BW
-v-
Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families
[2007]0943.PT
[2009]1508.PT

-Before-

Andrea Rivers
Margaret Halstead
David Cook

Heard on 2nd July 2009

The Appellant appeared in person.
The Respondent was represented by Mr Millford of counsel.

DECISION

1.	This is an appeal against two decisions by the respondent. The first was a decision to make a direction under s142 of the Education Act 2002, made on 18th December 2006, preventing the appellant from working as a teacher on the grounds that he is unsuitable to work with children. The second is an appeal against a decision, made on 7th January 2009, not to revoke that direction, following a review. The list of individuals prevented from working as a teacher because of a direction under the Act is known as List 99.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

2.	At a Directions hearing on 20th April 2009 His Honour Judge Pearl directed that the appeals be heard together. He also directed that there be a Restricted Reporting Order under Rule 14(1)(b) prohibiting the publication (including by electronic means) in a written publication available to the public, or the inclusion in a relevant programme for reception in England and Wales, of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any service user, such order to continue until the conclusion of the hearing and the tribunal to consider its continuation at the hearing itself.
3.	Having heard representations on this point from both parties, the tribunal decided to extend the order indefinitely. For that reason we will refer to people by their initials, using full names only for the professionals involved in the case.

THE LAW 

4.	S142 (4)(b) of the Education Act 2002 provides that the Secretary of State may direct that a person may not work as a teacher:
“on the grounds that the person is unsuitable to work with children”
5.	Regulation 9(2) of the Education (Prohibition from Teaching or Working with Children) Regulations 2002 provides that such a direction may be revoked or varied if:
(a)	the Secretary of State is in possession of information relevant to the decision to give the earlier direction which he did not have at the time that the decision was made; and
(b)	the Secretary of State is in possession of evidence of a material change of circumstances of the person concerned occurring since the earlier direction was given.

Powers of the First-Tier Tribunal

6.	Regulation 13 provides that:
(1)	Where on an appeal….the First-tier Tribunal considers that the direction is not appropriate it may order the Secretary of State to revoke or vary the direction.
(2)	The First-Tier tribunal shall not, in exercising its powers under this regulation, consider-
(a)	any information relevant to the decision to give a direction or not to revoke or vary a direction which the Secretary of State did not have at the time the decision was made; or
(b)	any evidence of a material change of circumstances of the person concerned occurring since the decision to give a direction or not to revoke or vary a decision was made.

7.	This means that the tribunal is not entitled to re-hear the matter or to take account of any evidence which was not before the Secretary of State when he made his decisions. Its decision is limited to a consideration of whether the direction, and the subsequent decision not to revoke the direction, were appropriate and proportionate in the light of the information available to him at those times.

 APPLICATION TO ADMIT FURTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

8.	At the beginning of the hearing the appellant asked permission to submit further documents. His request was opposed by the respondent on the grounds that Regulation 13 above does not permit the tribunal to take into account any information which was not before the Secretary of State at the time when he made his decision.
9.	Accordingly the tribunal refused to admit the documents.

BACKGROUND

10.	On 5th November 2002 Cardiff County Council was contacted by Mr Denning, the manager of a secure unit for young people in Exeter. He was concerned about a relationship between the appellant, and CN, a 15 year old boy who was serving a three month sentence at the unit, having been placed there by the Cardiff Youth Offending Team. The appellant had been making frequent phone calls to CN and sending him letters on an almost daily basis. He had visited him, using a false name and pretending to be a relative. He had sent him money and gifts. When staff tried to stop the communication, he had continued to contact CN using aliases and disguising his handwriting. 
11.	The council investigated the concerns set out in the letter and brought disciplinary proceedings, following which they decided, on 21st January 2003, to remove the appellant’s name from their register of approved relief teachers. The appellant appealed against their decision, but it was confirmed on 27th February.
12.	The council then informed the appropriate department at the Welsh Assembly Government and they in turn referred the matter on to the Teachers’ Misconduct Team at the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), who then began their own investigation as to whether or not the appellant was a suitable person to work as a teacher, and whether his name should be placed on List 99.
13.	In June 2004 the appellant was asked to agree to a medical examination as part of this investigation and arrangements were made for him to attend a clinic, chosen by the Respondent. The appointment was in October and the result of the examination was that the appellant was diagnosed as suffering from severe depression and was offered, and agreed to accept, a course of treatment at the clinic. A Staff Grade Psychiatrist, Dr Hillier, was put in overall charge of his treatment and she sent him for regular sessions with a psychotherapist.
14.	In July 2005 Dr Hillier provided a report on the appellant’s mental health, at the request of Dr Waddy, Senior Medical Adviser to the Teachers’ Misconduct Team. In her report Dr Hillier said that the appellant had responded well to treatment and was now stable. She said that “the evidence available to me at this time does not suggest that (he) poses a risk to children.”
15.	However, Dr Waddy remained concerned. She felt that the content of the letters which the appellant had sent to CN raised issues of “grooming” and that Dr Hillier had not satisfactorily addressed these concerns. The situation was no doubt complicated by the fact that the appellant was, at that time, due to stand trial following an allegation that he had indecently assaulted LH, a boy at a school where he had been working as a supply teacher, although it is important to note that in the event he was acquitted of the charge. 
16.	However, this was not the first time that the respondent had been accused of sexual assault. On 10th July 2003 he had been arrested, following an allegation of sexual assault made by a former pupil, GC. The appellant was never charged because GC refused to take the matter further. Sometime later a further similar allegation had  been made by TR, another former pupil. Although police were once again involved, the case was not pursued. As well as these allegations against him, the appellant himself reported that he had been the victim of a terrifying campaign of blackmail and assault, including sexual assault, by another young man, AW, who, he said, had tormented him and his family over many years and extorted large sums of money from him. The appellant included information about all these things in his detailed written submissions to the respondent. 
17.	He was invited to attend a meeting on August 23rd 2006. The invitation said that this was to “allow you to bring to the attention of the Secretary of State any matters you feel he is not already aware of.”
18.	The appellant agreed to the meeting and attended with his psychotherapist, who confirmed that he was still suffering from depression and was attending regular weekly or fortnightly therapy sessions. 
19.	Following the meeting Dr Waddy, who had been present, wrote to the department. She said, “he is still depressed and still requires regular sessions…There is no indication that his treatment is due for completion in the near future. Until his psychotherapy is completed it is not possible to assess his risk of similar inappropriate behaviour. I would recommend that his case is reviewed  when his treatment is finished and a proper risk assessment can be undertaken. Until then I would recommend that he be barred from working with children under the age of 18.”
20.	On 18th December 2006 a decision was made to include the appellant’s name on List 99. This was followed, one month later, by his acquittal after a three day trial, of the charge of indecent assault against LH. 
21.	After this the appellant’s mental state appears to have improved. His medication was reduced and he told the respondent that he anticipated that his treatment would finish by the end of 2007. He submitted a further report from Dr Hillier who said that his depressive symptoms were now “well controlled” and that there was “no medical reason why (he) should not be allowed to return to teaching”. 
22.	On 6th August 2007 the appellant wrote to the department requesting that his case be reviewed. In a statement dated 21st August 2007 he said, “I am prepared to undergo the necessary assessment procedures suggested by Dr Waddy” and  “I am contrite and full of regret for the events that have resulted in my barring”. 
23.	The respondent arranged for a risk assessment to be carried out by Annie Stubley, a Senior Therapist and Chartered Forensic Psychologist at the Lucy Faithfull Foundation. In her report Ms Stubley criticised the report of Dr Hillier. She said that Dr Hillier had failed to provide a detailed response to the concerns raised by the respondent and had also not addressed the issue of relapse prevention. In her view it was not safe for the appellant to return to teaching.
24.	On 7th January 2009 the respondent wrote to the appellant informing him that they had decided not to revoke their earlier decision to bar him from working with children.

THE EVIDENCE

The relationship with CN

25.	The appellant had previously been CN’s teacher. At that time CN’s parents had been concerned about what they regarded as the excessive attention which the appellant was paying to their son. We were shown a note of a meeting they had had with the County Council on 18th December 2002. According to the note they said that the appellant would give their son money and take him out on his own to Burger King after school. He had tried to contact CN at his sister’s house to arrange to give him cash which he said CN had asked for. He had, they said, treated CN  as a son. He “hushed up” anything that might have got CN into trouble. They believed that this special treatment had caused a deterioration in their son’s behaviour and they viewed the relationship as “unhealthy”. They had complained to the appellant about it. 
26.	At the time of the concerns raised by Mr Denning, however, the appellant was no longer CN’s teacher. CN had never returned to that school after his period of detention in the secure unit and the appellant was also no longer working there as he had taken early retirement and was then working as a supply teacher at another school. 
27.	When CN had been sent to the unit to serve his sentence the appellant had spoken to CN’s social worker to find out details of the placement. She had warned him that contact between him and CN “might be misconstrued”.
28.	We were shown copies of the letters and cards which the appellant sent to CN whilst he was in the secure unit. Between 11th October and 4th November 2002 he had been writing on an almost daily basis. In his letters he referred to CN as “the most exciting friend I have and the best of course” and “most handsome”. He wrote that he missed talking to him and “doing crazy things”. On 22nd October he sent a letter complaining that he had not heard from him, despite the fact that he had sent him a book, £20 and a postcard and had also tried to phone him. He ended with the words, “So what does a bloke have to do to get a reply?????????? (sic). On 24th October he wrote, “My mailbox is empty. It is waiting for your letter. Am I the forgotten friend? I am only joking.” He also appears to have been phoning frequently, because on 18th October he wrote “this is the first day that I have not spoken with you”. On 16th October he ended his letter with the following words, set into a box: I REALLY……(the word was repeated 86 times in capitals thereafter) DO MISS YOU! According to the unit manager he had sent CN a number of gifts and phonecards, as well over £100 in case. He had suggested including him on his family gym membership. 
29.	In his oral evidence the appellant told us that he “recognise(d) the events leading to the bar with shame” and said that it was “inappropriate conduct for any human being”. He had repeatedly expressed remorse for his actions throughout the various investigations which preceded this hearing. 
30.	At the same time he has always claimed that it was CN who had initiated the contact and CN who had been in control and he has consistently maintained that he was responding to CN’s needs rather than his own. He referred to letters, written to him by CN and to which he was simply responding. These, he said, would have demonstrated this and would have provided a less one-sided picture of their correspondence. The respondent had previously asked him, at the meeting in August 2006, to produce CN’s letters to him. The appellant’s initial response had been to say that he could not divulge the letters as this would breach CN’s confidentiality. Later in the interview he said that he had destroyed the letters in a fit of despair. 
31.	In his oral evidence to us he denied that his relationship with CN was driven by his own emotional needs and blamed his inconsistent responses about producing the correspondence on his mental state at that time. Despite his earlier expressions of remorse, he defended the language of the letters. He said he was trying to show empathy with a young person in a difficult and lonely situation and was writing to him in a jocular way which a young adolescent would appreciate. He was trying to “protect his morale”. He said when people view things from a child protection perspective they will “always find evidence to support” their theory. His mistake had been to “fail to keep abreast of changes” in the law in respect of child protection and he had “overstepped the mark.”
32.	He was also questioned about the various subterfuges he had used to continue his contact with CN after the unit had tried to prevent it. We were shown two letters in disguised handwriting, each ending with the words “love from your ‘bruv’ Shane.” The appellant had also tried to telephone CN using various aliases. He told us that it was CN who had suggested the use of aliases. However, in a letter dated 15th October, the appellant had written: “Now that phone calls are restricted, I will have to be more inventive in writing to you.” 
33.	According to the notes of the investigatory meeting convened by the County Council on 27th November 2002, the appellant had told them that he would not be continuing the contact with CN following his release from the secure unit. It later transpired that he had met him on January 1st 2003, the day after his release. At the disciplinary meeting on 21st January the appellant agreed that the meeting had taken place but said that it was in a public place and at the request of CN, who wanted an explanation as to why the association had ended. However, it transpired that on that day the appellant had driven CN in his car to see the school where he was going to be working as a supply teacher. On the way there they were seen by a member of staff from the secure unit and CN waved to him from the car. 
34.	In fact the appellant continued to see CN until a year or two ago and he said that it was CN who had finally ended the relationship.  He told us that he felt that the relationship had been beneficial to CN and that he had harmed only himself because he had made a “foolish misjudgment.” He had been CN’s mentor and had continued to educate him after he had left school but unfortunately for him, in trying to help CN he had “broken the rules”.  At the investigatory meeting in January 2003 he had drawn attention to a number of phrases in his letters which, he had told them, were evidence of his helpful approach. These included “take care”, “stay out of trouble” and “do it for me”. He had said that these comments were an encouragement to CN to do better.
35.	The letters to CN also contained references to CN’s car. Despite the fact that he was only 15 he owned a car and drove around in it with his friends. The appellant said he had informed the police about this, but they had not taken any action. He had allowed himself to be a passenger in the car when it was being driven by CN and said that he did not feel this to be wrong, since the police were aware of the situation. Moreover he felt that his presence, as an insured driver, reduced the risk. He told us that it was common practice for groups of young men in the area to “pool” cars between them and drive them around and that their values were “totally different from most people’s values.”
36.	While CN was at the secure unit, the appellant looked after his car, and arranged for repairs and an MOT. He saw nothing wrong in this as he said that he had ascertained that it was legal for a 15 year old to own a car. 
37.	The appellant was adamant that the letters, gifts and phone calls did not constitute “grooming”, in the sense that they were intended to lay the ground for a future sexual relationship with CN. It is important to emphasise that there is no evidence that there was any such relationship.
38.	In reaching their decisions, the respondent also took into account the allegations of sexual assault made against him by other former pupils, and the allegation made by the boy LH, for which the appellant was tried and acquitted. They also took into account the allegations made by the appellant himself against another young man, AW, who, he said, had conducted a campaign of harassment and blackmail against him and subjected him to regular assaults, including sexual assaults. 
39.	There were two allegations of sexual assault. The first was made by GC in 2003 and led to the appellant’s arrest. However, the boy did not wish to pursue the complaint and the case was dropped. According to the appellant, GC was a boy who, at that time, was on the verge of expulsion. He had offered him a lift and had got out for a few moments, leaving GC in the car. GC had taken the opportunity to steal his bankcard which was in the pocket of the door. GC had then been found with the card by his social worker and had invented the allegation of sexual abuse to get himself out of trouble. He told her that he had taken the card as an act of revenge. 
40.	After the allegations had been withdrawn the appellant had met GC in a park and had given him and his friends a lift back to town, because, he said, it was raining. When asked whether this was not unwise behaviour in view of the previous allegations, he said he had gone to meet him because he wanted to know why GC had lied. GC had told him that his parents had pressurised him to make the allegations and had offered him £500 to do so. In his oral evidence it was further put to him that it was unwise, in the circumstances, to give the boys a lift in his car. He said, “I’m a Christian. I knew he was lying. He apologised….Why should I hold a grudge? It was the end of the matter.”
41.	Another ex-pupil, TR, had also made a complaint to the police of sexual assault by the appellant. The appellant said he was the son of family friends and he had therefore taken a special interest in the boy and tried to help him, at his parents’ request. He told us that he had confided in TR, who was an adult by that time, about the problems he had had with GC. There had then been an argument about a car belonging to TR, which the appellant was helping him to sell but which was subsequently stolen. TR had held him responsible for its loss and had demanded £4,000 from him and had then sought revenge by making an allegation similar to GC’s. However, the police had not believed him and took no action.
42.	He spoke about the harrowing experiences that he and his family had suffered at the hands of the third young man, AW. He said that AW was a drug addict and had approached him for money to pay off a drug dealer. He told the appellant that he had given up drugs and now wanted to put his life in order. The appellant had given him £3,000 to pay the drug dealer because, he said, he had believed this would clear AW’s name and give him a fresh start. However, AW had gone on to demand more and more money from him. He had sexually and physically assaulted him and blackmailed him. In the end the appellant had lost so much money that he had been forced to sell the family home and now lived in rented accommodation.  This campaign of harassment had continued over several years. 
43.	He said that when he had reported the matter to the police they had not been helpful. We were shown a police report, dated 24th January 2005, of an interview with him about his complaint. According to this document he had told them that the previous day he had been attacked and threatened with a knife in his own home. However, he had not named his attacker and was not willing to have his house searched for the purposes of a forensic investigation. In the circumstances the police had not pursued the matter any further. 
44.	The appellant took issue with a number of details in the statement. He said that he had been treated insensitively by the police and that he had felt intimidated. He had not wanted the police to proceed at that time because he needed time to consider whether to take his complaint any further before committing himself to an investigation.
45.	LH was a pupil at a school where the appellant was working as a supply teacher in 2006. He alleged that when the appellant had given him back his pencil sharpener he had put his hand in LH’s trouser pocket and then “groped” his leg. LH also claimed that the appellant had sat on a chair in the classroom and spread his legs in a suggestive manner. 
46.	The appellant said that the allegation had taken him by surprise. He had been unaware of anything untoward. In her risk assessment Ms Stubley commented that LH might have been reacting to “non-verbal cues which were unsettling”. She concluded that “the appellant risks placing himself, his profession and pupils in a potentially vulnerable position without a better awareness of the interpersonal cues which gave rise to LH’s perception”.
47.	The appellant said that he had first suffered from depression in 1995. At that time had been prescribed medication by a GP friend and had apparently recovered, though he now realised that he had not then understood the nature of his illness Some time before the events concerning CN he had fallen ill again. At the time he had not realised what was happening to him. When he had attended the clinic at the request of the respondent, as part of their investigation, he had been diagnosed with severe depression. He had then been offered regular psychotherapy sessions. These had enabled him to explore his problems in more detail. He said he now understood that they were the combined result of an emotionally impoverished childhood and severe work stress in the years leading up to his breakdown. He said that at the time of his correspondence with CN he was mentally unstable and had “reverted to childhood practices”. When he looked back on how he had behaved he was “alarmed and horrified”. He had now recovered from what he termed a “fracture of the mind” and would be able to recognise any symptoms of relapse, should they occur. 
48.	However, when asked by counsel for the respondent why his earlier bout of depression in 1995 had not alerted him to the onset of the second episode he answered, “When you are clinically depressed you can’t consciously say, ‘I’m depressed. It becomes your reality”.
49.	In Dr Hillier’s report of July 2005, she had said that the appellant had responded well to treatment and was now stable. However, over a year later, at the meeting with the DfES on August 23rd 2006, his therapist, who had come with him, explained to Dr Waddy and Mr Dickinson that his mental state still fluctuated and he continued to require treatment. The appellant told us that he had been advised by the clinic to take his therapist with him to the meeting because he was not thought well enough to cope on his own. He said that he had not had very much contact with Dr Hillier. The psychotherapist reported back to her and he had seen Dr Hillier initially every three months and after that the contact had reduced, with longer and longer periods between. He said his psychotherapist was well aware that he was not fully recovered at that time, but that the general view had been that he was well enough to resume teaching.
50.	He took the view that provided he was able to do his job adequately it was unreasonable for his private life to come under such scrutiny. 
51.	He told us that prior to his dismissal he had taught for over 30 years with an unblemished record. He had had a challenging career, teaching in a social priority area and had always put himself out to help his pupils. He would help them to find jobs by arranging interviews. He had supported a boy who had got into trouble with the law, so that he had overcome his problems and done well in life. He had arranged trips abroad and exchange visits with foreign students and had raised the money to do so. He said he had been “recognised and applauded for the efforts I made”.
52.	Confirmation of his success as a teacher was provided in a report by the head teacher of the school where the appellant had been supply teaching at the time of the LH allegation. When he had taken up his post there he had been recognised by another member of staff who had previously worked with him. He said that the appellant had had a good reputation at his previous school. As a  supply teacher he had impressed the headmaster who wrote that “In terms of his classroom performance he is arguably the best MFL supply teacher we have had, and has consistently maintained a good level of class management”.

FINDINGS

53.	The appellant said he accepted that the tone of his letters to CN was completely inappropriate. Nevertheless he denied that in writing them he was driven by his own emotional need and dependency and said the letters were a way of providing help, guidance and support to a young person. We do not accept this explanation. There was an urgent and obsessive quality about them, especially when he complained that CN was not replying to his letters.  He pursued the relationship even though he knew that CN’s parents disapproved of it and despite the fact that CN’s social worker had warned him that it could be misconstrued. He sent gifts, including money, and offered to include him in his family gym membership. There is nothing in the letters to suggest that these gifts were related to any programme of good behaviour. In our view the appellant was motivated by an overwhelming need to pursue the relationship, regardless of the risks he was taking. 
54.	Nevertheless we accept that his behaviour did not constitute “grooming”, in the sense that this was not a planned campaign to win CN’s trust with a view to a future sexual relationship with him. Although it is understandable that his contact with CN would have aroused concerns about grooming, there is no evidence that this was his intention.
55.	The power of his emotional need was such that he embarked on a campaign of deception and dishonesty, in order to continue the relationship. He disguised his handwriting and used aliases. He did everything he could to circumvent the attempts made by the unit to end the contact. He must have known that his behaviour was wrong and foolish. The level of deception involved cannot, in our view, be explained by the fact that he was suffering from depression at that time. 
56.	He was less than frank in his meetings with the County Council and with the respondent. He made claims about CN’s letters to him and complained that the respondent had not seen these letters and had therefore taken a one-sided view of the relationship. Yet he failed to produce them as evidence and gave contradictory accounts in the same interview as to the reason for this.  He told the county council that he would not be seeing CN after his release from the secure unit but  in fact resumed  contact with him the day after his release and continued the relationship until quite recently. Once again, we do not accept that this lack of openness was caused by his depressive illness. 
57.	His decision to allow himself to be a passenger in a car driven by a 15 year old and to maintain and MOT that car for him while he was in a secure unit, so that he could continue to drive when he was released, is evidence of a level of irresponsibility which, once again, cannot be explained by his depressive illness. He tried to justify it by saying that the police were aware of what was going on, but this was no reason for him to behave in a way which positively encouraged CN to break the law.
58.	The allegations of sexual assault made against him by former pupils were dropped and he was tried and acquitted in relation to the allegation made by LH. There is thus no evidence that he has ever committed any such offence. In our view it would be unjust to give any weight to the substance of allegations which have either been withdrawn or in relation to which he has been acquitted. Similarly, the fact that he himself was the victim of a longstanding campaign of blackmail and harassment should not, of itself, be a matter for which he can be blamed.
59.	Nevertheless, we find that in a number of respects his behaviour towards the young people concerned was extremely unwise. He had spent his career teaching in an area with a high level of social deprivation. He himself had told us that the young people he dealt with had their own, different values. In that context we find that the extent of his personal involvement with the young men who went on to become his accusers and oppressors showed a complete lack of judgment bordering on recklessness. It is hard to understand how it was that despite GC’s previous allegation of sexual abuse he had gone on to meet him in a park and then given him and his friends a lift home. It was clearly unwise for him to involve himself with helping TR to sell a car, and the problems this caused him were predictable. Most worryingly, he had paid off a debt to a drug dealer for AW, and indeed it appears that this was the start of the campaign of blackmail which went on to cause such distress to him and his family. By paying off the drug dealer he had become involved in serious illegality and had clearly placed himself in danger. On all these occasions we find that his lack of judgment caused him to place himself in vulnerable and compromising situations. 
60.	Given his knowledge of the local community he should have been keenly aware of the risks he was taking. 
61.	So far as the allegation of LH is concerned, we note the opinion of Mr Stubley, that he may have been reacting to “non-verbal cues” subconsciously expressed by the appellant. It is impossible to know whether or not this was the case. It is equally plausible to speculate that the appellant’s unwise involvement with former pupils, and the unsubstantiated allegations made by them, gave rise to rumours which LH was aware of and which made caused him to misinterpret the appellant’s behaviour. The concern is that the appellant remains unaware that he himself had behaved in a way which risked damaging his reputation. 
62.	He has frequently expressed remorse for his behaviour, both in his evidence to us and in his written statements. When he addressed us at the start of the hearing he said that when he now looked back on what he had done he was “alarmed and horrified”. However we are not convinced that he genuinely felt this because when questioned further he continued to defend his actions. It seemed that he felt that his mistake had been to transgress against rules which he himself did not agree with, though he understood that he was obliged to accept them. He believed that he had been motivated by kindness and a wish to help the young people he came into contact with but that his actions had been misinterpreted. When asked  specific questions in cross examination about the tone of individual examples of the letters he had written to CN he appeared to reject any criticism of them. When asked in what way he was remorseful, he said that he regretted having “let himself down” and having been barred as a teacher.
63.	He has also repeatedly claimed that it was CN who had insisted on continuing the association and that he was simply responding to CN’s demands. At the same time he was clearly aware that it was not acceptable to blame CN and would qualify this by saying that he recognised that he was the adult and therefore he must take responsibility. He did not, however, appear to have genuinely accepted that responsibility and there was no recognition of the fact that he had used a vulnerable young person to satisfy his own emotional needs or that he had put himself in a series of vulnerable situations.
64.	We note that Dr Hillier reported in  July 2005 that the appellant’s mental state was stable, that he had good insight into his illness and that he was medically fit to return to work. Clearly this could not have meant that he made a full recovery, because at the meeting in August 2006 his psychotherapist told Dr Waddy and Mr Dickinson of the DfES that the appellant remained unwell. Dr Hillier’s second report, dated July 2007, simply re-affirmed her earlier view. It may be that from a therapeutic perspective the appellant had, through his treatment, developed an insight into the underlying causes of his own illness. However, in our view he continues to lack insight into the effect of his behaviour on others or himself. 
65.	We also share Ms Stubley’s concerns in respect of the risk of relapse. Although the appellant told us that he was confident that he would now be able to recognise the signs of a relapse, he also said depression distorts one’s perception of reality making it impossible to recognise it objectively.

DECISION

66.	We were referred to the decision in the case of Moseley v Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2002] 1 PC, in which the tribunal stated as follows:

“The role of a teacher in society is an important one and parents and the general public expect and are entitled to expect high standards from teachers. A teacher is placed by the parents of the children in a position of trust and responsibility and a teacher must be able to demonstrate those qualities not only in their professional spheres of work as a teacher but also in their personal conduct. Teachers are perceived as role models for children and trust and honesty are core values which underpin the status of teaching as a profession.”

67.	It is clear from our findings above that in our view the appellant’s conduct fell far below that which the public, and parents in particular, are entitled to expect from a teacher. The fact that these things took place outside school and concerned former pupils, rather than those he was currently teaching, does not exempt them from scrutiny. 
68.	His lack of trustworthiness has been demonstrated not only by the deceptions he used to continue his association with CN, despite attempts by staff at the unit to prevent this, but also by his lack of openness during the investigations which led up to these appeals. 
69.	His intense emotional involvement with CN was totally inappropriate and he pursued it against the wishes of the unit, against the wishes of CN’s parents and against the advice of CN’s social worker. 
70.	He has shown a lack of judgment which has led to his involvement in relationships which have caused him to expose himself, his reputation and thereby the reputation of his profession, to serious risk. This has involved allowing himself to be illegally driven by a 15 year old and paying off a drug dealer. 
71.	In our view, these are matters which cannot be satisfactorily explained by his fragile mental state at that time. 
72.	Even now, at a time when he says he is completely recovered, he continues to see little wrong in his behaviour. Although he says he accepts responsibility for his actions, he repeatedly blames others for what has happened to him and shows little insight into the part he himself has played in bringing it about. 
73.	Insofar as his behaviour was affected by his depressive illness, we have, for the reasons set out above, little confidence that he would be able to recognise signs of relapse and take the necessary action.
74.	For all these reasons we find that both decisions were appropriate and proportionate and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. 

APPEAL DISMISSED

 Andrea Rivers (Tribunal Judge)
Margaret Halstead
David Cook