THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONERS   

                                                Commissioner’s Case no:        CTC 626 2001

	                            SOCIAL SECURITY ACTS  1992 - 1999
                                                               TAX CREDITS ACT 1999

                                 APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF AN APPEAL TRIBUNAL 
                                                                ON A QUESTION OF LAW

                                DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

                                                         Commissioner David Williams

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER 

1	I dismiss the appeal.

2	The appeal was against the decision of the Southampton appeal tribunal on 20 July 2000. It was brought by permission of the chairman. The decision of the tribunal was that the appellant is not entitled to working families tax credit (“WFTC”) on the date of claim, 22 April 2000.     

3	For the reasons below, the decision of the tribunal is not erroneous in law.

4	I held an oral hearing of this appeal in London on 25 September 2001. The appellant (to whom I refer as Mr L) attended and represented himself. The Board of Inland Revenue was represented by Mr Nicholas Ainley of counsel, instructed by the Solicitor to the Inland Revenue. I am grateful to both for their concise presentations.

Background to the appeal

5	The facts are not in dispute. During the tax year 1999-2000 Mr L left full time employee’s employment to set up as an independent consultant. He did so by forming a partnership with his wife (“Mrs L”).  In the first few months, the net income from the partnership was low. On 20 April 2000 Mr and Mrs L made a joint claim for WFTC for themselves and their three young children. In the claim form they stated that Mr L worked 30 hours a week in the partnership and Mrs L worked 6 hours a week. As requested, they attached accounts for the partnership for the period to 5 April 2000, in the usual form. This showed a small net profit for the partnership. They also stated that his share of the profits was 0%, and hers was 100%. There were further questionnaires, but essentially the replies confirmed this information.

6	On the basis of this information, it was decided that neither Mr L nor Mrs L qualified for WFTC. The initial reason given was that neither of them was employed or working not less than 16 hours a week. That was clearly wrong. In a letter in response to an appeal by Mr L, an officer restated the reason as “neither you nor your wife was normally engaged in remunerative work”. At Mr L’s request, the appeal was referred to a tribunal.

The tribunal decision 

7	Mr L did not ask for an oral hearing before the tribunal, instead making a written submission. The evidence before the tribunal was therefore confined to that in the papers. This consisted of the information already provided, including the profit share.  The tribunal considered the appeal in the absence of both parties and confirmed the original decision. Mr L requested a statement of facts and reasons. The key part of this stated:

	“Mrs & Mrs L work in partnership and although Mr L puts in more hours he receives no remuneration. This is the arrangement made between the partners of their choice and is presumably accepted by the Inland Revenue and has tax advantages for the family. Partners can allocate income as they see fit. In this case under the arrangement in place at the claim date Mr L had no entitlement to income from the partnership, this all going to his wife. He may well have been able to draw on the joint account but it was her income he was drawing upon after it was paid into the joint account from her income from the partnership, not his income from the partnership.

There can be no objection to any one arranging their affairs and income if they are able to do so so as to make it tax efficient. However advantages in one area may lead to consequences in others which are disadvantageous. This is one of those situations. By assisting themselves in relation to tax they have done the opposite in relation to WFTC.”

Grounds of appeal

8	Mr L applied for permission to appeal on two grounds: 
(a) the tribunal had wrongly assumed that the profit allocation in 2000-1 would remain at 0% for him. He stated that in that year he expected the most tax-efficient allocation would be 50% each;
(b) the tribunal misinterpreted “remunerative work”. 
The chairman granted permission to appeal.	Mr L advanced the same arguments at the oral hearing. He pointed to the dictionary definition of  “remunerative” (payment for service rendered or work done) and stressed that the partnership’s income was all earned from its clients. He also pointed to the definition of “remunerative work” in the statute, and argued that his position was no different to the position of someone who made a loss rather than a profit. He also argued that he could have arranged that he received £1, his wife receiving the rest, and that then he would have met the Revenue argument. He asked why £1 should make a difference. 

9	In reply, Mr Ainsey relied on the plain words of the statute (section 128 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992) and the regulations (Family Credit (General) Regulations, regulation 4).  He submitted that L and his wife had voluntarily agreed that he would do most of the work while she earned all the money. The result was that Mr L had no remuneration from his work, nor any expectation of any, while his wife did not work 16 hours a week. That was entirely of their choosing, and the Revenue accepted that choice and its consequences for income tax purposes. But the unavoidable result was that they were both disqualified from WFTC. He had considered the relevant case law on the meaning of “remunerative work” but submitted that none was directly in point. He submitted that L’s argument ignored the fact that L had chosen voluntarily not to earn anything, and that the case must be judged on those facts, not other possibilities.

My decision

10	Mr and Mrs L can claim WFTC if, and only if, one or both of them is “when the claim is made … engaged and normally engaged in remunerative full time work” (Social Security Contributions and Benefit Act 1992, section 128(1)(b)). 

11	Regulation 4(1) of the Family Credit (General) Regulations provides that:
	“a person shall be treated as engaged in remunerative work where –
	(a) the work he undertakes is for not less than 16 hours per week;
	(b) the work is done for payment or the expectation of payment; 
	(c) he is employed at the date of claim and satisfies the requirements of paragraph (5).”
Regulation 4(5) requires that the work considered in paragraph (4) is “the work he usually does”, and that it is likely to last for at least 5 weeks after the week of claim. Regulation 4(7) provides that a person treated as engaged in remunerative work under these provisions is also to be treated as normally so engaged. 

12	As Mr Ainley noted, there have been a number of decisions of the Court of Appeal and Commissioners on the meaning and application of “remunerative work”. Reference should be made to the main approaches to the phrase as considered and set out by Millett LJ (as he then was) with the agreement of a Court including Bingham MR (as he then was) in the unreported case of Chief Adjudication Officer v Ellis (15 February 1995). That case concerned a claim for income support for a husband and wife engaged in running a small corner shop at a loss, the business having been for sale for some time.  The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Commissioner that this was not remunerative work. 

13	Giving the leading judgment, Millet LJ laid down a series of propositions setting out what he perceived to be the correct approach to interpreting the phrase. The following extracts are relevant to the facts of this case:

	“(1) The question is whether “the work is paid for or done in the expectation of payment”. That falls to be decided at the time the work is done; not at the end of a year or other period of account, but periodically and probably on a weekly basis, since that is the period with reference to which income support is calculated.
	(2) It is the character of the work and not its economic result which is decisive. The work is not required to be commercial activity or work of a kind which is normally paid for; it must be work which is in fact paid for or which is in fact done in expectation of a payment.
	…
	(5) In the case of a partnership business, a working partner may be paid a wage or salary in addition to a share of the profits. As a matter of strict legal analysis, a partner is not remunerated directly by the customer, since payments by the customer are received by the partner as agent for the partnership and not beneficially. His only legal entitlement is to a share of the profits on the taking of the partnership accounts. Had Mrs Perrot been a partner in the business her claim could not have been so easily disposed of. In the case of a small family business, especially one run by husband and wife, however, I would accept that the issue should be looked at more broadly. It will often be appropriate to treat the partnership as a single economic unit just as if it were carried on by a sole trader. 
(6) … In the case of a small family business it may be impossible to ascertain the true character of the drawings. But a partner who receives them in either capacity [as a wage or as an advance against a share of the profits] is plainly engaged in remunerative work, since they must either represent payment for the work or and advance against the payment which the partner expects to receive for her work.
…
(9) Even if the partners make no drawings, they will be engaged in remunerative work if they are carrying on the business in the expectation of receiving payment by way of a share of the profits. This does not depend on nice calculations nor on the state of the annual accounts. It depends on whether they expect to be paid by way of a share of the profits and whether that expectation is realistic. If they are engaged in an ordinary commercial activity, there will be a presumption that they are engaged in remunerative work. If the work is unremunerative, why are they working for nothing?”	

14	Applying that guidance to this case, the key questions, which it is to be stressed are questions of fact not law, are those at the beginning and end of this extract. First, what was the expectation at the time? Millett LJ’s guidance needs some modification as to defining that time. He was laying down guidance for the weekly benefit of income support, while this case concerns WFTC. The WFTC legislation provides that Millett LJ’s initial question must be asked for WFTC purposes at the date of claim. This is precisely when the Revenue and the tribunal looked at the issue, and I see no error of law on the approach taken in deciding the answer. At that time, Mr L confirmed that his wife would receive the profits, not him.  The question in the claim form is “what is your percentage share of the profit…?” and his answer is “0%”.  It is not relevant that he changed or might have changed his mind later.  Nor is the appellant assisted by the provisions of regulations 15 (normal weekly income of self-employed earners) or 22 (calculation of net profits of self-employed earners) of the Family Credit (General) Regulations 1987. These depend on there being earnings or a profit share. I can see no error of law in the factual conclusions reached by the tribunal on this evidence.  

15	The other question that Millett LJ posed was: “If the work was unremunerative, why are they working for nothing?” Mr L has also been open and honest about this. He was working for nothing because it saved income tax. As Mr Ainley accepted, Mr and Mrs L were entirely at liberty to decide to arrange their affairs in that way. This was effective for income tax for the reasons set out by Millett LJ at paragraph 5 of the above extract. These reasons were entirely different to those in the Ellis case but they are valid, and again I find no error of law in the approach of the tribunal to L’s share of the partnership profits on the agreed facts. I do not think this is a case where what Millett LJ described as a  “broad brush” approach as in paragraph (5) above applies. Mr and Mrs L were clearly fully aware of, and had made precise decisions about, dealing with the profits. I agree entirely with the comments of the tribunal chairman on this, and dismiss the appeal.        

									David Williams
									Commissioner 

									27 September 2001