Commissioner’s file: CH 2321 2002

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

1	I allow the appeal. 

2	The claimant (whom I call Mr S) is appealing with permission of the regional chairman against the decision of the Birkenhead appeal tribunal on 28 January 2002  under reference U 06 062 2001 01251. The formal issue under appeal is a decision that Mr S was overpaid housing benefit between March 1997 and October 1998. Behind  this is a dispute between some of the social services departments of Merseyside councils and some of their finance or housing departments. It is about arrangements made through an organisation known as the Merseyside Accommodation Project (MAP) for accommodating homeless or vulnerable young people in supportive surroundings in the Merseyside area. Mr  and Mrs S were landlords to three young people nominated by MAP, and housing benefit was paid to them for accommodation and services for them. Mr S was represented by the social services department of his council, Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council (the Council), while the Council itself was represented by its housing benefit officials and its Solicitor.    

3	For the reasons below, the decision of the tribunal is erroneous in law. I set it aside. The appeal is referred to a new tribunal for a full rehearing in accordance with section 14 (8) and (9) of the Social Security Act 1998.  I direct the tribunal that this appeal is properly to be considered as three separate appeals, relating to the three separate agreements with the young people. However, subject to any direction of a district chairman, it is clearly expedient that they continue to be listed and heard together.  

4	 During consideration of this appeal,  Mr S’s representatives put in evidence a letter from the local Benefits Agency that appeared to support the view of the social services department of the Council about the relevant law and not that of the housing benefit officials of the Council. I invited the Secretary of State to become a party and to express a view on the matter in dispute. I am grateful to those representing the Secretary of State for accepting this invitation.

5	I held an oral hearing of the appeal at Bury County Court on 8 January 2003. Mr S attended with his wife, and was represented by Mr Atkinson of the Welfare Benefits Advice Unit of the Council. The Council was represented by Mr Abraham, solicitor to the Council, accompanied by Mr Bailey of its housing benefit section. The Secretary of State was represented by Ms Haywood of the Office of the Solicitor to the Department for Work and Pensions. I repeat the thanks I expressed at the hearing both for the clear submissions made by all parties in writing before the hearing and for their help at the hearing.

The legal question in issue  

6	As I shall explain below, the decision to treat this as one appeal, not three, is wrong. The legal issue in question arises separately in connection with three consecutive agreements under which young people stayed with Mr and Mrs S. Each must be considered separately on its facts. But in each case, my concern is with the same question of law. Does paragraph 25 of Schedule 4 to the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987 (the Regulations)  apply to the facts of these cases?  Schedule 4 to the Regulations lists sums to be disregarded in the calculation of income other than earnings when claiming housing benefit. An earlier version of paragraph 25 was replaced by the following wording by regulation 7 of SI 1998 No 563, with effect from 1 April 1998. The new version reads:

	Any payment made by a local authority to the claimant or his partner for a 	person (“the person concerned”), who is not normally a member of the 	claimant’s household but is temporarily in his care, by 
 	(a)	a health authority;
	(b) 	a local authority;
	(c) 	a voluntary organisation; or
	(d)	the person concerned pursuant to section 26(3A) of the National 			Assistance Act 1948.	 

7	The operative wording was changed part way through the period relevant to this appeal. (Technically, it changed during the second of the three agreements, so is only relevant to that agreement). The tribunal formed the view that nothing in the amendments made in 1998 affected the present case. The parties accepted that view, and so do I. I refer to the current text, rather than the former text, to emphasise one of the difficulties in these cases. Regulation 7 of SI 1998 No 563 puts the same wording into six separate sets of regulations. Paragraph 25 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations is also:
paragraph 26 to Schedule 4 to the Council Tax Benefit (General) Regulations 1992, paragraph 27 of Schedule 9 to the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987,   paragraph 28 of Schedule 7 to the Jobseeker's Allowance Regulations 1996, 
paragraph 24 of Schedule 2 to the Family Credit (General) Regulations 1987, and paragraph 24 of Schedule 3 to the Disability Working Allowance (General) Regulations 1991. 

8	I list the various forms of the wording because they raise a general issue of law. Paragraph 26 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations was interpreted by the tribunal in the specific context of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987. I do not consider that to be the appropriate way to interpret a common rule of this sort. As is illustrated in these cases, this may lead to different authorities giving inconsistent interpretations to the rule. That is inherently undesirable and may be unfair on individuals, as again these cases illustrates. The advice of the local Benefits Agency was that Mr and Mrs S did not have to declare for income support purposes precisely those sums that the housing benefit department of the Council told them they did have to declare for housing benefit purposes, although the two authorities were applying an identically worded rule.  In my view, the specific contextual approach of the tribunal in interpreting this paragraph is wrong. Where, as here, Parliament amends all the income-related regulations at the same time and in the same way it is fair to conclude that Parliament intended to put a single rule in all those regulations and that it also intended that rule to have a common meaning in all those regulations. I therefore approach these cases by looking at the words in the general context of the schemes applying income-related benefits rather than the specific context of housing benefit.  

Background to the appeal 

9	The cases concern arrangements made by MAP to house vulnerable and/or homeless young people under 18 in Merseyside with local people who offer rooms in their homes and some level of support. Mr and Mrs S offered support through the scheme consecutively to three young people. The first of these young people was 16 when he arrived. He stayed with Mr and Mrs S for just under 9 months. The second  was 17 when he arrived. He became 18 4 months later, and left two months after that. The third was 16 when she arrived and she was still living with Mr and Mrs S two months later when Mr S’s benefit was stopped. 

10	The overpayment of housing benefit (if there was an overpayment) arose as follows. Mr and Mrs S were paid housing benefit for each of the young people in turn while they stayed with them, until October 1998. They were themselves claimants for housing benefit at the time. So the question arose whether the housing benefit paid to them for the young people formed part of their income. They understood from the Benefits Agency that they did not have to declare this income. They did not do so. The Council formed the view that the housing benefit it was paying to Mr and Mrs S was not an excluded form of income. That led to the decision on overpayment. 

11	The tenancy and financial arrangements under which Mr and Mrs S received  housing benefit for the young people were as follows. MAP reached an agreement with house owners such as Mr and Mrs S under which MAP was granted either a licence or a tenancy of a room for a nominal sum. MAP then selected and granted a licence to a young person to occupy that room. The young person agreed to claim housing benefit and to have it paid to the landlord. An application was made to the local council to pay housing benefit for the young person. The Council agreed an amount of housing benefit including an allowance for eligible services and, in these cases, paid it to Mr and Mrs S.  

12	The question at issue on these facts was whether Mr and Mrs S were correct in law in not declaring the housing benefit received from the Council for the young people as part of their own income when themselves claiming housing benefit from the Council.  That is the same question as whether that housing benefit would be income for the purposes of any claim for housing benefit, council tax benefit, income support, jobseeker’s allowance, or working families tax credit that Mr and Mrs S or anyone in a similar position to them might claim. In other words, it is not material that the failure to disclose the income was to the Council rather than the Secretary of State. 

 The tribunal decision 

13	The tribunal decided that none of the payments made by the young people came within the paragraph 25 exemption. It accepted the submission of the Council that the young people were not temporary residents with Mr and Mrs S. It also took the view that the Council was right in submitting that it was not easy to see how a person could come within the test of normal occupancy of regulation 5 of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987 (so as to be able to claim housing benefit) while at the same time being within paragraph 25. The tribunal approached paragraph 25 on the basis that “it contemplates a placement of a vulnerable person who needs care by one of the types of caring organisations specified.” It decided that payments of housing benefit were not within the scope of paragraph 25.  

Grounds of appeal 

14	Mr Atkinson rehearsed the arguments to me that he had put to the tribunal. He also buttressed them with further arguments. He pointed out that paragraph 25 was part of a group of paragraphs (23 to 26) all dealing with a common set of problems. They concern payment made by local and other statutory authorities, voluntary organisations and individuals to those looking after children or young or other vulnerable people.  Paragraph 25, when applied to young people, must be read with  paragraph 24 and the provisions in the Children Act 1989 to which it refers.  As applied to England and Wales, paragraph 24 exempts from declaration as income sums paid by a local authority to someone for arrangements under section 23(2) of the Children Act 1989 (fostering) or by a voluntary organisation under section 59(1). (Section 59 is a parallel power to that in section 23). Mr Atkinson told me that the powers in section 23(2)(f) were most important to social services departments in allowing flexible placements of children. If the local authority had placed the young people under this provision, then paragraph 24 would have applied. MAP, I was also told, was designed to help local authorities make provision under section 23. But Mr Atkinson accepted that in the less formal arrangements used by MAP in these cases it did not apply. But in his view the flexibility of the powers given to local social services departments for dealing with children needing support was reflected in paragraph 25 being alongside paragraph 24. 
 
15	Mr Atkinson took a further new point, drawing attention to part of the amendment made to paragraph 25 in 1998. The added source of income was in subparagraph (d): “the person concerned pursuant to section 26(3A) of the National Assistance Act 1948.” Section 26(3A) empowers a local authority, a “person concerned”, and a provider of premises to reach agreement for the provision of accommodation under that section. Under the subsection an agreement can be reached by which the person concerned can pay any sums that would have been paid under the 1948 Act to the provider not the local authority, and the local authority can make up the difference to the provider of the cost of the arrangement.  The amendment to paragraph 25 means that the exemption of that paragraph applies both to the sums paid by the local authority and the sums paid by the person concerned. Mr Atkinson submitted that there was a two-fold significance to new wording in paragraph 25. First, it related directly to CIS 17020 1996. The arrangement commented on by the Commissioner in that case was in fact, he submitted, a section 26 arrangement. The context in that case was the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987, but the point applied to housing benefit as well.  The amendment in paragraph 25 (and in all the other income-related regulations) was, he submitted, designed to remove the adverse effects on section 26 arrangements of the Commissioner’s decision.  Second, he submitted that the addition of the reference to section 26(3A) confirmed the general point he made about the scope of paragraph 25 and neighbouring paragraphs.

16	He then turned to the wording of paragraph 25, arguing that it should be interpreted with the social services context in mind. The key test was whether the young people had been “temporarily in the care” of Mr and Mrs S. Mr Atkinson argued that the arrangements used by MAP were inherently temporary. Alternatively he argued that the tribunal had put that test in the wrong context in looking at regulation 5 of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987. It also failed to make adequate findings of fact on whether the stays of the young people were temporary.  Consideration also needed to be given to the need for the young people to be “in the care of” the provider. 

17	In reply, Mr Abraham agreed that the argument centred on paragraph 25 and the equivalent provision for council tax benefit purposes. He did not take issue with whether MAP was or was not a “voluntary organisation “ for the purposes of paragraph 25. He submitted that it was necessary to look at the full arrangement here. MAP had rented the room from Mr and Mrs S for 1p. It then gave a licence agreement to the young person. The young person claimed housing benefit, and it was paid to Mr and Mrs S. He accepted the payments were in effect from the Council to MAP and from MAP to the landlord, but the agreement was between the young person and the landlord. 

18	The relevant provision to be applied in these cases is paragraph 42 of Schedule 4, not paragraph 25.  Mr and Mrs S were providing board and lodging. That being so, the disregard to be applied was the first £20 and 50% of the excess over £20. The other 50% was income of the claimant and should have been declared. The Council’s view was that the arrangement was a board and lodging arrangement with a minor addition of support, for which the council could and did allow housing benefit under Schedule 1 to the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987.  He took me to the general empowering section, section 130 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, and to regulation 5 of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987. Unless the conditions of regulation 5 were met, the young person could not claim housing benefit, so the application of paragraph 25 could not arise. The young person’s normal home was with Mr and Mrs S, and that was not “temporarily”. He accepted that whether or not something was “temporarily” was a question of fact, and there is no set period for reference. But the tribunal had reached a clear decision on the facts, and this was not appealable. Mr Abraham fully accepted the duty on the Director of Social Services under the Children Act, but those powers were not in issue here. This was an informal arrangement for independent living, which was not within those powers. Finally, he emphasised that the particular arrangement in these cases arose from the way in which the Council had exercised its discretion under regulation 94 of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987. If the Council had decided to pay the housing benefit to the young person, then the other side had conceded that paragraph 25 could not apply. But that was a discretion for the Council to exercise, and not part of paragraph 25. 

19	For the Secretary of State, Ms Haywood was unable to assist in terms of the specific letter written by the Benefits Agency about the application of the rule to the MAP arrangement. She accepted that the local office had indicated that the income need not be declared, but that might depend on individual facts of which she was not aware. She agreed with the argument presented by Mr Abraham for the Council on paragraph 25 on the general issues and did not agree with the Benefits Agency letter as it stood. The payment being made to Mr S was housing benefit not rent. The tribunal had considered the relevant issues, and had reached clear findings of fact. She accepted the approach that the arrangements could be not only temporary and permanent, but also indefinite. On that I was referred to CIS 17020 1996, to CS 2629 1995 and to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Adjudication Officer v Din.  It was enough to establish that they were not temporary. With regard to the issue of the young people being  members of the claimant’s household, this is a question of fact. There were relevant findings of fact on that issue in these cases.

The scope of paragraph 25

20	Paragraph 25 must be looked at not as a housing benefit rule but as a general rule in relation to income related benefits. The question is not how that paragraph is to be interpreted in the context of housing benefit, but (a) how the rule is to be interpreted as a general provision relating to the assessment of non-earned income for an income-related benefit claim and (b) how it is to be applied to Mr S’s housing benefit claim. To that extent, arguments about the interpretation of paragraph 25 that rest on provisions exclusively in the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987, such as regulation 5, may mislead. 

21	I accept the argument of Mr Atkinson about the context of paragraph 25 in the Schedule. That paragraph is surrounded by similar paragraphs in each of its contexts in the schedules of non-earned income disregards.  Paragraphs 23 to 26 of Schedule 4 to the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987 are paralleled, for example, by paragraphs 25 to 28 of Schedule 9 to the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987. When one of these sets of provisions is amended, so is the other. That context confirms that paragraph 25 is part of a policy of allowing those claiming income-related benefits to receive sums of income for providing accommodation, supervision or care without any if it being offset against income related benefits. They provide incentives to the providers, allowing them to make a personal gain from helping individuals and public authorities in this way. If these provisions did not exist, there might be no point in people like Mr and Mrs S helping out in the way they have. They would lose in benefit much, or all, that they gained in income. That aim is clearly different from the aim of paragraph 42 of Schedule 4 and its equivalents. They provide a rough and ready rule for offsetting the cost of providing the board and lodging from the income.  They are not exempting provisions in the same sense as is paragraph 25. 

22	I also accept Mr Atkinson’s submission that the intention behind the MAP arrangements was to provide accommodation for young people in a less formal way than under the Children Act, and perhaps also to similar effect but separately from the National Assistance Act. But it is precisely because the arrangements were not made expressly under those Acts that these cases arise. Had those provisions been used, then paragraph 23, 24, 25 or, as the case may be, paragraph 26 would have applied.  Mr Atkinson criticised the decision in CIS 17020 1996 because it did not recognise arrangements that were or could have been made under one of those sections. It was not considered, it seems, because no one mentioned this possibility to the Commissioner. That concerns me somewhat in these cases, as those paragraphs give a raft of powers to local authorities and others to pay for the accommodation of children and other disadvantaged people. I was taken through some but not all of those powers. I assume nonetheless that the local authorities have power to enter into the MAP arrangements, and to place young people through them. I am told that it is a scheme into which several local authorities have entered. 

23	Are the paragraphs of which paragraph 25 forms part are intended to cover all similar arrangements under which local authorities directly or indirectly help children or vulnerable young people, or only some of them.? Given the clear policy objectives of these paragraphs, I cannot see any fair basis for giving the incentives to some providers of accommodation and not others. I would expect the paragraphs between them to give a comprehensive cover, unless a clear limitation is established. I find no such limit here. In particular, I dismiss approaches to these cases that subject the arrangements to the criticism that they are “artificial”.  Either they are within the powers of the Council or they are not.  None of the parties in these cases has suggested that they are not. 

24	I was referred to the official guidance manual issued by the Department to local authorities to explain the rule, and to its quotation without comment in CPAG’s Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Legislation. The paragraph is illustrated as covering the case of temporary respite care for an elderly/disabled person so that a principal family carer can go on holiday. The attempt to argue from this that paragraph 25 is limited to such cases is unpersuasive. The commentaries in the standard works about the equivalent paragraphs in the other regulations are just as relevant. That about the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 paragraph does not mention this point and deals only with CIS 17020 1996. 

25	I therefore approach paragraph 25 as a provision allowing some additional flexibility to paying authorities or organisations to make payments outside the scope of the specific powers in the adjoining paragraphs to those receiving benefits where those recipients help others with accommodation and support. I approach the MAP arrangement as one way in which local authorities can help young people within their statutory powers and duties. Nonetheless, the paragraph is an exemption and it is for a claimant to show that he or she is within it. 

The application of paragraph 25

26	To qualify within paragraph 25, the claimant must show on the balance of probabilities that the payment for which he is claiming exemption: was paid:
(a)	to him, 
(b)	by one of the listed payers,
(c)	for someone who is not normally a member of his household, and
(d)	while that person is temporarily in the recipient’s care.
I deal with each in turn.

(a) payment to the claimant

27	This is a matter of fact, and is not in doubt. It is not relevant to the interpretation of this provision that the sum could have been paid to someone else. 

(b) payment by a listed payer 

28	It is not in question that the payments, if made by MAP, were made by a voluntary body. Alternatively, they were made by the local authority. Either alternative is expressly within paragraph 25. That distinguishes them from CIS 17020 1996. 

(c) “not normally a member of the household”

29	This test must be met before, and not at the same time as, the test of “temporarily”.  It is only if the individual is “not normally” part of the claimant’s household that the test of  “temporarily” need be applied. It follows that if a person becomes normally a part of the claimant’s household then the test of “temporarily” no loner applies. The tribunal did not comment on this aspect of paragraph 25. It seems not to have been in dispute that the young people were not normally part of the household of Mr and Mrs S. They clearly were not when they arrived. Mr and Mrs S had not met them before. But once they had arrived and moved in, they became members of the household.  Did that become “normal”, and if so when?  That needs to be considered separately in each of the cases. 

(d) “temporarily in his care”  
30	This applies only to those who are not, and have not become, normally members of the claimant’s household.  It imports two qualifying criteria: that the arrangement is temporary, and that it is an arrangement involving care. The tribunal found, partly as fact and partly as an application of the MAP scheme, that these criteria were not met. At paragraph 23 of the decision the tribunal decided:

… in my judgment the payments of housing benefit made under regulations 93 or 94 HB regulations to Mr S on behalf of his tenant do not count as payments within the meaning of paragraph 25. I do not accept that these were payments of the character envisaged by paragraph 25. As I have indicated, that paragraph seems to me to refer to payments made by the sponsoring organisation for the care of the person being placed. The direct payments of housing benefit is not of itself enough to bring a payment within paragraph 25. 

31	I do not agree with that reasoning or conclusion. As the Council accepted, and as was the fact in these cases, housing benefit can contain elements for support services: Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987, Schedules 1 and 1B. Further, the payment of housing benefit was part of an arrangement and not paid by or of itself.  There were contributions from the young people. In any event I see no reason why, given the policy of the paragraphs of which paragraph 25 is part, housing benefit should not be within them where it is paid “of itself”.  Part of the task of the Council is to find both accommodation and support for vulnerable and homeless young people. The aim of MAP is to provide both at the same time. The housing benefit scheme makes provision for just such cases and that provision was used here. I see no reason why a payment of housing benefit in these circumstances cannot be within paragraph 25. I conclude that as a matter of law a payment of housing benefit by a local authority to a claimant can be within paragraph 25 and its equivalents, and I must conclude that the tribunal erred in law in deciding otherwise. Whether it is, or is not, is a question of fact. In that context it must be decided if in fact the young people, or any of them, were “in the care” of Mr and Mrs S.  And it may be of importance in deciding that issue that the second young person became 18 during the period of his stay. Was he “in the care” of Mr and Mrs S after that?

32	If the young people were in the care of Mr and Mrs S, and not part (or not yet part) of their household, the crucial test is whether all or each of them were in the household of Mr and Mrs S, and in their care, temporarily.  Ms Haywood submitted that this question was to be dealt with in the same way as outlined by the Court of Appeal in Chief Adjudication Officer v Din and others (unreported, 16 March 1994). In that case Neill LJ laid down tests to be applied by tribunals (and Commissioners) in applying the provision about “temporarily absent from Great Britain”.  He emphasised that it is a question of fact, with the burden of proof on the claimant. He also set out the following guides: “the quality of the absence may change with the passage of time”; “the fact that no date is fixed for the claimant’s return does not prevent the absence from being temporary”; “the intention expressed by the claimant will always be relevant although it is not decisive”; “the absence contemplated [by the rule] is an absence for a limited period only”. 

33	The findings of the tribunal were that each of the young people were not “temporarily” in the care of Mr and Mrs S. In part, that reasoning was based on whether the young people could or could not claim housing benefit under regulation 5 of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987 (where the test is that they “normally occupied “ the place for which they were claiming benefit). For the reasons above, I do not consider that that is more than one of the factual issues relevant to deciding if the stay was temporary. In particular, the approach of the tribunal of “reading the HB Regulations as a whole” to emphasise the importance of regulation 5 is misplaced, and puts too much weight on that one aspect of the facts. But I am also concerned that the tribunal did not explore two of the points emphasised by Neill LJ. What did Mr and Mrs S intend when they took on each of the young people? What did the young people intend? There are no findings about the former issue, and nothing at all in the papers about what the young people themselves intended. The only finding is that MAP intended it to be temporary. The other is that the arrangement may have started as a temporary arrangement but then changed to one that was not temporary.  

34	I see only one problem in applying the judgments in Din to these cases. Sections 8 and 12 of the Social Security Act 1998 prevent the tribunal using the benefit of hindsight. Events must be looked at as they were up to and at the date of the original decision. If there is any later change, the process of supersession must be used.  It is therefore irrelevant to the determination of these cases that the third young person moved out of Mr and Mrs S’s house only two and a half years later, unless the parties had assumed a lengthy stay in the first few weeks of the stay.  If it is correct, as the tribunal records, that Mr and Mrs S, and also the young person, assumed that the stay would only be for a couple of weeks when she arrived, I do not see how as a matter of law it could be other than temporary at that time, whatever might have happened later. The initial quality of the stay cannot be altered retrospectively by later changes.   

My decision 

35	The tribunal erred in law in its view of the payment of housing benefit under paragraph 25 and in the findings and absence of findings it made. I set the decision aside. I cannot myself take the decision that the tribunal should have taken. I do not consider that the facts about the temporary nature of the stays of the three young people, about the care they were given, or about whether (and if so when) they became members of the household of Mr and Mrs S are sufficiently clearly found for me to use them to reach my own decision. I am not sure what the expectations of Mr and Mrs S, or the individual young person, were at the start of each of the stays. The appearance seems to be that each started as a temporary stay, but that the stays may have ceased to be temporary, may have ceased to be arrangements under which Mr and Mrs S provided “care” and indeed may have become arrangements under which the young person had “normally” become a member of the household of Mr and Mrs S. If any of those changes occurred, then it must be considered if at some time, and if so which time, the stay ceased to be a temporary stay within the scope of the paragraph.

36	 I therefore direct that the cases be referred to another tribunal to consider the appeal in the light of this decision. That tribunal should consider, in connection separately with each of the young people, whether those representing Mr and Mrs S have established on the balance of probabilities that the criteria in paragraph 25 were met for all or any part of the time that the young person stayed with Mr and Mrs S.  It must look at the appeal as a series of cases, not a single case. I direct the tribunal that for the purposes of applying paragraph 25 to these cases the payment of housing benefit can be a payment within the scope of the paragraph and that the arrangement entered into by the authority, MAP, the young person, and Mr and Mrs S in each case is to be looked at as a valid transaction within the powers of the Council. There is an overpayment of housing benefit and of council tax benefit to Mr and Mrs S only if there is a period, or there are periods, when the criteria in paragraph 25 were not met. 

The overpayment question

37	I add one final point if the tribunal finds that there was an overpayment, or overpayments.  Mr and Mrs S appear to have acted under the guidance of both the Council (through its social services department) and the Benefits Agency. If that is in fact so, consideration should be given to whether any official error by the Council (and not merely the housing benefit department) and/or the Benefits Agency caused the overpayment. 

								David Williams
								Commissioner

								30 January 2003
[Signed on the original on the date shown]