United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2024-005780 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65920/2023 LP/08566/2024

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

 

On 2 ^nd of April 2025

 

Before

 

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

 

Between

 

AA

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr Mohzam, solicitor, Burton and Burton Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, senior presenting officer

 

Heard at Field House on 31 March 2025

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal shall continue in force. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1.               By a decision dated 13 November 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the Respondent's 7 December 2023 decision to refuse the Appellant's 28 October 2019 protection and human rights claim .

2.               Thereafter, the Appellant made an in-time application to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. By a decision dated 17 December 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready refused the permission application.

3.               Thereafter, the Appellant made an in-time application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. By a decision dated 20 January 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman granted the permission application on all grounds.

4.               The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 31 March 2025.

Background

5.               The Appellant is a national of Albania now aged 32. She has a son who is also a national of Albania. He is now aged 13 and is a dependant on her protection and human rights claim.

6.               In short summary, the claimed factual basis for the Appellant's claim was that she was subjected to serious physical and psychological abuse at the hands of her husband (the father of her son), including sexual abuse and threats to force her to engage in sex work in Italy. Her attempts to seek assistance from her own family were unsuccessful - they also beat her and returned her to her husband. Her attempts to seek assistance from the police were unsuccessful - he had influential associates. Her attempt to flee with her son to Tirana was unsuccessful - within two to three months, her own family found her there, beat her and detained her with the intention of returning her to her husband. However, before they were able to do so she escaped with her son. They fled Albania and made their way to the UK where the Appellant made her claim, fearing ill-treatment and trafficking by her husband, her own family and/or others on return. I note that the Appellant has adduced medical evidence to support her claim to be in poor mental health.

7.               In her 7 December 2023 decision letter, the Respondent accepted that the Refugee Convention was engaged on the basis that the Appellant was a member of a particular social group as a potential victim of trafficking. Further, the Respondent accepted the credibility of the Appellant's claims to have been subjected to domestic violence and threats to be forced into sex work by her husband. However, the Respondent refused the Appellant's protection claim on the basis that she: (1) would not be at risk of ill-treatment or trafficking in her home area (the latter by reference to an analysis of the risk factors identified in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC)); (2) would have a sufficiency of protection; and (3) she could internally relocate to Tirana, Vlorë or Elbasan. The Respondent also refused the Appellant's Article 8 ECHR human rights claim.

8.               In the 13 November 2024 decision, Judge Parkes dismissed the Appellant's protection appeal, seemingly on the basis that the Appellant would not be at risk on return, would have a sufficiency of protection and could internally relocate (see §§15-25). Judge Parkes also dismissed the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds (see §§27-29).

Hearing

9.               Before me, the documentation was contained in a consolidated bundle of 736 pages. There was no rule 24 response.

10.           Mr Mohzam applied for the anonymity order made by Judge Parkes to remain in force. Mr McVeety did not oppose the application. I grant the application because the Appellant is a protection claimant who is vulnerable by virtue of mental health difficulties and I consider that disclosing her identity could give rise to unacceptable risks to her.

11.           In his submissions, Mr Mohzam adopted the Appellant's grounds of appeal and amplified them orally. His submissions may be summarised as follows: (1) in assessing risk on return, Judge Parkes failed to consider certain of the risk factors identified in TD and AD, in particular that the Appellant was a single mother and that she was vulnerable by virtue of her mental health difficulties; (2) in assessing internal relocation, Judge Parkes gave weight to the fact that the Appellant had previously successfully relocated to Tirana when, in fact, within two to three months of the Appellant being in Tirana, her own family had found her there, beat her and detained her with the intention of returning her to her husband; (3) Judge Parkes made no clear findings on the evidence of the independent country expert Dr Mirtezani; (4) Judge Parkes did not approach the question of sufficiency of protection correctly, following Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37, [2001] 1 AC 489 ; and (5) in dismissing the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds, Judge Parkes failed to undertake a lawful assessment of the Appellant's son's best interests.

12.           In his submission in response, Mr McVeety conceded that the purported error in the second of Mr Mohzam's submissions did indeed amount to a material error of law in circumstances where the Secretary of State had not disputed that the Appellant's own family had found her in Tirana in the circumstances claimed. Further, although it was an error that primarily affected the issue of internal relocation, he conceded that it was also a material error in the assessments of risk on return, sufficiency of protection and Article 8 ECHR. Therefore, he conceded that Judge Parkes' decision should be set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved. He said that, in light of the extent of the fact-finding required, the appropriate course was for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for the decision to be re-made.

13.           In his submissions in reply, Mr Mohzam said that he agreed that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for the decision to be re-made.

14.           At the conclusion of the hearing, I allowed the appeal with my reasons to follow in writing.

Decision and reasons

15.           At §§21 and 23 of the 13 November 2024 decision, Judge Parkes gave weight to it being the Appellant's own family rather than her husband that located her in Tirana and to the Appellant's own family not acting in concert with her husband in doing so. In fact, it was the Appellant's case that her own family had found her in Tirana, beat her and detained her with the intention of returning her to her husband. According to Mr McVeety, this aspect of her account was not disputed. I accept Mr McVeety's concession that this amounted to a material error of law in the assessment of the safety of internal relocation.

16.           At §§24 and 25 of the 13 November 2024 decision, Judge Parkes gave weight to the Appellant's previous success in internally relocating. Clearly, the Appellant's previous attempt to internally relocate to Tirana was not successful - as I have said, it was her undisputed evidence that her own family found her in Tirana, beat her and detained her with the intention of returning her to her husband. I accept Mr McVeety's concession that this amounted to a material error of law in the assessment of the reasonableness of internal relocation.

17.           Further, I accept Mr McVeety's concession that this error also amounted to a material error of law in the assessments of risk on return, sufficiency of protection and Article 8 ECHR. It cannot be said that any rational Tribunal would have come to the same conclusions on those issues if the error had not been made (see SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at §49 per Sales LJ, as he then was).

18.           Having accepted each of Mr McVeety's concessions, I allow the appeal and set aside Judge Parkes' decision in its entirety with no findings preserved. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to decide upon the Appellant's remaining grounds of appeal, though I do note that I could see the force in the arguments made on her behalf.

19.           I agree with the representatives that, given the extent of the fact-finding that will be required, it is appropriate for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for the decision to be re-made.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is allowed. Judge Parkes' 13 November 2024 decision contains material errors of law and is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved. The appeal is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal in Birmingham to be heard by a judge other than Judge Parkes.

 

 

B. Hoshi

 

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

 

31 March 2025