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	United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) >> Campbell v Cammarano & Ors (HOUSING - RENT REPAYMENT ORDER - procedure - the First-tier Tribunal's statutory power to review its decisions - nature of a review - natural justice - matters relevant to the quantum of a rent repayment order - the need for findings of fact in response to evidence of fact) [2025] UKUT 122 (LC) (04 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/LC/2025/122.html Cite as: [2025] UKUT 122 (LC)

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)
APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER
FTT Ref: LON00AM/HMF/2022/0200

		Royal Courts of Justice
		4 April 2025

TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007

HOUSING – RENT REPAYMENT ORDER – procedure– the First-tier Tribunal's statutory power to review its decisions – nature of a review – natural justice – matters relevant to the quantum of a rent repayment order – the need for findings of fact in response to evidence of fact

The following cases were referred to in this decision:

London Borough of Waltham Forest v Marble Properties (London) Limited [2025] UKUT 2 (LC)

Point West GR Ltd v Bassi [2020] 1 WLR 4102

Introduction

1. In London Borough of Waltham Forest v Marble Properties (London) Limited [2025] UKUT 2 (LC) the Tribunal (the Deputy Chamber President, Martin Rodger KC) observed at paragraph 1 that the temptation for the First-tier Tribunal to review a decision of its own should usually be resisted, and he referred to the Court of Appeal's decision in Point West GR Ltd v Bassi [2020] 1 WLR 4102. The present decision is a similar cautionary tale about the difficulties that can arise on a review.
2. This is an appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal to make rent repayment orders against the appellant, Mr Campbell, in favour of the respondents Ms Cammarano, Mr Juurlink, Ms Villaescusa and Mr Costello. The appellant presented his own case in the appeal, and the respondents were represented at the hearing by Ms Stephanie Alvarez of counsel; I am grateful to them both.
3. The respondents are all former tenants of 58 George Downing Estate, London N16. In September 2022 they applied to the FTT for a rent repayment order pursuant to sections 40 and following of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 on the basis that the property was a house in multiple occupation ("HMO") which required an HMO licence and did not have one. The FTT conducted a hearing, and by its decision dated 11 April 2023 ("the 2023 decision") it made rent repayments orders in favour of each respondent against the appellant as their landlord amounting to £15,916.95 in total. In response to his application for permission to appeal the FTT decided to review the 2023 decision, because it accepted that he had had insufficient time to make his submissions at the hearing; in order to do so it conducted a further hearing on 8 May 2024 at which it heard his submissions but no further evidence. The respondents were represented but did not attend. The FTT issued its reviewed decision on 22 July 2024 ("the 2024 reviewed decision"), and the appellant has permission, granted by this Tribunal, to appeal it on two grounds. It will be useful first to look at the nature of the FTT's power to review its decisions before setting out in more detail what was decided by the FTT in 2023 and in 2024 and considering the grounds of appeal.

The FTT's power to review a decision

4. Section 9 of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ("the 2007 Act") provides:

"(1)  The First-tier Tribunal may review a decision made by it on a matter in a case..,

…

(4)  Where the First-tier Tribunal has under subsection (1) reviewed a decision, the First-tier Tribunal may in the light of the review do any of the following–

(a)  correct accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the decision;

(b)  amend reasons given for the decision;

(c)  set the decision aside.

(5)  Where under subsection (4)(c) the First-tier Tribunal sets a decision aside, the First-tier Tribunal must either–

(a)  re-decide the matter concerned, or

(b)  refer that matter to the Upper Tribunal."

5. Section 9(3) (not set out above) provides that tribunal procedure rules may restrict the power to review, and rule 55 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 ("the tribunal rules") provides:

"(1) The Tribunal may only undertake a review of a decision—

(a)  pursuant to rule 53 (review on an application for permission to appeal); and

(b)  if it is satisfied that a ground of appeal is likely to be successful."

6. The statutory power conferred by section 9(1) of the 2007 Act is for the FTT to review a decision "on a matter in a case"; likewise in section 9(5) it is said that the FTT must re-decide "the matter" or refer it to the Upper Tribunal. In Point West at paragraph 35 the Court of Appeal said:

"35.  Where the FTT undertakes a review of one of its own decisions, it must make it clear which parts (if any) of that decision it is prepared to review and, following the carrying out of the review, which parts (if any) of that decision it intends to set aside."

7. Accordingly the power to review must be exercised in relation to one or more specific matters in a decision. The question the FTT has to ask itself in considering the grounds of appeal is whether an appeal is likely to succeed, and if it is satisfied about that it can review its decision by correcting errors, amending reasons, or setting the decision aside (sub-section (4)). A hearing will rarely be needed; if the FTT takes the view that something may have gone wrong but that it needs to conduct a hearing in order to determine whether or not it has, alarm bells should ring. In such a case the answer is not to review the decision, because the condition in rule 55(1)(b) is not satisfied, but to grant permission to appeal on the basis that the appellant has an arguable ground of appeal.
8. So much for the legal basis of review. I noted in paragraph 3 above the legal background to the respondents' application to the FTT, namely the power conferred by the Housing and Planning Act 2016 to make a rent repayment order against a landlord who has committed certain offences, including the offence under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 of managing an HMO which required a licence and did not have one. I do not need to go into that legal background any further because it was not in issue in the appeal.

The FTT's 2023 and 2024 decisions

9. I am going to refer to the parties as "the tenants" and "Mr Campbell", to avoid the confusion that can flow from the fact that in the FTT the respondents to this appeal were the applicants and Mr Campbell the appellant was the respondent.
10. The tenants' application to the FTT was made against both Mr Campbell and Ms Damaris Sanders. The FTT heard the application on 9 March 2023, by video link; the tenants were represented by Mr Clark Barrett of Represent Law, and Mr Campbell was unrepresented. The FTT's 2023 decision addressed, first, two preliminary issues: (1) it admitted documents provided late by the parties, comprising information about licensing from the tenants and Mr Campbell's financial information, and (2) it determined that Mr Campbell was the appropriate respondent. It appears that Ms Sanders was at the time the registered proprietor of the property, but Mr Campbell told the FTT that that was a temporary arrangement and that the property was being transferred back to him. In a written statement in his bundle in the FTT Mr Campbell said:

"Ms Sanders is the Trustee on behalf of the J Campbell who is the sole beneficiary and landlord for the tenancies. All responsibilities and benefits in regard to the property accrues to myself, J Campbell, only."

11. The tenants, too, said that Mr Campbell was their landlord and that they paid rent to him. Accordingly the FTT accepted that Mr Campbell was the landlord and struck out the application against Ms Sanders.
12. The next section of the 2023 decision was headed "The issues". The FTT found that the property had been unlicensed throughout the tenants' occupation (they lived there for different periods between September 2020 and April 2022), and that therefore Mr Campbell had committed the offence under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 of controlling or managing an unlicensed HMO. It noted that he applied for a licence on 10 September 2022. The FTT decided that he did not have a reasonable excuse, that it was appropriate to make a rent repayment orders, and that he must repay 70% of the rent for the relevant 12-month period to each of the tenants, after deductions for utilities.
13. In deciding the quantum of the order the FTT said that it was "very concerned by aspects of the landlord's conduct", for example, the management of the property and in particular the fact that Mr Campbell "used the tenancy conditions to ensure the property was properly run" (paragraph 111 of the 2023 decision). It was concerned about his "relaxed attitude" to the protection of the tenants' deposits (Mr Campbell admitted that he had been slow to protect the deposits), and by the tone of some of his communications in connection with the deposit. It expressed concern about persistent damp but said it was difficult to work out the cause; it acknowledged Mr Campbell's evidence that the damp came from a leak in an upstairs flat without making a finding about that evidence. It expressed "a major concern" about the size of the accommodation but noted Mr Campbell's evidence that each bedroom was above the minimum standard for room sizes; it said that because of the lack of communal space other than the kitchen the property was unlikely to be licenced for four separate households once it was inspected by the local housing authority. It expressed "serious concern" about the fire alarm, which the FTT raised on its own initiative (paragraph 80 of the 2023 decision; it was not mentioned by the tenants in their witness statements). It said at its paragraph 119:

"The tribunal notes that the points it has raised about the conditions of the property may well suggest that category 1 hazards under the Housing Act 2004 exist at the property. The elimination of hazards is one of the aims of the London Borough of Hackney licensing provision and their potential existence concerns the tribunal."

14. I pause to note that it is the role of courts and tribunals to make findings, not to express concerns. The "potential existence" of hazards, whatever that means, cannot be a relevant consideration in the determination of the amount of a rent repayment order. Nor can "concerns". The parties have given evidence and are entitled to findings of fact on the evidence they have given. Furthermore, in raising concerns itself when they formed no part of either party's case the FTT was treading dangerous ground.

The decision to review

15. The applicant sought permission to appeal on extensive grounds. He disagreed with all aspects of the FTT's 2023 decision, including the finding that he was the landlord of the property. He complained that the FTT had raised matters about which the tenants had not complained. He asserted that the FTT was biassed. He said this:

"8. We also assert that the hearing was unfair because the Tribunal allowed too much time to the Applicants to make their case repeatedly over 6 hours (from 10am to 4:50pm), and put the Respondent under undue suggestive verbal pressure on the respondent to make his case quickly and cut the presentation of his case short. …

9. The case was originally listed for 3 hours, however all 4 applicants were allowed exhaustive time to make their case, for the most part repeating the same assertions between applicants and so entrenching repetition bias.

10. The Respondent was allowed to question the first two applicants, although the time allowed to the cross examination was curtailed. However, by lunch break (and expiry of the allotted time) only two applicants had been heard. All of the afternoon was taken up by hearing the next two applicants. Under pressure of time, the Tribunal Chair denied the Respondent the right to question the last two applicants. The Tribunal Chair … told the Landlord that he need not make his points as she would read them later.

11. The landlord finally got to make his statement as 4:50pm. [The judge] put undue time pressure on the landlord to be quick, that she had not placed on any of the applicants. She asked "how long will this take, Mr Campbell". [The judge] repeated that she would "read the Respondent's points", which we find completely unacceptable.

12. As a result of this undue pressure, the Respondent asserts that he failed to make key points."

16. In response, the FTT gave directions on 1 June 2023 and said that it would review the 2023 decision because

" …the tribunal has considered and taken into account the points now raised by the respondent. In particular, the tribunal considers that it was of the mistaken view that the Respondent had been given sufficient opportunity to state his case. It now appears that this was not the case and the tribunal's original decision may therefore be incorrect or based on incorrect information.

3. The tribunal considers that the applicant should make a response to the request for permission to appeal and the matter will then be considered afresh, by way of review. That review will be by way of a face to face hearing …"

17. That hearing took place on 8 May 2024 and the 2024 reviewed decision was issued on 22 July 2024. In that decision the FTT reiterated its finding that Mr Campbell was the landlord. It considered again the condition of the property and Mr Campbell's financial circumstances, reproducing the text of the 2023 decision but adding material in light of Mr Campbell's further submissions, and it decided that he should repay 60%, instead of 70%, of the rent after deductions.
18. In his application for permission to appeal the 2024 reviewed decision Mr Campbell challenged specific findings on the basis that despite the review hearing they remained unfair. In granting permission to appeal the Tribunal said this:

"The only decision which is open to appeal is the FTT's reviewed decision of 22 July 2024, but the circumstances in which that decision came to be made appear to have been irregular, and the decision itself reads in places as the FTT's dismissal of an appeal against its own previous conclusions (for example at paragraph 144 and in its greatly extended discussion of the condition of the property, room size, fire precautions etc in response to the applicant's grounds of appeal). The FTT decided to review its original decision because it considered that an appeal was likely to succeed on the grounds that the initial hearing had been unfair as the applicant had been prevented from making submissions due to a shortage of time. In those circumstances those parts of the decision in which the FTT revisits and bolsters its original conclusions are at risk of being undermined by the same unfairness."

19. In light of that, permission to appeal was given on two grounds; the first challenged the FTT's decision that the appellant was the landlord of the property, and the second challenged the quantum of the rent repayment orders including the FTT's findings about the condition of the property and the appellant's financial circumstances. Permission to appeal was refused on a further ground, namely that the FTT should have found that the appellant had a reasonable excuse for not having an HMO licence on the basis that the appellant could not have been expected to know about the licensing requirement; the Tribunal took the view that there was no realistic prospect of success on that ground.

Ground 1: the finding that Mr Campbell was the landlord

20. The identity of the landlord was addressed by the FTT in its 2023 decision as a preliminary matter which was not in issue between the parties. It is clear from the discussion in the 2023 decision that Mt Campbell's wanted to have the application against Ms Sanders struck out, and that the tenants agreed that he was the landlord. They produced copies of their tenancy agreements naming him as landlord, signed by him, and bank statements showing that they paid their rent to him. This was a matter dealt with at the start of the hearing and was a matter on which the parties were agreed.
21. In its 2024 reviewed decision the FTT explained that Mr Campbell had produced at the review hearing counterpart copies of some of the tenants' tenancy agreements, bearing the same signatures as the original, but with the landlord's name stated to be Fixbrook Consultancy Limited. He also produced some Deposit Protection Certificates on which the landlord was stated to be Fixbrook Consultancy Limited. He argued that that company was the landlord and that he was not. The FTT said that it was not going to revisit the identity of the landlord when it had been told by Mr Campbell at the first hearing that he was the landlord and that he had failed to challenge the tenants' evidence that he was the landlord.
22. At the hearing of the appeal Mr Campbell said that he written statement to the FTT that he was the landlord (paragraph 10 above) was a mistake. He said that his objective was to get the application against Ms Sanders struck out and therefore needed an unambiguous statement. He claimed that he shared on screen at the first (video) hearing the documents naming Fixbrook Consultancy Limited. He claimed that the tenancy agreements in the bundle, naming him as landlord, had had his name as landlord filled in by the tenants after he had signed the agreements in blank. However, he agreed at the appeal hearing that he was Ms Villaescusa's landlord.
23. Permission to appeal on this ground was granted on the basis that there was some confusion at the first hearing about the identity of the landlord, and that in light of the FTT's acknowledgement that Mr Campbell was pressed for time at the original hearing it was arguable that when the point was developed at the second hearing the FTT had already made up its mind so that the 2024 reviewed decision was itself unfair. It is clear to me that that was not the case. It is important to note that the discussion of the identity of the landlord took place at the start of the original hearing, before there was any time pressure. It was a point on which the parties were agreed and the FTT agreed with the parties; it was an uncontroversial point on which Mr Campbell's written statement, his oral evidence, the tenants' evidence and the tenants' documents were consistent. As to Mr Campbell's written statement, if it was his case at the original hearing that Fixbrook Consultancy Limited was the landlord he would have said so in that written statement and would have argued not only that the application against Ms Sanders should be struck out but also that the application against him should be struck out.
24. I do not accept that Mr Campbell shared on screen, at the original hearing, documents bearing the name of Fixbrook Consultancy Limited. The FTT stated that the documents he introduced afresh at that hearing were about his financial circumstances. Fixbrook Consultancy Limited was not part of the discussion at the original hearing, and the company was first referred to in Mr Campbell's grounds of appeal after the original hearing. In those grounds he referred to the counterpart agreements and said that they "will be presented should the Appeal be granted"; there was no suggestion that the FTT had seen them already.
25. On that basis it was correct for the FTT to refuse to revisit the identity of the landlord. It had indeed made up its mind, but on the basis of a point that was uncontroversial at the original hearing and where Mr Campbell had made it clear in writing and orally that he was the landlord at a time when there is not suggestion that he was being hurried along. There is no basis on which the FTT's repetition in its 2024 reviewed decision of its finding that he was the landlord can be said to have been unfair.

Ground 2: the quantum of the rent repayment orders

26. The quantum of the rent repayment orders was a major issue between the parties.
27. Section 44(4) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 says this:

"(4)  In determining the amount [of a rent repayment order] the tribunal must, in particular, take into account—

(a)  the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,

(b)  the financial circumstances of the landlord, and

(c)  whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies.

28. The FTT in its 2023 decision looked at the conduct of the parties and the financial circumstances of the landlord (as Mr Campbell had no criminal convictions). In terms of conduct, the FTT focussed on the condition and management of the property; its observations are summarised at paragraph 13 above. The question in the appeal is whether the FTT put right, on review, what it agreed had gone wrong at the first hearing. It is important to be clear that the FTT acknowledged, in its decision to review (paragraph 16 above) that the first hearing was unfair because Mr Campbell did not have time to make his submissions.
29. At the hearing of the appeal Ms Alvarez sought to argue that that was not the case. She was not present at the first hearing but her instructions from Mr Barrett were that none of the tenants gave oral evidence in chief so that there was time for Mr Campbell to cross-examine them all, and that Mr Campbell himself gave evidence and was cross-examined. That was in marked contrast to Mr Campbell's account of the proceedings; according to him, all four tenants gave evidence in chief, that there was only time for him to question two of them, he did not get to open his case until 4:50pm, ten or 15 minutes before the end of the day, and he was not cross-examined on his own evidence.
30. It is too late for the tenants to challenge Mr Campbell's account of what happened at the original hearing. They chose not to respond to his original grounds of appeal despite the FTT's directions (paragraph 16 above); they did not challenge his account of the 2023 hearing in their response, filed in the Upper Tribunal, to his grounds of appeal against the 2023 decision nor in counsel's skeleton argument. When asked why the point had not been raised before Ms Alvarez suggested that it was clear from the 2023 and 2024 decisions that Mr Campbell had cross-examined all four witnesses and had himself been cross-examined. None of the paragraphs to which Ms Alvarez took me goes anywhere near to suggesting that.
31. Ms Alvarez also challenged Mr Campbell's assertion that he had not been able to cross-examine all the tenants, on the basis that the FTT in its decision to review mentioned the lack of time for him to make is submissions but did not say that there had been any problem about cross-examination. However, if Mr Campbell had cross-examined all four tenants, contrary to what he said in his grounds, it is hard to understand why the FTT would not have said so in its response to his grounds of appeal. In the 2024 reviewed decision the FTT reiterated without comment Mr Campbell's assertion that he had not been able to cross-examine all the tenants.
32. Accordingly I accept Mr Campbell's account of what happened at the 2023 hearing; crucially it is clear that the FTT did so too.
33. In circumstances where the FTT accepted that the original hearing had been unfair it is difficult to see how a review of the 2023 decision by way of a further hearing for submissions only could possibly have put things right. The thinking appears to have been that the hearing was incomplete, because Mr Campbell was rushed at the end of the day; in effect he was being given at the review hearing the opportunity to say what he wanted to say when he opened his case at 4:50 p.m. in the first hearing (the parties to the appeal do agree that that hearing ended soon after 5 p.m.). But that gives rise to two problems. One is that if Mr Campbell was not able to cross-examine all the tenants at the hearing in March 2023 a review hearing in the absence of the tenants could not remedy that, in circumstances where there were issues of fact between the parties about the condition of the property. The other is that by 1 June 2023 the FTT had already made its decision. Unless the outcome of the reviewed decision was completely different from the 2023 decision it was bound to be open to the criticism that the FTT's mind was already made up and that therefore that Mr Campbell did not get and could not have a fair hearing in May 2024, contrary to the rules of natural justice.
34. For all those reasons the review hearing should not have been conducted; not only was it a review outside the scope of the statute, because the FTT did not state the "matter" that was under review, but also it was not going to be possible for the review to remedy the unfairness of the original hearing. The FTT should have set aside its 2023 decision and conducted a fresh hearing, in accordance with section 9(5) of the 2007 Act.
35. Nevertheless, at the hearing of the appeal Ms Alvarez argued that the 2024 reviewed decision was fair because the FTT considered Mr Campbell's further submissions at length, and because the FTT changed its decision, moving from repayment of 70% of the rent to 60%. That argument cannot succeed, for the following reasons.
36. The first is that the 2024 reviewed decision repeated the 2023 decision's expressions of concern with which Mr Campbell disagreed, as well as some limited findings of fact for example about the presence of damp. That could not be fair where the appellant had had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. That alone means the decision has to be set aside.
37. The other reason is that it is clear from the 2024 reviewed decision that there had been no real re-think and that the FTT's mind was already made up. I say that for a number of reasons.
38. First, the 2024 reviewed decision repeated almost verbatim the text of the 2023 decision, with the addition of paragraphs setting out Mr Campbell's submissions and further paragraphs addressing some (but not all) of them). The thinking in the 2023 decision remains in place, with additions but without change.
39. Second, despite the fact that the FTT had now heard Mr Campbell's submissions it still expressed "concerns" rather than making findings of fact. For example, the FTT recorded Mr Campbell's submissions that the tenants had chosen to find their own replacements when they left, and had been paid a fee for finding the replacement, and his explanation of the procedures for testing smoke alarms and that the this was not the tenants' responsibility. But it made no findings as to whether what Mr Campbell said was true; it simply repeated verbatim paragraph 111 of the 2023 decision (see paragraph 13 above) with its expressions of concern. That was in any event not a proper basis on which the FTT could make a decision about the quantum of rent repayment; but it also reinforces the impression that at the review hearing, again, Mr Campbell had not had a fair hearing.
40. Third, the FTT failed to take on board the implications of the fact that by the time of the review hearing an HMO licence had been issued for the property. The licence set out the size of the rooms and yet was issued without conditions, and it is impossible to understand why the FTT stated in paragraph 162 of the 2024 reviewed decision that the "cramped nature of the accommodation" was relevant to the landlord's conduct and therefore to the amount of the rent repayment order. Furthermore, the FTT repeated its expressions of concern about fire precautions, adding a number of paragraphs to its discussion of the fire alarm including some observations based on the panel's own on-line research (paragraphs 150 to 156). At paragraph 157 it repeated verbatim the entirety of the text of paragraph 119 of its 2023 decision, including the reference to the "potential existence" of category 1 hazards, and then went on to say that it took into account the fact that a licence had been granted without conditions. But it is impossible to see in what way it did so. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the FTT was endeavouring to bolster its imprecisely expressed concern about the alarm system, about which neither the tenants in their witness statements nor the local housing authority in the HMO licence had complained.
41. Where a property is unlicensed and the FTT makes findings of fact (rather than merely expressing concern) that there are hazards, or failures to meet regulatory requirements, which indicate that it could not be licensed, that might be relevant to its consideration of the landlord's conduct; but where a licence has been issued despite the matters that are worrying the FTT then those matters should not influence the amount of the rent repayment order. It is for the local housing authority to enforce housing standards, and for the FTT to hear appeals where they are brought against enforcement action; it is not for the FTT to police those standards on its own initiative.
42. Finally, there is no reasoning to explain why the amount ordered to be repaid was 60% in the 2024 reviewed decision instead of the 70% ordered in the 2023 decision. Perhaps the reduction was made because of the grant of the HMO licence? The FTT did not say, and the impression is given that this was a token reduction.
43. The FTT's comments about Mr Campbell's financial circumstances were set out in the 2023 decision in a paragraph following its determination of the amount of the rent repayment order, and included a comment to the effect that the FTT was "not convinced" that his tax return was accurate. In the 2024 reviewed decision most of that paragraph was repeated, but not the comment about the tax return; and a sentence was added reiterating the FTT's conclusion that Mr Campbell's financial circumstances did not justify a reduction in the amount of the award. It is impossible to understand from that revised paragraph whether and how Mr Campbell's further submissions about his financial circumstances had affected the FTT's reasoning.
44. For all those reasons Ms Alvarez's argument that the FTT properly reconsidered its decision on quantum, and cured the unfairness in the 2023 decision, cannot succeed. The FTT's decision on the quantum of the order has to be set aside.

Conclusion

45. The FTT's finding that Mr Campbell was the landlord of the property stands. Its decision as to the quantum of the award is set aside in its entirety and is remitted to the FTT for a re-hearing before a different panel. That panel will hear the matter afresh, on the basis of witness statements and other material already filed, including material that has come to light since the 2023 decision including the HMO licence itself. It is a matter for that panel whether to direct further evidence including a witness statement from Mr Campbell so that his evidence can be properly tested.
46. If the tenants wish to pursue their application they must apply to the FTT for directions within 28 days of the date of this decision.

Upper Tribunal Judge Elizabeth Cooke

4 April 2025

Amended in paragraph 10 pursuant to rule 53

15 April 2025

Right of appeal 

Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision.  The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal's decision on costs is sent to the parties).  An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.  If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.