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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments >> UI2025000346 [2025] UKAITUR UI2025000346 (1 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKAITUR/2025/UI2025000346.html Cite as: [2025] UKAITUR UI2025000346 |
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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER |
Case No: UI-2025-000346 |
|
First-tier Tribunal No: IA/04759/2022 PA/51793/2022 |
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 1 st of April 2025
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT
Between
M.Z.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation :
For the Appellant: Ms McCarthy
For the Respondent: Mr Wain
Heard at Field House on 26 March 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant, the appellant's daughter, the appellant's husband and the appellant's sister are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant, the appellant's daughter, the appellant's husband and the appellant's sister. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant made a claim for asylum which was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 12 May 2022. The appellant appealed the respondent's decision and it came for a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. The judge of the First Tier Tribunal dismissed all the appellant's claims in a decision dated 20 October 2024.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 23 January 2025 on all 4 grounds.
3. The grounds of appeal are:
4. At the start of the hearing Mr Wain conceded ground three and conceded that the judge had failed to make findings and consider Article 8 and Article 3 ECHR (the latter in relation to the appellant's daughter's health through the prism of suicide risk).
5. During submissions I raised with the parties that the appellant's skeleton argument did not raise and there was no reference in the judgement to a Refugee Convention reason. Ms McCarthy accepted that this was the case and that the appellant's case was therefore put as a Humanitarian Protection claim and not as a Refugee Convention case. This is in accordance with the respondent's decision which found that there was no Refugee Convention reason.
Submissions
6. Ms McCarthy's submissions did not distinguish between the grounds and I consider that to some extent they all run together.
7. Ms McCarthy's submissions can be summarised as follows:
a. The first ground was put that the judge did not adequately consider the expert report of Dr Rano Turaeva-Hoehne and in particular the propiska system which gave AS (the police officer who repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted the appellant's minor daughter) the means of tracking and finding the appellant and her family. The judgement also failed to take into account the relevancy of the appellant's and her family's ethnic minority and the impact this had on them in relation to being targeted by the state.
b. It was also put that the judge did not adequately consider the witness statements of the appellant, the appellant's daughter, the appellant's husband and the appellant's sister.
c. These errors meant that the judge has also not considered whether there is state protection and if internal relocation is possible.
d. In relation to internal relocation it was said that the respondent's concession in relation to Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 ECHR meant that an internal relocation assessment could not have been adequately carried out because the judge would need to take into account the situation of the appellant and her family under Article 8 ECHR.
8. Mr Wain's submissions can be summarised as follows:
a. in relation to the expert report, the judge has clearly engaged with it. He made specific reference to it and considered it in the context of whether AS would be able to locate the appellant's daughter;
b. the respondent's concession on ground 3 does not undermine the judge's findings in relation to the reach and influence of AS;
c. the judge did not consider internal relocation or state protection and it is submitted they are not material because the judge found that there was not a risk from the police officer finding the appearance family;
d. It is said that the judge failed to take into account evidence that post dates the appellant coming to the United Kingdom. The documents relied on are dated 2018 and 2019 and they do not predate entry to the United Kingdom and therefore they do not undermine the judge's findings at para 16 that AS was not a current threat to the appellant or her family.
Decision
9. It is recorded that the appellant represented herself before the First-tier Tribunal which may have meant that some of the issues were not as clear as they could have been.
10. The judgement sets out at paragraph 9 the judge's understanding of the issues before him:
" in my view this appeal requires the determining of the influence and reach of AS and what risk he would pose to the appellant and her family on return to Russia. If a risk is found then to determine whether the state could offer sufficient protection or whether internal regulation would sufficiently alleviate the risk."
11. Paragraph 10 sets out:
"the appellant says that AS holds the rank of major. The respondent accepts that AS may have influence within his own police station but not outside of that."
12. At paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 the judge considers the expert report and set reasons why he rejects the view of the expert.
13. Paragraph 16 the judge sets out that " in my view there would be no reason for AS to currently be a threat to the appellant or her family."
14. Paragraph 17 goes on to set out in detail that the judge accepts AS has influence within his police station but that he does not have " any real power or control over the Russian police service or other offices from other stations nor do I accept, on the evidence before me, that he is well enough connected to be able to detect the appellant and her family on arrival or seek to locate them on return to Russia. Nor do I accept that he is in such a position of power to cause them a real risk of harm that could not be prevented by the Russian authorities."
15. The judge does not make any mention of the propiska system which is considered in the expert report at paragraph 12, paragraph 13 and which sets out for example " Prospiska grant citizens basic citizenship rights and basic access to social welfare and employment." and paragraph 33.
16. At paragraph 31 the report sets out that " high-ranking police officers are largely reported to be leading such criminal activities as rocketing businesses, abusing and raping women (often practised private parties and the police officers with bringing girls and gang raping as popular hobby which marks the status of high-ranking officers), exploiting and peeling people, killing people to obtain their property..."
17. The background section of the expert report sets out how Russia is a state controlled society where the police act along the lines of the KGB to enforce state control of citizens and they do not act to protect private citizens.
18. Paragraphs 32 of the expert report identifies that AS " is of higher ranking police officer who is in the meantime heading passport stol (in Russian police officer which handles passport issues and registration issues as well as migration and mobility administration) in the district of Nagorniy (a central part of Moscow)."
19. Paragraph 33 of the expert report goes on to state " it is highly likely that he is in the position of using his power to have a good overview of the mobility route of registered residents of Moscow. Thanks to propiska system no registered resident of Moscow can move within Russia without the knowledge of police officers who have unlimited access to the propiska database. It is as easy as asking a local officer the place of residence of the wanted resident to inform about vypiska from the same address in case the same resident wants to register in a new place. It is highly likely that any officer who works in a police office be it a high ranking officer or just a normal officer can obtain access to personal data of any registered residents under any pretext or without it... As soon as the vypiska will be applied the note can be reported to another police officer who left the request when forming which requires no big efforts."
20. I find that the judge makes no reference to the witness statement evidence about how AS repeatedly tracked down the appellant and her family over a substantial period of time in Russia.
21. The judge also failed to specifically address the propiska system and whether this would enable AS to track the appellant.
22. I find that paragraph 17 of the judgement is in direct conflict with paragraph 33 of the expert report. Paragraph 33 identifies that even a normal officer can obtain access to the personal data of any registered resident under any pretext or no pretext. The respondent accepted that AS was a major, the judge rejected the expert's claim that AS was the person identified by the expert in a blog and rejects the assertion that AS was on his way to promotion and a promising career. However, I find that the judge has not given reasons for why he found that AS " is [not] well enough connected to be able to detect the appellant and her family on arrival or seek to locate them in Russia" given that the expert concluded a normal officer can do this at will. The judge has not given reasons for his rejection of the expert report on this issue.
23. I find that this is an error of law.
24. I have considered whether or not this is a material error of law given that the judge also found that [paragraph 16] " there would be no reason for AS to currently be a threat to the appellant or her family".
25. The judge did not mention the witness statement evidence which set out in detail how AS had pursued the family even after the withdrawal of their complaint and that the appellant received a summons after she withdrew her complaint. The summons is also not referred to but that by itself is not a material error law.
26. I find that the judge failed to consider the background section of the expert report and the corrupt state system in which AS operates, the impunity of police officers and that police officers are able to and do commit serious crimes such as gangrape, extortion, killing etc if they wish and for no more reason than that.
27. I find that the judge has failed to consider material evidence and specifically the evidence contained in the witness statements about AS tracking the appellant and her family in the past and the effect this has on any future risk to the appellant and her family.
28. I find there is a material error of law in relation to the failure to consider the material evidence of the parts of the expert report identified above and the witness statements.
29. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains errors of law. It is set aside in its entirety and is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing. There are no preserved findings.
Notice of Decision
30. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard afresh by a different judge with no preserved findings.
J Bartlett
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 March 2025