United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2024-005645
	First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58873/2023

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On the 24 March 2025

 

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

 

Between

 

AS

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Ms. Yong, instructed by M & N Solicitors.

For the Respondent: Mr. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Field House on 19 March 2025

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Anonymity was ordered by the First-tier Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force.

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

Background

1.          The appellant, a citizen of Albania, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Davison (the 'judge') promulgated on 6 ^th October 2024.

2.          The appellant first arrived in the UK in 2015. In March 2019 he was sentenced a total of 48 months imprisonment comprising 36 months imprisonment for the offence of possession of cocaine with intent to supply together and a consecutive sentence of 12 months imprisonment for possessing cannabis with intent to supply. The appellant was deported in February 2020.

3.          On 13 ^th February 2021, the appellant was intercepted at the port of Holyhead when attempting to gain entry to the UK. He claimed asylum on 12 ^th April 2021. On 16 ^th November 2021, the appellant claimed to be a victim of Modern Slavery. His claim was referred to the Competent Authority, which on 3 ^rd February 2022 made a 'conclusive grounds' decision that the appellant had been the victim of trafficking. His asylum claim was refused on 14 ^th August 2023.

4.          The judge's decision first considered whether s.72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 applied and concluded that it did not. That aspect of the decision is not challenged. The key findings reached by the judge in the remainder of his carefully structured decision were as follows.

5.          At [21] to [24] the judge found the appellant to be a victim of trafficking, and accepted that he was put to work supplying drugs in Southampton to pay off a debt to his traffickers. He accepted that the appellant and his wife, a Romanian national, were in a genuine and subsisting relationship: [25]. The judge noted at [27] that the respondent had accepted "that the appellant was trafficked to the United Kingdom and compelled to work" and that "the traffickers had been to his parents' house in Albania looking for the appellant."

6.          Having made reference to the expert report of Antonia Young, and the respondent's Country Information and Policy Note, and having noted the lack of interest in the appellant between June 2020 and February 2021, the judge concluded that the traffickers did not pose a real risk to the appellant: [29]-[31]. In the alternative, having considered the factors in TD & AD (Albania) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), the judge concluded that the Albanian authorities would offer sufficient protection: [31]-[32] or that the appellant could internally relocate so as to avoid future difficulty: [32]-[33]. He therefore found that the appellant was not at risk of harm on return [35]. From [36]-[40], the judge explained why he had concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in the appellant's deportation.

Grounds of appeal

7.          Permission to appeal against the judge's decision was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara on 14 ^th February 2025 in the following terms:

'It is arguable that there was an inadequate assessment of the background country material, that inadequate reasons were provided for adverse findings and that the accepted facts were not taken into consideration in relation to the exceptions to deportation or the existence of very compelling circumstances.'

8.          There was no Rule 24 response from the Respondent.

9.          The appellant's written submissions advance two grounds of appeal. In reality, there are more. For convenience we address them below in the order they were advanced to us in oral submissions. Grounds (1) and (2) refer to the appellant's protection claim. Ground (3) refers to the appellant's human rights claim.

 

Discussion

Ground 1: Reasons and finding

10.       We place in this broad heading, Ms Yong's submissions that the judge failed to take into account relevant matters, proceeded on a factual basis contrary to that agreed by the respondent and/or failed to provide adequate reasons for such findings. In doing so, we apply the principles set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48.

(i)             An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration;

(ii)           The fact that a piece of evidence is not mentioned does not mean that it has been overlooked;

11.       Those principles are referred to in the Senior President of Tribunal's Practice Direction on Reasons for Decisions (4 June 2024) -

Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have been decided.... Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal's conclusion have been resolved.

12.            We found it helpful to delineate between the various aspects of Ms. Yong's submissions.

A threat or threats?

13.            In her grounds of appeal (§10) Ms. Yong asserted the appellant was threatened "a few times" following his deportation to Albania, whereas the judge refers to a single event. She also made reference in that paragraph to the traffickers' "persistence in targeting the A". At the outset of the hearing, we took time to establish with Ms Yong the evidence before the judge.

14.            Her record of the appellant's oral evidence before the judge was that he said: ' they came and threatened us at the house and said we are coming back'. The appellant's wife reported seeing a gang member(s) on a subsequent occasion but was not observed by a gang member or subject to a direct or indirect threat. The judge's summary accurately records the evidence. It was not suggested by Ms Yong, therefore, that the judge had misunderstood the evidence when he concluded that there was an eight month period during which the traffickers neither visited nor threatened the appellant.

 

'A debt'

15.            Ms. Yong submits that the Judge [27] failed to take into account there was an outstanding debt owed by the appellant to a criminal gang in Albania and by doing so, the judge deviated from the facts agreed by the respondent.

16.            There is no merit to this ground. The judge: records the chronology of the appellant's account at [13] and [21] to [22]; makes it plain [24] the appellant was working to pay off a debt; and records [31] the threat took place at the appellant's home and went further to consider the issue of sufficiency of protection. It is fanciful, with respect to Ms Yong, to suggest that the judge either did not understand that the appellant owed a debt to his traffickers or that he somehow omitted that agreed fact from his assessment.

'An informer'

17.            It is submitted that the Judge failed to make explicit findings as to the risk arising to the appellant from being (at least perceived as) an informer. There is no merit in this ground.

18.            There is no evidence that the appellant ever claimed that he was threatened because he had (or was suspected to have) informed on the gang's criminal activities to the authorities in the UK or elsewhere. The appellant simply speculates that this might be a matter known to those to whom he is indebted.

 

Ground 2: Failure to take into account background evidence

19.            Ms. Yong submits the judge failed to give adequate or any proper consideration as to background country evidence in determining the appellant's appeal. It is clear that the judge referred to the relevant CPIN and in this context Ms. Yong's reference to ' background evidence' was exclusively to the report of Dr. Antonia Young, dated 12 ^th June 2024 (the 'expert report').

20.            Again, we separate the distinct grounds advanced by Ms. Yong under this broader heading.

The debt

21.            Ms. Yong, submits that the judge failed to take into account background evidence in which it is said that the criminal gangs do not relent in seeking to satisfy the debt owed to them.

22.            We are reminded by Mr. Wain that the judge did make direct reference to the expert evidence [29] and [32] to [33] when assessing the risk to the appellant.

23.            Again, the criticism of the judge's reasoning from Ms Yong is that the judge did not expressly refer to the debt the appellant owed in reaching his conclusions. We do not agree. Applying Volpi v Volpi, and considering the judge's decision as a whole it is clear that the judge proceeded on the basis that there was an outstanding debt.

24.            The judge made clear and reasoned findings [31], that there was a lengthy period when the appellant was in Albania in which he was not pursued by the traffickers as the evidential basis for assessing the (lack of risk) to the appellant. The judge took account of the relevant evidence in reaching that finding, and it is not said that the finding was irrational. It follows that Ms. Yong's criticism of the judge is no more than a disagreement with his findings. There is no error of law.

25.            We consider it appropriate to add the following observation. The judge's finding was not only rational, it was in accordance with the background material and supported by commonsense. The expert evidence spoke of the enthusiasm with which criminal gangs in Albania pursue those who are indebted to them. The appellant had been threatened at his family home some four months after his return but there had been no further threats for eight months. In those circumstances, it might be thought to be quite plain that these particular traffickers were no longer pursuing this particular debtor.

26.            Ms Yong suggested at one point that the judge should have considered the reasons why they had apparently lost interest but such speculation was not necessary as a matter of law; the period of time spoke for itself and there might be any number of reasons why a gang might discontinue its pursuit of a debtor. The gang might have disbanded, critical members might have died or been imprisoned. Ms Yong's submission was premised on an assumption that there had been no supervening event but the passage of time clearly suggested that the debt was not being pursued when the appellant left Albania for the second time.

An informer

27.                Ms. Yong submits that the judge failed to consider expert evidence that the appellant was at risk because of being perceived as an informer. As we have noted above, however, the appellant has never suggested that he was threatened on this account; he merely assumed that it might cause him additional problems.

28.                The expert report at paragraph 6, p34 says

' A particularly important aspect of Arsen's case is the issue of his having informed the police about his trafficking experiences; this'

29.                The verbatim extract (above) offers no opinion as to the risk to the appellant or other from being an informer at all. The report seems to be incomplete. No explanation is provided as to why. There is no addendum. It follows simply that there was no opinion offered for the judge to ignore. Whilst it might have been preferable for the judge to confront this point in terms, any failure to do so is immaterial, since no rational judge could have found there to be a real risk to the appellant on this basis.

Risk of trafficking

30.            Ms. Young submits that the Judge thereafter failed to take adequate account of the expert report in assessing the future risk to the appellant from re-trafficking.

31.            When invited to do so Ms. Yong conceded there was no direct evidence from which the judge could properly make the segue between the gang to whom the appellant owed money and influence over or immunity from law enforcement in Albania but that more widely there is an ongoing potential risk of re-trafficking not adequately addressed by the judge.

32.            At [29] the judge considers and give weight to the expert report. At [30] to [34] the judge makes reasoned and sufficiently detailed findings as to the risk of re-trafficking. That assessment was based on the risk factors in TD & AD (Albania) CG. We find that this ground is no more than a disagreement with the judge's findings.

33.            Ms Yong tended in her oral submissions before us to suggest that the judge had either ignored the expert report of Ms Young or that he had failed to give adequate reasons for preferring the respondent's Country Information and Policy Note. We are not able to accept either submission. The judge plainly took account of the country expert and he gave cogent reasons for preferring the CPIN. Those reasons are to be found at [29] of his decision, where he observed that the report detailed "historical events and issues that the authorities in Albania have been addressing in more recent times." It was not suggested by Ms Yong that this did not amount to a proper reason for the judge to depart from the conclusions of the expert.

 

Ground 3: Failure to consider very compelling circumstances and undue harshness

34.            In her skeleton argument §27 Ms. Yong submits the judge failed to properly and adequately consider relevant evidence when assessing undue harshness and at §32 - ' there are very compelling circumstances over and above the exception, which have not been properly and adequately taken into account' in the judge's assessment of the appellant's human rights claim generally. In her skeleton argument and oral submissions, Ms Yong asserts the judge gave no (adequate) consideration to the extant threat to the appellant from a criminal gang.

35.            We do not agree.

36.            At [37] to [40] the judge summarises the evidence before him in so far as it might amount to undue harshness or very compelling circumstances. The judge's findings are plain and are the spine of his decision: No risk existed to the appellant from an extant threat from a criminal gang.

37.            The complaint is against the factual findings of the judge re-crafted under a different heading. However expressed, the complaint lacks merit. There is no error of law.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error of law. Judge Davisons's decision of 6 ^th October 2024 stands. The appeal is dismissed.

 

 

Paul Lewis

 

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

20 ^th March 2025