairman of the local Awami League in June 2020 which led to an arrest warrant being issued for the Respondent in May 2021.

8.              The judge also accepted that the Respondent had posted material on Facebook critical of the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina, as a result of which he had received threats on Facebook, his account had been hacked and posts deleted, and his family home in Bangladesh had been attacked in January 2024.

9.              At paragraph 40 of the decision, the First-tier Tribunal concluded that the Respondent would still be at risk on return notwithstanding the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government, because Awami League supporters continued to present a potential risk to their political opponents at a local level despite their power and influence having greatly reduced. The Tribunal took into account the fact that the Respondent had previously attracted adverse attention from local Awami League opponents, and that his genuine political beliefs meant he would continue to be politically active on return.

10.          The Secretary of State appealed on the sole ground that the reasoning of the First-tier Tribunal was not adequate. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 25 November 2024.

11.          The matter came before the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 27 February 2025. Having heard submissions from the parties we reserved our decision.

The parties' submissions

12.          On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Parvar submitted that in light of the fall of the Awami League government, the individuals who the Respondent feared were no longer state actors; there had been no evidence before the judge to show that there would not be sufficient protection, or that internal relocation was not a viable option. Mr Parvar accepted that the Secretary of State had not filed further evidence before the First-tier Tribunal nor carried out a further review of the Respondent's case following the change of government. He submitted however that the issues were obvious in light of the change of regime, and were likely to have been raised in submissions by the presenting officer. The First-tier Tribunal's conclusions at paragraph 40 were supposition and were not safe in light of the significant political change in Bangladesh.

13.          For the Respondent, Mr Richardson submitted that the Appellant's appeal, although framed as a challenge to the adequacy of reasons of the First-tier Tribunal, was in essence a perversity challenge to the Tribunal's conclusion. The reasons given for the First-tier Tribunal's conclusion at paragraph 40 were perfectly adequate. The First-tier Tribunal had made clear findings of fact and accepted the Respondent's account of past persecution, and there was no material before the judge which suggested that the presumption in paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules did not apply. The Secretary of State's position in the refusal letter and review had been that if the facts of the Respondent's account were accepted, neither sufficiency of protection nor internal relocation fell to be considered. There was nothing in the submissions recorded in the determination which indicated that the Secretary of State's position at the First-tier Tribunal hearing was different.

Decision

14.          The duty to give adequate reasons for a judicial decision is well established: English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409. What is required will depend on the nature of the case and the dispute between the parties, but the essential principle is that adequate reasons should be given which enable the parties, and any appellate court, to understand the basis of the decision. The question of whether reasons for a judgment are adequate is fact-specific, and the judgment must be read fairly and as a whole: R (on the application of AI) v West Berkshire Council [2025] EWCA Civ 136. The need for judicial restraint by an appellate court when considering the reasoning of the First-tier Tribunal is also well established: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at §72.

15.          The Appellant's grounds of appeal asserted that the First-tier Tribunal had erred by "failing to give any reasons" for its conclusion that the Respondent would be at risk on return not only in his home area but elsewhere in Bangladesh. In oral submissions, however, Mr Parvar focused not on the absence of reasons, but rather on whether the Tribunal's reasons were adequate and supported by the evidence before it.

16.          In this case, the First-tier Tribunal's finding that the Respondent was at risk on return must be seen in the context of the judgment as a whole and the credibility findings made in the Respondent's favour. The Tribunal had accepted the Respondent's account of his past ill-treatment by local Awami League politicians, which included physical attacks, arrest and detention, and two prosecutions on false charges prior to his departure from Bangladesh, as well as online threats, hacking of his social media account and an attack on his family since his departure. The Tribunal also accepted that the Respondent's political beliefs were genuine, and found that he was therefore likely to continue his political activities for the BNP on return. None of those findings is challenged by the Appellant.

17.          The First-tier Tribunal's conclusions must also be considered in light of the positions of the parties at the appeal hearing. The Secretary of State had accepted, both in the refusal letter and in the subsequent review, that if the material facts of the Respondent's account were accepted, then neither sufficiency of protection nor internal relocation arose. Whilst both the refusal letter and the review pre-dated the change in government in Bangladesh, the Appellant had not sought to amend the decision or reconsider the basis of refusal. There is nothing in the decision to suggest that at the First-tier Tribunal hearing the Appellant raised sufficiency of protection or internal relocation as issues which the Tribunal was required to determine; indeed, the issues in dispute as set out at paragraphs 6-8 of the decision identified only the credibility of the Respondent's account of his experiences in Bangladesh and whether his sur place activities in the UK were likely to place him at risk.

18.          The Appellant's original case, in the grounds of appeal, that the First-tier Tribunal failed to give any reasons for its conclusions is simply unsustainable when one looks at the decision as a whole and at paragraph 40 in particular. In that paragraph the First-tier Tribunal set out five reasons for its conclusion that the Respondent would be at risk on return, despite the fall of the Awami League government. First, the judge considered that it was "common sense" that the change in government did not mean that Awami League activists or supporters had disappeared. Second, the judge noted that Awami League activists continued to be bitterly opposed to BNP supporters and that violence between the two groups was commonplace. Third, the judge concluded that Awami League activists continued to pose a risk to political opponents at a local level despite their influence and power having been greatly reduced following the change in regime. Fourth, the judge considered that whilst the level of risk posed to an individual by local Awami League opponents would depend on an individual's profile and level of political activity, the fact that the Respondent had previously attracted adverse attention from local opponents was indicative of a real risk in his home area. Lastly, the judge concluded that whilst the Respondent could escape the particular individuals who had targeted him in his home area by relocating, his genuine political beliefs meant that he would be at risk of attracting similar adverse attention elsewhere. The judge noted that the adverse attention was not limited to the bringing of false criminal cases, as the Respondent had been physically assaulted and his family home had been damaged previously.

19.          We observe that the central submission which the Appellant now makes to the Upper Tribunal, i.e. that sufficient protection and/or internal relocation would be available to the Respondent following the change of government in Bangladesh, does not appear to have been made to the First-tier Tribunal.

20.          The reasoning of the First-tier Tribunal was clear, structured and succinct, and was based on robust and detailed credibility and factual findings which have not been challenged by the Appellant. The Tribunal took into account the need to consider the change of government, but the reasoning at paragraph 40 was not based on the national political situation; instead, the judge's reasoning focused on the local situation and the likelihood of a continuation of past ill-treatment by local Awami League political activists. The First-tier Tribunal's conclusion that Awami League supporters had not disappeared as a result of the political change was, as the Tribunal said 'common sense', and it was similarly open to the Tribunal to conclude that the bitter animosity shown by Awami League supporters towards BNP supporters at a local level was unlikely to be eradicated by the change of government. It was also open to the Tribunal to find that Awami League members could still pose a risk to political opponents at a local level; indeed, the Appellant's own grounds of appeal to this court recognised that some Awami League members remained in positions of power. The First-tier Tribunal's conclusion that there was a real risk of further ill-treatment in the Respondent's home area on return, given his past experiences, was clearly reasoned and was open to it on the evidence.

21.          In considering the viability of internal relocation, the First-tier Tribunal correctly directed itself by reference to HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31. The finding that the Respondent's political beliefs were genuine has not been challenged by the Appellant. In that context, the conclusion that the Respondent's political beliefs, which had resulted in past attacks and ill-treatment by local political opponents, were likely to put him at risk of similar ill-treatment if he relocated outside his home area, was a finding which was entirely open to the Tribunal.

22.          We consider that the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning was more than adequate to explain its conclusions, which were open to the judge on the evidence. There was no error of law in the decision.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and we decline to set it aside.

The Secretary of State's appeal is dismissed.

 

 

L Hirst

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

1 April 2025