MR/CM/6
CIS/14255/1996
1.	This is an appeal, bought by the adjudication officer with the leave of the tribunal chairman, against a decision of the Birmingham social security appeal tribunal dated 20 February 1996, whereby they allowed the claimant’s appeal against a decision of an adjudication officer given on 21 November 1995 and held that the claimant was not disentitled to income support from 3 October 1995 by reason of being a student.  At the hearing before me, the adjudication officer was represented by Ms Rachel Perris of the Office of the Solicitor to the Departments of Social Security and Health and the claimant was represented by Mr Allan Norman of Messrs J M Wilson & Co Solicitors, of Birmingham.  The case has been very well argued on both sides.

2.	The claimant began a full-time degree course at Ashton University in October 1993.  He failed his second year examinations in the Summer of 1995 and was obliged to resit the examination in the Summer of 1996 before he could proceed to the third year.  He obtained employment in July 1995, after he failed his examinations, but that came to an end on 30 September 1995 and he claimed income support on 3 October 1995.

3.	Section 124(1)(d)(i) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 made it a condition of entitlement to income support that, accept in prescribed circumstances, the claimant be available for, and actively seeking, employment.  Regulation 10(1)(h) of the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 provided that a claimant should not be treated as available for employment if he was “a student during the period of study”, subject to certain immaterial exceptions.  By regulation 2(1), “period of study” meant:-

	“The period beginning with the start of the course of study and ending with the last day of the course or such earlier date as the student abandons it or is dismissed from it; that any period of attendance by the student at his educational establishment in connection with the course is outside the period of the course shall be treated as part of the period of study.”

“Last day of the course” is defined as having the meaning described by regulation 61 for the purposes of the definition of the period of study.  “Course of study” is defined as meaning:-

	“Any full-time course of study or sandwich course whether or not a grant is made for attending it.”

“Student” is given the meaning described in regulation 61.  Before 1 August 1995, regulation 61 included the following definition:-

	“‘Student’ means .... a person aged nineteen or over but under pensionable age who is attending a full-time course of study at an educational establishment; and for the purposes of this definition - 

		(a)	a person who has started on such a course shall be treated as attending it throughout any period of termal vacation within it, until the last day of the course or such earlier date as he abandons it or is dismissed from it;”.

The words I have underlined were deleted with effect from 1 August 1995 by regulation 2 of the Social Security Benefits (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 1995.  Regulation 61 includes one further definition of relevance to the present case:-

	“‘Last day of the course’ means the date on which the last day of the final academic term falls in respect of the course in which the student is enrolled.”

It is common ground that the claimant in the present case was not entitled to benefit if he was a “student” and that it is the amended form of the definition that must be considered.  The issue is whether or not he was a “student” within that amended definition when he claimed benefit on 3 October 1995.

4.	The court of appeal has already considered the definition of “student” in regulation 61 on three occasions without there being imminity of approach on any of them and they will shortly be considering it for a fourth.  In Chief Adjudication Officer v Clarke and Faul [1995] ELR259, the Court had to construe the unamended definition in force before 1 August 1995.  One of the two claimants took a year off between her second and third years at university and the other fell ill during her third year and had to start it again the following year.  Both students were therefore away from the university for a substantial period of time and claimed income support.  A social security commissioner held that they were not “students” within regulation 61 of the 1987 regulations during there periods away from the university because they had temporarily abandoned their courses.  On the Chief Adjudication Officer’s appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected that approach.  Hoffman LJ said:-

	“We were referred to a number of decisions by Commissioners in England and Northern Ireland in which different views have been expressed on the meaning of ‘abandoned’.  Examples are given of the use of abandoned in senses which are not final, such as the motorist who abandons his car in dense fog to walk home but still intends to return to collect it when the fog lifts.  I readily accept that abandoned may legitimately be used in such a sense, but I am quite satisfied that it cannot have this meaning in the definition of ‘student’ in regulation 61.  The context places the word in conjunction with two other events which are undoubtedly final, namely the end of the course and the students dismissal from it.  Furthermore, nothing short of total abandonment can make the definition work.  If the commencement of an intercalated year means that the definition no longer applies, what happens when the student returns a year later?  The definition cannot apply to the remainder of the course, because it contemplates that the period which ends with the last day of the course will have begun with the student starting on the course, not with his resuming it after a break.”

Hirst LJ and Glidewell LJ agreed with that approach.  However, Hoffman LJ and Glidewell LJ held that the periods of absence could not fairly be described as periods of either term or vacation within the courses.  The Chief Adjudication Officer’s appeal was therefore dismissed, with Hirst LJ descending.  The amendment wrought by the 1995 regulations was clearly designed to reverse the effect of Clarke and Faul.

5.	The adjudication officer disallowed the claim in the present case on the ground that the claimant had been following a full-time course that he had neither abandoned nor been dismissed from.  The tribunal’s reasons for allowing the claimant’s appeal are as follows:-

	“Tribunal have accepted the submission that the claimant was at the date of the claim, on a part-time course of study.

	Tribunal noted the statement of Dr Wilson (Senior Tutor) on 8 November 1995 to the effect that the claimant is repeating his second year without attendance.

	It appears that the claimant failed only part of his second year examinations or otherwise would have been required to attend and re-do the whole of the course work involved.  It appears this is not required of the claimant.

	However Dr Wilson’s statement is not entirely consistent with the claimant’s statement of appeal which was written by a Mrs Wilson (Welfare Advisor) on 6 December 1995.  She takes the view that the claimant is not in reality attending a part-time course and that his only commitment to the university is to return in June to take his exams.

	If that view is taken, the claimant has in effect been dismissed from his course.  He is suspended.  He is not registered as a student and has no right to attend lectures.  He has no right of return unless and until he satisfies the conditions which have been imposed.

	Dismissal by the university, such as for failure of examinations, is quite different from abandonment of the course by the student himself.  Both of these circumstances are referred to in the definition which governs the claimant’s status for income support purposes.

	However tribunal are inclined to accept that the senior tutor is more likely to know the position although his statement is lacking in detail as to what is required of the claimant.  This would appear to be somewhat less than as required on a full-time course at date of claim.”

6.	Ms Perris submitted that the tribunal had erred in law because the finding that the claimant was attending a part-time course not open to them on the evidence.  It is not in dispute that, when the claimant was in fact attending the course, he did so on a full-time basis and that he was not in fact attending the course at all when he claimed income support.  However, Ms Perris submitted that the claimant was deemed by the definition of “student” in regulation 61, to the attending the course until he abandoned it or was dismissed from it, neither of which had occurred.  The actual non-attendance was therefore irrelevant and the claimant had to be regarded as continuing to attend a full-time course.  She further submitted that the claimant could derive no assistance from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Adjudication Officer v Webber (1 July 1991) because that decision was given in respect of the period before the 1995 amendment.

7.	Mr Norman, on the other hand, placed considerable reliance on Webber.  In that case, the claimant was following a modular degree course with the consequence that the question whether it was full-time or part-time depended on the number of modules being pursued at that particular moment.  The claimant started the course on a full-time basis but it then became part-time.  Counsel of the Chief Adjudication Officer argued, as Ms Perris argues here, that the course was full-time when it started and that dealing provision in paragraph (a) left the definition of “student” had the effect that the claimant was to be treated as attending a full-time course until he abandoned, or was dismissed from, the course altogether.  That approach did not find favour with any member of the Court of Appeal.  Hobhouse LJ said (transcript 10F to 11B):-

	“... the present case has to be decided under the regulations including the phrase ‘throughout any period of termal vacation within it.”

Following the approach in the Court of Appeal in Clarke and Faul, there are difficulties in saying that the relevant period fell within “any period of term or vacation within” the full-time course.  There were periods of terms and vacation within what was at the material time a part-time course.  If matters have to be considered in strict categories, it is position of the material time was that Mr Webber was not on a full-time course but (on the hypothesis that he had been on a full-time course) had transferred to a part-time course.

I recognise however that any such analysis could be said both to fail to give effect to what is, after all, an arbitrary deeming provision and to involve an element of artificiality since from the point of view of the university and Mr Webber he was still pursuing the same course albeit part-time not full-time.  In my judgment the answer to be preferred is to accept the overall approach of Mr Rabinder Singh [Counsel for the Chief Adjudication Officer] to the construction of the definition in regulation 61 but to recognise that a course which does not require full-time attendance cannot properly be described as a full-time course.

	“Therefore independently of the decision of this court in Clarke and Faul and the inclusion that the material time of the phrase throughout any period of termal vacation within it in the dealing provision, I prefer the view that the course upon which Mr Roper was enrolled was not a full-time course and that he never was a student within the definition in regulation 61.”

Peter Gibson LJ preferred not to express a view on the point taken by Hobhouse LJ but held that the case could not be distinguished from Clarke and Faul.  He said:-

	“Mr Singh argued that Clarke and Faul was distinguishable because unlike the academic annus non of Ms Clarke and Ms Faul during which they were expected to stay off the university campus, the respondents second year was unquestionably treated as an academic year by the university which required him to continue with his studies, albeit on a part-time basis, with a view to returning to the full-time course the following year.  I am not persuaded by this distinction.  The additional requirement recognised in Clarke and Faul was that the period in question must be a ‘period of termal vacation within it’, that is to say, within the full-time course.  Plainly for the respondents second year there was no period of termal vacation within any full-time course.”

Evans LJ agreed with Peter Gibson LJ but added that the claimant was entitled to succeed without relying on the words “throughout any period of term or vacation within it”.  He said (transcript 15D to G):-

	“In my view, it is one thing to treat a person as a full-time student at times when, although such a student, is not in fact attending the course, but quite another thing to rely upon the dealing provision to create a status as student which does not exist in fact.  In Clarke and Faul during the academic year in question the claimants were not members of the university.  So far as they and the university were concerned, there year of ‘intercalation’ was ‘annus non’.  In plain English, they were given leave of absence from their course, and for that period they ceased to be students on that or any other course.

	In the present case, the claimant remained a student, but in fact a part-time student whom the regulations did not exclude from entitlement to income support.  By parity of reason, I would hold that the dealing provision in regulation 61(a) cannot be relied upon to create a status of full-time student which does not exist in fact.”

8.	It seems to me that Ms Perris’s right to argue that the tribunal erred in finding that the claimant was attending part-time course at the time of his claim of benefit.  He may have been expected to do some private studying but he was not expected to attend the university until his examinations came round.  However, it is not important whether the claimant in fact was attending a part-time course or was not attending any course at all; the question is whether he is to be deemed to be attending a full-time course.  Thus, if the tribunal did err in this respect, the error was immaterial.  Mr Norman stressed the fact that paragraph (a) of the definition of “student” deems a person who is not attending a course to be attending, rather than deeming a course that is not full-time to be full-time.  That is true, but it does not follow that a person cannot be deemed to be attending a full-time course while he is in fact attending a part-time course or not attending a course at all.  He sought to rely on the judgment of Hobhouse LJ in whether and on CSIS/62/92 for the proposition that a person should not be deemed to be attending a full-time course if he has transferred to a part-time course.  However, as Ms Perris submitted, Hobhouse LJ held that a modular course not to be regarded as a full-time course at all, even if it was in fact it was being followed on a full-time basis.  Furthermore, whether can be distinguished from the present case because there was no obligation on Mr Webber ever to resume full-time study in order to obtain his degree.  CSIS/62/92 may be distinguished on the same ground.  The present claimant’s course was not modular and clearly had been full-time when he started it and would, if he passed his examinations, become full-time again.

9.	Mr Norman also relied on the judgment of Evans LJ in Webber in seeking to persuade me that Clarke and Faul did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the claimant was deemed to be a student while he was clearly not in fact one.  He accepted that Evans LJ’s judgment was not binding on me in so far as he held that Mr Webber could succeed without relying on the words “throughout any period of term or vacation within it”, but argued that it was persuasive and consisted with the approach taken by a Deputy Commissioner in CIS/595/92 before Clarke and Faul was decided and, more recently, by a Commissioner in CIS/13986/96.  In CIS/595/92, the claimant had decided to take a year away from studies because she was expecting a child.  In CIS/13986/96, the claimants had to take a year away from studies because, like the claimant in the present case, he had failed examinations.  In both cases it was decided that the claimant had abandoned, or been dismissed from, one course and would, upon resuming her or his studies, start another course.  CIS/595/92 can, I think, be distinguished from Clarke and Faul because the claimant had no guarantee of any sort that she would be admitted to the college at the end of her year away in order to start again her studies.  CIS/13986/96 has been held, by another Commissioner in CIS/15594/96, to be inconsistent with Clarke and Faul.  Mr Norman submitted that I should prefer CIS/13986/96 to CIS/15594/96.  Ms Perris submitted that I should prefer CIS/15594/96 and that Evans LJ’s approach was also inconsistent with Clarke and Faul.

10.	The argument that there are two separate full-time courses of study or, at any rate, two separate periods of attending full-time course of study in a case like the present is, it seems to me, necessary if Evans LJ’s approach is to work.  It is an attractive argument but it requires that the first course, or the first period of attending a course, be brought to an end.  The legislation provides that, if a course does not end to the affliction of time, it can be ended only be abandonment or dismissal.  However, if it is intended that studies will be resumed, any abandonment or dismissal is only temporarily and, following Clarke and Faul, does not amount to abandonment or dismissal for the purposes of the legislation.  I therefore accept Ms Perris’s submission.  Only if the claimant had been dismissed from his course with a degree of permanence required by Clarke and Faul, could he be regarded as not attending a full-time course.

11.	Mr Norman did submit that it could not be right to require the same degree of finality for dismissal as is required for abandonment, despite the way the legislation is drafted.  He argued that its distinction was to be drawn because dismissal was a matter for the university rather than the student and a student might find himself or herself permanently excluded from income support because a university held open the possibility of a return to studies.  The answer to that is that the student could choose to abandon these studies, just as a student who falls ill and has to start a year all over again can become entitled to income support by abandoning his or her intention to return to studies.  Why the government should want to pursue such a policy which can hardly be said to widen access to education is hard to understand but it is the inevitable result of the decision to amend the regulations following Clarke and Faul.  There has been much judicial criticism of the legislation.  I asked Ms Perris what the Department’s answer to the criticism was.  She replied that she had no instructions on that point.

12.	It did seem to me to be arguable, however, that dismissal for failure of examinations did have the requisite degree of finality.  It might be contrasted for the position of a student sent down for disciplinary reasons but guaranteed a place at the beginning of the following year.  A student who has failed examinations does not have a right to resume studies unless he or she resits the examinations and passes.  However, Ms Perris submitted that that was the wrong approach.  She pointed out that the examinations would not be amended in this examination but a “finishing-off” examination and should be regarded as part of the course.  As long as the student had the right to resit the examinations, he or she had the right to return to the court and it was immaterial that he or she did not have any more right than any other student to proceed to the next year without passing the examinations.  Whether or not examinations are to be regarded as part of a course of study or something that follows it depends on the context.  In the present context, in which it is clear that a final year student is to be excluded from income support until the end of his or her last term, it is clear that examinations are to be regarded as part of the course.  Therefore, once again, I accept Ms Perris’s submission.

13.	It follows from all this that I must allow the adjudication officer’s appeal unless there can be challenged one of two assumptions upon which the argument before me have been advanced.  The first assumption is that the 1995 amendment for the definition of “student” in regulation 61 of the 1987 regulations is valid.  In CIS/15594/96, the Commissioner rejected an argument that it was invalid.  Mr Norman did not seek to reopen that issue before me but reserved his client’s position should the case go further.

14.	The second assumption is that what was said in Clarke and Faul about the meaning of “abandons” is binding on me.  Strictly speaking, it was not a necessary part of there decision as they could have upheld the Commissioner’s decision, on the alternative ground that there was no recognisable term or vacation for the claimant, without considering whether the Commissioner had correctly construed the word “abandons”.  However, as all three members of the court expressly held the Commissioner’s construction to have been wrong, that part of the decision must clearly be followed by a Commissioner in respect of any period before the legislation was amended.

15.	The amendment raises a different issue.  In Thompson v Moyer [1961] AC967, the House of Lords, at a time before they had freed themselves from a duty to follow their own decisions, were faced with two decisions, one (Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gordon [1952] AC552, a decision of the House.  Lord Reid said:-

	“These cases would have caused me considerable difficulty were it not for the fact that by reason of the provisions of the Finance Act, 1953, s.24, they are longer good law.  They do not add much to the general statements in the earlier authorities but they do apply those statements to facts which, though indistinguishable, are not very far removed from the facts of the present case.  The fact that the decisions are no longer valid in my view diminishes the authority of the rationes decidendi, but if I had been sitting in a lower court I would have hesitated before reaching the decision which I think I ought now to take.”

Lord Radcliffe, with whom Viscount Simonds agreed, said:-

	“In essence the decisions adopted the view that he could, as it were, take the debt over to the income instead of bringing the income to the debt.  Whether that is the right way to treat the facts when the creditor is a bank with London and overseas branches is not now of any importance, since the legislator has intervened after the Gordon case to reverse the consequences of that decision and to bring such operations within rule 2 of case V for the future.  It would be a mistake in those circumstances to build any principles upon the basis of those two decisions.”

Lord Kohen, who had been a party to Gordon, said that the actual decision in that case was no longer of importance since the amendment and added:-

	“If there is anything in my dictum in Gordon’s case which conflicts with the above summary of the position in the present case, I can only express the hope that the dictum we will receive from your Lordships is sudden a death as you have given to the decision in Gordon’s case by section 24 of the Finance Act 1953.”

Lord Denning said bluntly:-

	“The decisions in those cases have been reversed by Parliament in section 24 of the Finance Act, 1953, and they can no longer be regarded as a binding authority; nor can the reasons on which they are based.”

In the present case, the legislation has only been partially amended so that the words “abandons” remains but in a rather different context.  As statutory provisions must be construed as a whole and as the effect of various possible constructions may determine which is correct in a case where a word may have different meanings, it is at least arguable that the amendment means that the construction of the word “abandons” held to be correct in Clarke and Faul is no longer correct and that the approach taken by Evans LJ in Webber is to be preferred.  It might be argued that the amendment was based on an assumption that the word “abandons” would always be construed in the ways that the Court of Appeal construed it in Clarke and Faul, but the “doctoring of Parliamentary endorsement of decided cases” did not receive support from the majority of the House of Lords in Farrell v Alexander [1977] AC59.

16.	However, even if Clarke and Faul is no longer strictly binding, I nevertheless do not consider that I should think about departing from it.  To do so would be to speculate how the Court of Appeal would have decided the case had the amendment already been in force.  It is one thing for the Court of Appeal to do that but it is quite another for a Commissioner to do it.  I am conscious of what Lord Reid said in Thompson v Moyer about how he would have approached the case had he been sitting in a lower court.  My diffidence is not decreased by the recollection that the argument so clearly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Clarke and Faul was one that I, as Counsel, had advanced before the Commissioner in that case.

17.	Therefore, I allowed the adjudication officer’s appeal.  I set aside the decision of the Birmingham social security appeal tribunal dated 20 February 1996 and I give the decision that they should have given which is that the claimant was not entitled to income support from 3 October 1995 because he was a “student” within the definition of regulation 61 of the 1987 regulations and was to be treated as not available for employment by virtue of regulation 10(1)(h).

MR